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Presentation
Immigration is one of the social and demographic phenomena that has most 
transformed Spanish society in the last two decades. Currently, foreigners 
constitute approximately 12% of the population of Spain, a proportion similar to 
that found in European countries with a long tradition as recipients of migration 
flows. 
The increase in the number of immigrants has been the result of sustained 
economic growth, and this influx of workers from other countries, both men 
and women, has provided plentiful, flexible and relatively cheap labour in 
sectors such as construction, agriculture and services. It is also noteworthy 
that this sociodemographic transformation has taken place up until now 
without significant social tension or conflict. 
However, this situation may be changing since the onset of the serious economic 
crisis which began in Spain in 2007 with its corresponding dramatic increase in 
unemployment, budget cuts and cuts in social services. In this context, some sectors 
of Spanish society have begun to question not only the arrival of new immigrants, but 
the role of those already present and their impact on the welfare state and its future 
sustainability. These types of debates, too often based on prejudices or stereotypes 
not supported by the evidence, demand rigorous and objective analysis based on 
empirical data. It is in just such a context that this study acquires special importance.
In its analysis of immigration and its relationship to the welfare state, the present 
study provides data and reflection in three respects. First, the authors examine 
immigrants’ access to and use of the health care and education systems and 
social services, highlighting inequalities affecting immigrant groups which 
should be the object of policies aimed at responding to the challenges of equality 
and equity.
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Secondly, the authors analyze the contribution of immigrants to Spain’s social 
protection system, whether through their social security contributions and taxes 
or through their employment in the system for the provision of personal services 
and care, in which oftentimes working in an irregular situation, they help to 
resolve the difficulties of a welfare regime strained by social change caused by 
both an ageing population and the growing participation of women in the labour 
market. Based on this analysis, the authors raise the issue of the economic 
sustainability of the Spanish welfare state in the face of the challenges it must 
address in the future.
Lastly, the study presents data on the evolution of attitudes in Spanish 
society toward immigrants, and in particular regarding the access of 
immigrants to social protection systems. This analysis, also using data from 
other neighbouring countries, offers indications of the risk of conflict as 
well as public support for the social protection and redistribution policies 
underlying the welfare state, thus, enabling us to analyze the social 
sustainability of Spain’s social protection systems.
With this edition of the ”la Caixa” Foundation’s Social Studies Collection we 
seek to contribute to the debate on immigration and the welfare state through 
the analysis of objective indicators. These indicators allow us to evaluate with 
greater accuracy the impact of immigration on the sustainability of public 
services and social protection systems and, in addition, to anticipate the dangers 
and opportunities that may appear in the future. Only through informed analysis, 
such as that provided by the present study, can measures be taken that will 
guarantee social cohesion and the survival of the welfare state.
Jaime Lanaspa Gatnau
Executive Director of  
”la Caixa” Welfare Projects  
and Chief Executive Officer of  
the ”la Caixa” Foundation
Barcelona, May 2011
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 i. introduction
In the mid-1980s Spain began to transform from a source of migratory flows 
to a country of residence for a growing number of foreigners. In the last two 
decades the proportion of foreigners has increased to 12.1% of the registered 
population (more than 5.7 million persons), making Spain the country with 
the second highest number of foreigners in the European Union (EU-27) after 
Germany.
As striking as the scale of recent immigration is the speed with which it has 
occurred. Since 2000 the pace of foreigners settling in Spain has accelerated 
sharply, above all in the years 2000-2005, during which the annual intensity of 
settlement reached 16.8 foreigners per 1000 inhabitants (Izquierdo, 2006). 
Starting in 2005, the volume of migration flows to Spain decreased significantly 
but still remained higher than the European average. As a result, between 1990 
and 2005 Spain became one of the primary destination countries for 
immigration in the world, joining countries with a long tradition as receivers 
of migration flows, such as the United States and Germany (United Nations 
A/60/871, 2006: 31).(1)
The transformation of the role played by Spain in the international 
migration system has had a profound impact on the country’s production 
system, in particular on the labour market, which has been significantly 
changed by this phenomenon. Half of the new jobs created between 1995 
(1) This study has been carried out with the invaluable collaboration of Inés Llinás in the treatment, selection and 
presentation of the vast amount of statistical data managed during its preparation. The authors would also like to 
express their gratitude to José Manuel Rojo, Carlos Bruquetas Callejo, Celia Mayer, Ana Arriba, Pau Mari-Klose, 
Marga Mari-Klose, Inés Calzada, Amparo González and Alessandro Gentile for their collaboration during different 
stages of the preparation of this text. This work has been carried out under the auspices of the projects INMEBEA 
(Inmigración y Estado de Bienestar en la España Autonómica, Plan Nacional de I+D, Ref. SEJ2007-67521/CPOL) 
and WAE (Welfare Attitudes in a Changing Europe, Plan Nacional de I+D, Ref. CSO2008-02874-E/SOCI).
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and 2005 were taken by foreigners, who went from representing 4% of 
social security affiliates in 2001 to more than 10.5% in 2010. The immigrant 
workforce has facilitated the shift of Spanish workers toward other jobs 
with better working conditions. In addition, women immigrants working 
as ‘care workers’ have contributed significantly to the increase in the 
labour force participation rate of Spanish women by taking on many of the 
tasks generally associated with the home, including both the care of 
dependent persons (the elderly, those with disabilities and children) as 
well as domestic tasks. Overall, immigration played a fundamental role in 
the significant economic growth which took place in Spain from the middle 
of the 1990s until the end of 2007.
Immigration has also led to a large-scale social and demographic transformation 
with important implications for public policy, in particular regarding social 
protections schemes included under the generic heading of the welfare state. 
With the settlement of foreign-born population groups, new social needs have 
emerged resulting in increasing demands for services and their diversification. 
This situation has overwhelmed Spain’s public administrations. Their response, 
lacking in foresight, has been primarily reactive and improvised, oriented 
above all toward responding to the most visible and pressing needs.
In this context, immigration has become an issue of great public concern in recent 
years as revealed in periodic barometers of public opinion conducted by Spain’s 
Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) [Centre for Sociological Research] 
since 2002. Although there is still a predominantly favourable attitude toward 
immigrants, the autochthonous population increasingly believes that they are in 
competition with immigrants for jobs and services (healthcare, school places, 
housing and public assistance, etc.) (Cea D’Ancona and Vallés, 2008, 2009). This 
growing perception of competition fuels support for limiting the rights of 
immigrants and opposition to adapting social programmes to meet the specific 
needs of the immigrant population. Among broad sectors of the autochthonous 
population, the perception that immigrants are favoured in the provision of public 
resources has provoked a communitarian and/or nationalist reaction of ‘those from 
home first’ (Colectivo Ioé, 1995). 
Anti-immigrant attitudes are reinforced in a period of economic crisis such 
as the current one, characterized primarily by very high unemployment and 
budget cuts that directly affect social protection programmes. In particular, 
IntroductIon 15
the current situation benefits ‘political entrepreneurs’ who seek to transform 
citizen concerns into distrust of immigration, seeing this as a way to get 
votes. Although the political discourse regarding immigration among the 
major Spanish political parties is still in a phase of definition, this issue has 
begun to gradually be included in electoral programmes and campaigns 
(Zapata-Barrero, 2003), contributing in some cases to the development of an 
erroneous view of the relationship between immigration and the welfare state. 
In general, receiving societies address the management of migratory flows 
from a utilitarian perspective, in which immigrants are welcome to the extent 
that they are net contributors toward the financial sustainability of the 
welfare state.
A number of studies regarding the relationship between immigration and the 
welfare state have used cost-benefit analysis from a rational choice perspective. 
According to this approach, immigrants develop rational migratory strategies 
aimed at optimizing their benefits and minimizing costs/efforts. Framed in 
this way, the possibility of accessing welfare state services and benefits in the 
destination country would then constitute a particularly important element in 
deciding to emigrate. 
In contrast, this study addresses immigration and its relationship to the welfare 
state from a more comprehensive perspective, taking into consideration the 
institutional dimensions of migration. It is necessary to understand immigrants 
and their economic and survival strategies in the institutional context of the host 
country (characterized by the interrelationship between the economic system 
and existing social protection programmes, as well as by the social and political 
context), given that this context determines to a great extent the alternatives 
available to migrants. In addition, we believe that it is important to recognize 
all the roles played by immigrants in the receiving society: workers, family 
and community members, users of welfare services, but also providers of 
personal services, citizens and contributors to the public treasury through their 
taxes (direct and indirect) and contributions to social security. 
Our study aims to provide the basic conceptual tools, along with key statistical 
data, to understand the complex relationship between immigration and Spain’s 
systems for social protection. Using available statistical data and systematically 
reviewing the specialized literature, we will present a rigorous and well-
documented view of this relationship; in this way, we seek to educate public 
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opinion on the fundamentally positive effects of immigration on the welfare 
state in Spain. 
This book is structured around five clearly differentiated analytical aims: 
1) to study the way in which populations of immigrant origin access the 
benefits and services of the different social protection programmes which 
constitute the Spanish welfare state; 2) to analyze inequalities, both in the 
ways these programmes are used as well as in their results among immigrant 
populations, including a look a the main institutional responses developed in 
the welfare sphere; 3) to describe the role played by immigrants in the 
caregiving field, the central element in the adaptation of the Spanish welfare 
regime to the important socioeconomic changes that have taken place in 
Spain in recent decades; 4) to analyse the implications of migratory 
phenomena on the economic and social sustainability of the Spanish welfare 
regime, and 5) to present the major challenges faced by Spanish society and 
in particular, the social protection system, as a consequence of the settling 
of immigrants in Spain.
The relationship between immigration and the welfare state is an area that has 
not been closely studied in Spain. However, it is possible to find some 
pioneering studies on the relationship between immigration and Spain’s social 
protection systems in the literature on migrations in the fields of sociology, 
political science and economics (Aparicio and Tornos, 2002; Izquierdo, 2003; 
Cachón and Laparra, 2009; Otero, 21010), and we have used these as a starting 
point in developing our study. There are also a number of studies which address 
specific aspects of this relationship (immigration in relation to the labour 
market, to education, etc.), and we will refer to these secondary sources in the 
corresponding sections. 
In addition to reviewing the existing literature on this issue, the present volume 
is based on the statistical exploitation of a series of data bases developed by 
different public bodies in Spain (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Centro de 
Investigaciones Sociológicas, Banco de España, government ministries and 
autonomous regional governments) Third sector institutions (the FOESSA 
survey on social exclusion) and international organizations (Eurostat, OECD, 
United Nations). Our statistical analysis enables us to distinguish the factors 
which are most important in understanding the relationship between 
immigration and Spain’s social protection systems. 
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From the various statistical sources used in the preparation of this study 
we have selected data which provide reliable indicators of immigrant 
groups’ access to and use of Spain’s social protection systems, as well as 
indicators related to the appearance of inequalities which specifically 
affect immigrant groups. This has not been an easy task as the statistical 
tools available to analyze the situation of these recently arrived populations 
are limited and not very precise. Of the multiple surveys used, only the 
National Immigrant Survey 2007 (Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes 2007) 
was specifically designed to study the immigrant population residing in 
Spain. In the majority of surveys, immigrants are clearly underrepresented, 
limiting the possibilities of analyzing the specific situation of this 
population. As a strategy in response to the lack of representative statistical 
data regarding immigrant groups, we have increased the number of sources 
used. In the case of the Living Conditions Survey (LCS) (Encuesta de 
Condiciones de Vida) – a particularly rich source of information on a broad 
number of aspects related to the participants inclusion in different 
dimensions of society – we have combined the surveys from 2004 and 
2008 with the aim of increasing the size of the immigrant sample.(2)
The structure of this book reflects the central issues that have guided our work. 
After this introductory chapter, we examine the basic characteristics of both 
the Spanish welfare state and the migratory flows to Spain that have taken 
place in recent decades. The third chapter looks at the extent to which 
immigrants enjoy rights of access to the Spanish welfare state’s different social 
protection programmes. To examine this issue we start with the idea that 
access is measured by three fundamental factors: 1) the different categories for 
foreigners established by Spain’s legal framework and the rights associated 
with each category; 2) the type of existing welfare regime and its philosophy 
regarding coverage, and 3) the structure of the labour market and the form of 
insertion possible for immigrant workers. 
(2) The LCS is a survey with a longitudinal component (in other words, participants in the survey are interviewed 
annually for four years, while a quarter of them are renewed with each cycle) which is aimed at monitoring the 
living conditions of the population. The only way to combine two cycles of this survey was, therefore, to add 
the samples from the first (2004) and the last cycles (2008) available, so that the individuals interviewed were 
completely different (having produced a complete rotation of all the participants from the first cycle in this four 
year period). The sum of both cycles permitted us to double the size of the sample and, as a result, increase the 
presence of immigrants.
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Chapter four examines to what extent formal rights of access to social benefits 
translate into the effective use of these benefits among immigrants, also analyzing 
the existence of inequalities which particularly affect immigrant groups. We 
understand that the translation of rights of access into concrete and measurable 
results is not automatic but mediated by a series of variables ranging from 
differences in use – attributable to factors such as the socioeconomic level of 
immigrants or the cultural specificities of different immigrant groups – to the 
problems that can emerge when immigrants attempt to exercise those rights. 
These problems may arise from the nature of the programmes themselves, from 
difficulties in the implementation and execution of policies related to the 
behaviour of professionals or civil servants responsible for their effective 
application or from institutional obstacles or discrimination. We also briefly 
review the initiatives adopted by Spain’s public administrations to respond to the 
specific needs of immigrant origin groups within the framework of their policies 
for managing diversity. 
In chapter five we analyze the effect of immigration on the systems for the 
provision of care characterizing the Spanish welfare regime. Our aim is to 
overcome the biased image which views portrays immigrants only from 
the standpoint of their demand for social benefits and services. This is 
followed by an analysis of the contribution immigrants make as providers of 
services in a welfare regime that has been affected by major social and 
demographic changes. In particular, this chapter will analyze the role of 
women immigrants in the evolution of the systems for the provision of care 
and personal services to families in Spain. 
The role that immigration can play in the future sustainability of the 
Spanish welfare state, both from a financial as well as social perspective, 
is the central theme of chapter six. The impact of immigration on the 
finances of the welfare state is a controversial issue, and therefore we 
review the literature on this, comparing data available on the contribution 
immigrants make to public finances as well the cost of their use of social 
services. Regarding the social sustainability of the welfare state, we 
analyze the data available on the impact of immigration on public attitudes 
toward redistribution, examining theoretical discussions about the decline 
of support for social protection policies in ethnically heterogeneous 
societies. To do this we look at the extent to which the Spanish population 
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holds negative attitudes toward the immigrant population and/or towards 
the extension of social rights to these groups. 
Finally, chapter seven presents the conclusions from our study, structured 
around an analysis of the fundamental challenges that immigration raises for 
Spanish society in general and for the social protection systems of the welfare 
state in particular.
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 ii.  Principal characteristics of the welfare 
state and migration in spain
This chapter provides basic conceptual tools to understand the different 
dimensions through which we will analyze the relationship between 
immigration and the welfare state in Spain. We will first briefly review the 
academic debates on the nature of the welfare state and its relationship to 
immigration. We will then provide a description of the basic characteristics of 
the Spanish system of social protection, and finally, we will look at recent 
migration in the Spanish context, focusing in particular on the impact this 
phenomenon has had on the labour market. 
 2.1. the welfare state and the integration of immigrants 
During the 20th century European countries developed complex social protection 
schemes aimed at protecting their citizens from what were considered to be the 
primary social risks. Initially, risk protection was aimed at poverty, understood 
as the lack of resources resulting from the loss of earnings due to ageing, 
unemployment or illness. The response to the risk of poverty was the basis for 
the origin of social security systems in the majority of western European 
countries. As social policies in Europe developed, the range of social risks and 
needs attended broadened to include among others, maternity, disability, 
homelessness, education, healthcare and integration. Although such social 
policies were generally promoted by states, the specific mechanisms to regulate, 
finance and administer them were based on characteristics and circumstances 
specific to each country at the time that these programmes were designed and 
implemented.
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The first studies on these systems of social protection under the rubric of the 
welfare state were focused, above all, on comparative analyses of levels of 
public spending, trying to measure what Wilensky and Lebeaux (1958) called 
the “welfare effort” made by each state. These studies gradually broadened to 
include analyses of results and the impact of programmes, focusing on, for 
example, a specific group of beneficiaries of a social protection scheme or the 
impact of protection schemes on social inequality. Esping-Andersen’s contribution 
(1990) of the concept of the “welfare regime” was a key contribution to our 
knowledge of systems of social protection. In the work of this author, the 
welfare regime refers to the roles of state, market and civil society (including 
families, informal networks of solidarity, the third sector) in ensuring that 
citizens’ needs informal met. Each welfare regime corresponds to a specific 
economic-industrial configuration, as well as to a specific type of labour 
market (Rhodes, 1996). In his typology, Esping-Andersen proposes the existence 
of three ideal welfare regime models (liberal, conservative-corporatist and 
social democratic) based on their degree of “decommodification”, understood 
as the possibilities that each regime offers its citizens to live independently of 
the market. 
The liberal regime (characteristic of Anglo-Saxon countries) aspires to a 
minimum of state intervention and is defined by the central role assigned to 
the market, regarding both obtaining the resources necessary for subsistence 
and the provision of benefits and services linked to welfare. In this model the 
state plays a residual role, providing relatively modest public services based 
on strict income verification systems so that its degree of “decommodification” 
is very low. 
The conservative-corporatist regime (typical of central European countries: 
Germany, Belgium, France, etc.) is characterized by social insurance systems 
based on participation in the labour market. Employer and worker contributions 
serve to finance systems of social security which allocate benefits proportional 
to income and based on workers’ employment status. This type of regime seeks to 
maintain existing social relations and provides an intermediate degree of 
“decommodification”. 
The third ideal type of welfare regime, the social democratic (found especially 
in Scandinavian countries), is characterized by the central role assigned to the 
state in guaranteeing a high level of social protection to its citizens. In this 
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model, the role of the market is secondary, as the responsibility for reaching 
full employment and providing income maintenance corresponds to the state 
in a regime with a high degree of “decommodification”. 
Following the conclusions drawn from the debates on welfare regimes, 
the typology described had to be supplemented with a fourth model known as the 
“Mediterranean” regime, specific to countries in the south of Europe. This 
model combines the conservative-corporatist logic of social insurance in some 
programmes (retirement pensions, unemployment benefits), with policies of a 
universal character in others (health and education), as found in the social 
democratic model. In the Mediterranean model, the state plays a complementary 
role to that of families, which function as the central element in the social 
order (Moreno, 2006; Ferrera, 1996). This regime occupies an intermediary 
position on the “decommodification” scale, and it is this model which best fits 
the specific characteristics of the Spanish welfare regime. 
Despite the long tradition of research on the welfare state, its relationship to 
migration has only recently received systematic attention. Similarly, with only 
a few notable exceptions (Soysal, 1994: Geddes, 2003), studies dedicated to 
the analysis of migrations have tended to ignore the welfare state, as if the 
integration of immigrants in host societies was only based on ad hoc policies 
and structures oriented to encouraging the integration of immigrant 
populations. The reality, however, is that welfare schemes are the primary 
institutional mechanisms involved in the social integration of immigrants. 
In response to the lack of research on the relationship between the welfare 
state and immigration, some recent studies have begun to explicitly address 
this subject. These studies can be classified into three major groups based on 
their primary focus. 
The first line of research has focused on immigrants’ use of social services. These 
studies, fundamentally economic in nature, represent the majority of the 
bibliography addressing the issue of immigration and the welfare state, and most 
of them have been carried out in the United States and to a lesser degree, in 
European countries such as Germany. Focused on cost-benefit analysis, they 
analyze the financial impact of the immigrant population on public finances. The 
basic problem with these studies is their very limited scope; from the perspective 
of demand, they tend to focus on a small number of social protection programmes 
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(use of unemployment subsidies or other social services), while offering an 
excessively simplistic quantification of the role of immigrants as contributors to 
the public treasury. In chapter five we will discuss these studies in greater detail 
as part of a broader discussion on the impact of immigration on the financial 
sustainability of the welfare state.
The second group of studies has analyzed from the perspective of political 
economy and political sociology how different welfare regimes structure their 
immigration policies, focusing on the volume and profile of migratory flows. 
In this line of research we find two basic theoretical approaches: the theory of 
rights and the theory of exclusion. 
The theory of rights maintains that as non-citizens gain rights, it becomes 
more difficult for governments to justify and implement measures that restrict 
the entry of immigrants (Hollifield, 1992). Countries with generous welfare 
states will thus have greater difficulty in imposing restrictions on immigration, 
resulting in their migratory flows tending to be constant or even increasing 
(Soysal, 1994; Jacobson, 1996). This approach is based on the notion of 
natural rights, those that are not contingent on legislation and that are universal 
and unchanging; therefore, the recognition of these rights for immigrants 
would only be a matter of time (Hollifield, 1992:28).This theory could explain 
the extension of social and civil rights to immigrant workers by western 
European countries in the post-war period. In line with this, the widespread 
trend toward the extension of rights has been associated with movements in 
favour of social and civil rights since the 1960s (Hollifield, 1992) and with the 
extension of human rights, as well as with the transnationalization of citizenship 
and the weakening of the the nation state (Soysal, 1994; Jacobson, 1996). 
Proponents of a theory of exclusion, on the other hand, understand that the 
extension of rights that took place in Europe after the Second World War could 
produce the opposite effect of that argued by the theory of rights (Freeman, 
1986; Gran and Clifford, 2000). Given that more rights often mean greater 
expenses for the state, countries that facilitate immigrant access to their social 
protection schemes will have a greater interest in reducing levels of 
immigration. These authors propose an inverse relationship between social 
rights and immigration that could be summarized in the approach “more rights, 
fewer immigrants; and fewer rights, more immigrants.” 
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Gran and Clifford (2000) empirically tested the hypotheses of rights and exclusion 
comparing access to social rights with levels of immigration in nine OECD 
countries. Their findings suggest that the relationship between social rights and 
immigration varies depending on the age of the immigrants, as the countries that 
provide more generous aid to families have higher levels of immigration, while 
those countries with more generous non-contributory pensions for the elderly 
permit fewer older immigrants to enter the country. As is also suggested by the 
findings from a comparison of the United States and Germany carried out by 
Wenzel and Bos (1997), states apply different migration policies (restricting or 
permitting higher levels of immigration) based on their social protection schemes. 
The third group of studies focuses on the relationship between welfare and 
immigration policies and analyzes to what extent these two policy areas are 
complementary, or on the contrary, work in opposition. There is broad 
consensus about the existence of highly stable “immigration policy regimes” 
that determine the broad outline for immigration policy developed by each 
state. These “immigration regimes” consist of rules and regulations governing 
the possibilities of immigrants acquiring work and residency permits, 
participating in the economic, cultural and political life of the receiving society 
and becoming citizens (Faist, 1995). Such regimes are the result of specific 
patterns in the formation of nation-states, so that each model will have 
developed based on country-specific historical and organizational contingencies 
(Hammar, 1990). The central idea underlying the conceptualization of these 
regimes is that the way citizenship and nationality is understood in a specific 
nation-state shapes not only the rules of admission and membership in this 
community (immigration policy), but also the treatment and opportunities for 
inclusion that foreigners settled in the country receive (integration policy). 
Recognizing the existence of immigration regimes, the question raised by some 
authors is to what extent these migratory regimes correspond to the welfare 
regimes previously described. In a classification constructed inductively from 
the comparison of various cases, Baldwin-Edwards (2002) identified a 
“semiperipheral” migration model, a “Schengen” model and a “Scandinavian” 
model that roughly correspond to the “Mediterranean,” “conservative-corporatist,” 
and social-democratic” welfare regimes respectively. For Soysal (1994) this 
relationship between welfare and immigration regimes is a question of institutional 
isomorphism, as the organizational policies and structures created to facilitate the 
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integration of the immigrant population would above all apply the institutional 
repertoires available in the welfare regimes of each nation state (Soysal, 1994: 36). 
Faist (1995) argued that each welfare model has different effects on the policies of 
selection, admission, and integration of immigrants so that different welfare 
regimes lead to the formulation of different immigration policies consistent with 
those regimes. In particular, the author considered social spending and the transfer 
of social rights to be the two most important aspects of welfare regimes for 
immigrants. If Baldwin-Edwards talks about correlation and Soysal about 
isomorphism or structural analogy between welfare and immigration regimes, 
Faist talks about causality, in the sense that each welfare regime will generate 
specific immigration policies.
Sainsbury (2006) argues that the interrelationship between welfare and 
immigration policy regimes would vary in space and time, producing distinctive 
patterns of social rights for immigrants and generating specific dynamics of 
mutual reinforcement or contradiction. For example, in the United States, 
welfare policy is in contradiction with the dictates of an inclusive immigration 
regime. In Sweden, on the other hand, measures based on the principle of residence 
principle have formed a nexus between welfare and immigration regimes. 
Germany offers an example of both contradiction and correspondence between 
regimes: on the one hand, immigration policies restrict the use of public 
assistance programmes for foreigners; on the other hand, employment provides 
a nexus between the two regimes within the complementary logic of exclusion. 
According to this author, there is no single, unambiguous relationship between 
(ideal types of) welfare and immigration regimes.
 2.2. Principal characteristics of the spanish welfare state
When characterizing the nature of the Spanish welfare state, there is great 
debate among academic experts. While some authors consider Spain and its 
neighbours in southern Europe to constitute a fourth welfare regime model, 
the Mediterranean model (Ferrera,1996; Moreno, 2006), others argue that 
Mediterranean countries are merely late-comers to the conservative-corporatist 
welfare regime, characterized by low levels of social protection and rudimentary 
institutional development (Katrougalos, 1996). Without going into the details 
of this debate, there is, however, widespread consensus about the particularity 
26 ImmIgratIon and the Welfare State In SpaIn
of various features of the Spanish welfare system: a highly fragmented and 
“corporatist” system of social insurance responsible for income maintenance; 
key social protection programmes based on universalist principles (health 
care, education); the combination of public and private agents in the provision 
of welfare services, and the central role reserved for the family in this sphere. 
As in the other countries of southern Europe, the combination of insurance 
schemes and universal programmes constitutes one of the specific features 
of the Spanish welfare regime. Today’s Spanish welfare state was founded 
upon the inadequate corporatist system of social provision developed under 
Franco, a variant of the conservative-corporatist model in place in continental 
Europe. Since 1977, social policies under Spain’s democratic governments 
have not radically restructured the pre-existing social protection programmes, 
but rather attempted to achieve a higher degree of universalization and 
coverage for these same programmes (Moreno and Sarasa, 1993:21). 
But perhaps the principal characteristic of the Spanish welfare regime, as well as 
of its counterparts in southern Europe, is the central role played by the family in 
all areas of social protection (Moreno, 2009). Public authorities have taken for 
granted the self-sufficiency of households regarding the provision of care and 
material support for their members in such a way that the familisation of care 
has traditionally been a part of social policy (Flaquer, 2000). This has reinforced 
a model based on the exploitation of family resources and in particular women; 
this model now faces the challenge of the growing incorporation of women into 
the labour market and the gradual decline in expectations of solidarity within the 
family. 
Also characteristic of the Spanish welfare regime is the high degree of 
decentralization regarding policy decision-making and programme 
management. Except in the cases of the pension system and unemployment 
insurance, which remain in the hands of the central government, other social 
protection policies are fundamentally the responsibility of the autonomous 
regional governments and municipal authorities. In this context, the 
responsibility of the central government lies in the development of basic 
legislation applicable nationwide, as well as in specific financial transfers of a 
conditional character to cover a portion of the costs of certain social protection 
programmes. The autonomous communities have, as a result, emerged as 
central political actors in the area of welfare, developing regional systems of 
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health care, education, social services and assistance and introducing 
considerable innovations. This means that reforms recognizing social rights 
end up taking distinct forms in different regions, based on the priorities 
established by the autonomous governments and also on the resources that can 
be mobilized in each region to finance such policies. On the one hand, 
autonomous governments serve as a laboratory for the implementation of 
public policy initiatives that on occasion are copied by other communities, 
thus generating a dynamic of expansion of social rights, as occurred in the 
area of income support programmes first established in the 1990s (Aguilar et 
al., 1995). On the other hand, they adopt positions regarding reforms promoted 
by the central government and influence the final form of legislation adopted, 
as occurred in the case of long term care (Del Pino and Ramos, 2009).
Social spending in Spain also follows characteristic patterns. In comparison to the 
most developed countries of Europe, the Spanish welfare state is characterized by 
its late and incomplete development and as a result, low levels of social spending. 
As can be seen in graph 2.1, the percentage of GDP allocated to social spending 
in Spain is among the lowest of all European countries, systematically below the 
average for the EU-15. In 1990 Spain spent approximately 20% of its GDP on 
social protection, while the average for the EU-15 was 22.2%. Not only is there no 
evidence of a trend to reduce this difference, but in specific years it has considerably 
widened. Thus, in 2004 Spain spent approximately 21.2% of its GDP on social 
programmes, more than three percentage points less than the average for the 
EU-15. In 2007, the last year for which comparative date is available, the differential 
was once again around two percentage points. Clearly, if a comparison is made 
with European countries with a greater tradition of investment in social protection 
policies—Sweden, France or Germany—the differences are even more significant. 
However, as graph 2.1 shows, there has been a slow and gradual convergence in 
aggregate social spending patterns across European countries, with a slight upward 
trend in countries within the Mediterranean regime, containment in countries with 
conservative-corporatist regimes, and even a noticeable reduction in the case of 
Sweden, paradigm of the social-democratic model until the 1990s.
A detailed analysis of the disaggregated data on social spending shows, 
however, that it is necessary to look at the different priorities in spending on 
social protection programmes in order to understand how social protection 
regimes work in each country. 
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graph 2.1
evolution of social spending in eU countries as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP)
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Francia 24,87 25,54 26,30 27,82 27,76 28,50 28,77 28,62 28,80 28,85 27,72 27,74 28,38 28,93 29,04 28,97 28,59 28,40
Alemania 20,05 23,70 25,55 26,29 26,32 26,76 27,38 26,73 26,56 26,65 26,56 26,74 27,39 27,73 27,14 27,23 26,15 25,16
Italia 19,95 20,27 20,87 21,05 20,83 19,90 21,99 22,71 22,94 23,32 23,28 23,52 23,99 24,39 24,69 24,98 25,09 24,86
España 19,95 20,71 21,84 23,13 22,05 21,41 21,34 20,73 20,62 20,42 20,44 20,14 20,40 21,02 21,16 21,41 21,40 21,58
Suecia 30,23 31,82 34,71 35,69 34,42 32,04 31,59 30,39 30,24 29,65 28,43 28,70 29,35 30,11 29,53 29,08 28,41 27,30
Media UE-15 21,23 22,34 23,46 24,29 24,03 23,68 23,76 23,20 22,98 22,96 22,54 22,93 23,48 24,14 24,21 24,18 23,86 23,50
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Source: based on oecd data.
It can be clearly seen in the Spanish case (as in the other countries of southern 
Europe) that there is a relatively significant financial effort put into pensions, while 
scant resources are provided for housing or family support policies. Similarly, it is 
interesting to note the cyclical nature of spending on unemployment benefits, a 
policy area that absorbs a significant part of the financial resources dedicated to 
social protection in countries like Spain, characterized by a labour market that is 
particularly sensitive to the impact of economic cycles.
Variations in social spending between different policy areas involve a number 
of imbalances and tensions that produce social inequality and economic 
inefficiency (Guillén and Matsaganis, 2000: 121). As we will show in the 
following chapters, this clearly impacts on the relationship between 
immigration and the welfare state, affecting the role of immigrants as users 
and agents in the system, as well as the consequences of immigration on the 
system’s financial sustainability.
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table 2.1
Breakdown of social expenditures as a percentage of GDP
1990 2000 2007
ue-15
Total 20.62 23.41 24.34
retirement 7.15 7.78 7.91
unemployment 1.48 1.28 1.21
family 1.95 2.20 2.35
healthcare 5.35 5.75 6.57
housing 0.36 0.40 0.39
france
Total 24.87 27.72 28.40
retirement 9.21 10.50 11.06
unemployment 1.67 1.45 1.36
family 2.50 3.02 3.00
healthcare 5.83 8.07 7.85
housing 0.75 0.88 0.76
germany
Total 20.05 26.56 25.16
retirement 8.67 8.78 8.65
unemployment 0.78 1.34 1.38
family 1.52 2.05 1.83
healthcare 3.55 4.73 5.86
housing 0.13 0.32 0.61
Sweden
Total 30.23 28.43 27.30
retirement 8.55 8.25 6.54
unemployment 0.86 1.38 0.67
family 4.42 2.95 3.35
healthcare 4.86 5.52 6.84
housing 0.64 0.62 0.47
Spain
Total 19.95 20.44 21.58
retirement 7.22 9.08 8.98
unemployment 3.16 1.98 2.12
family 0.32 0.97 1.23
healthcare 7.41 6.25 6.58
housing 0.11 0.17 0.18
Source: based on oecd data.
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 2.3. Principal characteristics of immigration in spain
Before analyzing the relationship between immigration and the welfare state 
in Spain we must clearly define the population which is the object of this 
study, specifying the different groups of foreign residents which we refer to 
throughout the book. The more than six million foreigners currently residing 
in Spain are not a homogeneous group with the same characteristics and living 
conditions. On the contrary, it is possible to divide this group into at least four 
main categories: citizens of other EU-15 countries (primarily retired persons, 
medium and highly skilled workers, and students); citizens from non-EU 
western developed nations; citizens of Eastern European countries that have 
joined the EU since 2004, and finally, a broad mix of individuals from 
developing countries. Our study is primarily focused on the third and fourth 
groups as they fit into the category of “economic immigrants” in the Spanish 
collective imaginary. Moreover, as will be analyzed in chapter three, immigrant 
origin (particularly whether one is from the EU or not) has a great influence on 
legal status in Spain and therefore, on the degree of incorporation into the 
labour market and rights of access to social protection systems. 
The available statistical data on which our analysis is based does not always 
make it possible to differentiate these two groups from other foreign residents in 
Spain. When it is not possible to refer only to these groups we will make this 
explicit, attempting then to compare the situations of the different categories of 
foreigners that we can identify with those of the autochthonous population. 
The migratory process experienced by Spain in recent decades has certain 
unique features. One primary characteristic is the extraordinary volume and 
intensity of migratory flows to Spain and the sharp increase in the foreign 
resident population, particularly in the past decade. Spain has gone from being 
a country of emigration to being a net recipient of migratory flows (Izquierdo, 
2006). According to aggregate data from municipal population registers, 
there were 923,000 foreign residents in Spain in 2000 out of a population of 
40.4 million. Ten years later (in December 2010), this figure had increased 
to slightly over six million foreign residents out of an overall population of 
45 million. In other words, in the past decade foreign residents have gone from 
representing 2.28% to 12.17% of the total population in Spain. 
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graph 2.2
evolution of the number of foreigners residing in spain and the number 
of authorizations to reside in spain
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However, the number of foreigners who reside legally in Spain has always been 
below the figures supplied by municipal population registers. Graph 2.2 makes 
it possible to compare data from these population registers with Ministry of the 
Interior data on the number of foreigners with authorization to reside in Spain. 
Hence, we can see that in June 2010 slightly more than 4.7 million foreigners 
had residency permits, compared to the slightly more than six million listed in 
municipal population registers. 
There is no doubt that there are undocumented immigrants residing in Spain, but it 
is not possible to accurately determine how many of them there are. The difference 
between the figures from population registers and the Ministry of the Interior clearly 
suggests that there are more immigrants residing in Spain than are counted by the 
Ministry. But it also seems plausible that there are fewer immigrants than are listed 
in municipal population registers, given that the registers do not provide an 
accurately updated record of individuals who have left a specific municipality or 
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even the country.(1) As will be seen in greater detail in the next chapter, from the 
perspective of an undocumented immigrant, there is a dual incentive to register in a 
municipality: being registered entitles one to certain social services (in particular, 
to education, health care and housing under equal conditions with respect to Spanish 
citizens) and moreover, constitutes proof of settlement that can then be used in the 
process of regularizing legal status. The figures from municipal population registers 
give us an idea of the number of foreigners residing in the country; although they 
tend to provide an overestimation. 
The number of undocumented immigrants residing in Spain has fluctuated, on the 
one hand, in response to specific factors and historical contexts in the countries of 
origin of immigration (for example, the exchange rate crisis in Ecuador in 2000 and 
the ‘corralito’ in Argentina in 2001 - the name given to the economic measures 
taken by Argentina’s government in freezing bank accounts and withdrawals from 
US dollar accounts). On the other hand, the Spanish government has resorted to a 
series of extraordinary regularization programmes to reduce the number of 
undocumented migrants: 1991 (116,000 undocumented immigrants regularized); 
2000-2001 (220,000 regularized); 2002 (240,000 regularized) and 2005 (580,000 
regularized). The law also provides a regularization mechanism based on establishing 
a certain level of social integration (arraigo social) available after three years of 
residency in the country without papers; this constitutes a sort of quasi-automatic 
mechanism that maintains the volume of undocumented immigrants within certain 
limits, while offering undocumented migrants the chance to escape from the 
insecurity and vulnerability resulting from their illegal status. 
It should also be noted that often it is the legislation itself which creates 
irregularity by making it difficult for immigrants to renew work and/or residency 
permits by demanding requirements which are difficult to meet in the context 
of an economic crisis with high levels of unemployment and job insecurity 
such as we find in Spain today. As we shall see, the existence of immigrant 
groups in situations of administrative irregularity has important consequences 
(1) The process of registering as a resident in a municipality is sometimes done by family members or friends of an 
individual who does not reside in Spain, with the aim of accumulating time as a resident before actual migration. In 
light of the removal of almost 500,000 non-EU immigrants from municipal population registers in the summer of 
2006, Fenández Cordón pointed out that “a considerable number of foreigners registered as residents in reality do 
not live in Spain, and as a result it follows that the number of undocumented immigrants does not reach the levels 
that are currently being considered (between 700,000 and 1.6 million)” (El País, 23-08-2006).
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for their social integration, largely determining their relationship to the welfare 
state and economic system as a whole.
Of the 4.7 million foreigners with legal residence in Spain in June 2010, 
slightly more than 48% belong to the European Community regime (in other 
words, European citizens with the same civil and social rights as Spanish 
citizens and in addition, with specific political rights -the right to vote and run 
in local elections and for the European Parliament), while the rest belong to the 
general regime (immigrants from outside the EU). As can be seen in Table 2.2, 
from 2000 to 2010, there was a significant increase in all groups of foreign 
residents in Spain, but the total for all non-EU immigrants made those falling 
under the general regime the majority beginning in the year 2000. 
European integration has facilitated the mobility of European citizens within the 
EU common space. This has translated into a significant number of community 
nationals coming to reside in Spain - particularly from the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Italy, Portugal, France and the Netherlands. The expansion of the EU 
into eastern Europe has ended up including under the umbrella of the community 
regime a large number of economic immigrants proceeding from new member 
countries (Romania, Poland and Bulgaria primarily). The Romanian community 
has in fact tripled during the past decade, becoming since 2008 the largest 
foreign group. In addition to Europeans, the other large immigrant groups are 
Moroccans because of geographic proximity and Latin Americans because of 
language and cultural ties. 
table 2.2
evolution in the number of foreigners residing in spain by geographic origin
natIonalItY 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
rest of the eu 277,845 375,487 489,813 636,037 918,886 2,102,654 2,346,515
rest of europe 29,772 47,209 202,411 404,643 690,970 731,806 226,379
latin america 117,868 189,464 730,459 1,237,806 1,500,785 1,758,295 1,741,179
north america 14,286 17,374 22,104 24,613 27,292 26,595 28,250
africa 147,875 228,972 423,045 579,372 785,279 909,757 1,048,909
asia and oceania 44,719 57,811 100,688 144,748 220,281 259,133 317,194
Total 632,624 916,730 1,969,107 3,027,800 4,144,166 5,788,797 5,708,940
Source: continuous municipal register files, Ine.
34 ImmIgratIon and the Welfare State In SpaIn
In January 2009, Romanians represented 14.1% of the total foreign population, 
followed by Moroccans (12.7%), Ecuadorians (7.5%), and UK citizens (6.7%). 
These four groups combined represented 40% of the foreigners registered in Spain.
When analyzing data from the Ministry of the Interior in order to study the 
foreign-born population living in Spain, it should be noted that this data does 
not include those who obtain Spanish nationality through one of the 
mechanisms in the Civil Code. Until only a few years ago this phenomenon 
was of minor importance, but with the arrival of greater numbers of Latin 
American immigrants who are eligible to obtain nationality after only two 
years of legal residency in Spain (instead of the ten years required for the 
majority of foreigners) it has become more important; today approximately 
100,000 people are granted Spanish nationality annually. 
A similar situation is occurring in the case of second generation immigrants 
(actually born in Spain) who are able to acquire Spanish nationality more 
easily (Martin and Moreno Fuentes, 2010) as they do not appear in immigration 
statistics or quickly disappear from them. The significance of this lack of data 
with respect to these groups lies in the fact that it is much more difficult to 
study the inequalities affecting them because of the difficulty in tracing them 
statistically. 
The foreign population is not uniformly distributed throughout Spain but 
tends to be concentrated in certain regions and within these regions, in certain 
provinces. Broadly speaking, the distribution reflects the geography of 
economic development, with a high degree of concentration on the 
Mediterranean coast and in the Community of Madrid. Thus, Catalonia 
(20.9%), Madrid (18.7%) and the community of Valencia (15.5%) combined 
account for 55.1% of the foreign population in Spain. If we add Andalusia, 
then 67.3% of the resident foreigners in Spain are concentrated in only four of 
Spain’s 17 autonomous communities. 
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table 2.3
citizenship naturalizations by geographic region of origin
Year total
amerIca europe
afrIca aSIa otherSlatIn north* ue non-eu**
1995  6,750 4,053 111 616  53 1,059 818 40
1996  8,411 5,410 119 688  59 1,029 1,080 26
1997 10,293 6,204 176 846  81 1,471 1,486 29
1998 13,165 8,024 223 1,137 103 2,149 1,480 49
1999 16,373 10,063 302 1,168 150 2,880 1,756 54
2000 11,996 6,893 254 828 122 2,575 1,283 41
2001 16,735 9,447 395 1,043 192 3,824 1,787 47
2002 21,805 13,382 496 1,226 191 4,325 2,131 54
2003 26,556 13,954 457 1,252 193 8,522 2,122 56
2004 38,335 23,813 573 1,426 295 9,991 2,198 39
2005 42,829 31,290 540 1,146 307 7,346 2,164 36
2006 62,339 50,254 692 1,037 397 7,618 2,303 38
2007 71,810 56,741 725 1,135 445 10,312 2,418 34
2008 84,170 67,443 912 1,404 490 11,201 2,684 36
* except mexico, which is included under latin america.
** data from the eu calculated from the members states in each year (including therefore romania and bulgaria 
starting in 2008).
Source: based on data from the Dirección general de Registros y Notariado, ministry of Justice.
If we look at foreigners as a percentage of the total population in each autonomous 
community, the following communities have the highest concentration of 
immigrants: the Balearic Islands (21.8%), Valencia (17.3%), Madrid (16.6%), 
Murcia (16.4%), and Catalonia (15.9%). These communities reveal the dual 
nature of the presence of immigrants in Spain: on the one hand, the non-EU 
immigrant population, concentrated primarily in the areas with the highest 
demand for foreign labour; on the other, residents from other countries of the EU, 
many of them retired and living along the coast or settled primarily in the large 
cities, where there are greater professional opportunities.
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table 2.4
Distribution of foreign residents by autonomous community  
(1 january 2010)
autonomouS communItY no. of foreIgnerS percentage of the populatIon
andalusia 698,375 8.36
aragon 172,015 12.79
asturias 49,149 4.53
balearic Islands 241,704 21.87
basque country 139,229 6.39
canary Islands 305,661 14.45
cantabria 39,010 6.59
castilla-la mancha 228,290 10.89
castilla y leon 167,597 6.56
catalonia 1,193,283 15.90
extremadura 38,747 3.50
galicia 109,222 3.91
la rioja 46,342 14.40
madrid 1,071,292 16.62
murcia 240,605 16.48
navarra 70,931 11.15
Valencia 884,622 17.35
ceuta 3,993 4.96
melilla 8,873 11.67
Total 5,708,940 12.16
Source: based on data from the Ine.
In addition to this dual distribution of the immigrant population based on 
country or region of origin and different reasons for settling in Spain, we can 
also identify clear patterns in the choice of place of residency by different 
groups of foreign residents. Romanians primarily settle in Madrid and 
Castellon, while Moroccans tend to settle in Catalonia and the eastern part of 
Andalusia. Latin Americans are more concentrated in Madrid (working in 
construction and services) and in Murcia (in agriculture); Pakistanis reside 
mostly in Barcelona and Algerians in Alicante. These settlement patterns can 
be explained by a combination of the type of demand for labour predominant 
in each of these zones (the Spanish labour market is highly segmented by nationality 
and sex) and by the influence of migratory networks formed by migrants 
already settled in an area. Retirees from the EU residing along the Mediterranean 
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coast, in the Balearic and Canary Islands have settled in these areas looking 
for a better climate and have also to some extent followed the logic of residing in 
national enclaves, which on a different scale and different level of intensity 
replicate the patterns of concentration found among economic immigrants. As 
will be analyzed later, this concentration of the immigrant population in 
certain regions has significant impact on public services in general and on 
welfare state programmes in particular. 
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Another distinguishing characteristic of the immigrant population in Spain is 
its age distribution; immigrants are significantly younger than the native-born 
population. According to Eurostat data, the average age of foreign residents in 
the EU-27 in 2009 was 34.3 years of age, compared to an average of 41.2 years 
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of age for Europeans. Spain is no exception to this rule, as the average age of 
foreign residents is 32.6 years of age, well below the average age of 41.4 for 
Spanish nationals. 
graph 2.4
comparison of population pyramids of the population residing in spain 
by nationality, sex and age (1 january 2010)
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A comparison of population pyramids for the native-born and foreign 
population in graph 2.4 shows that the majority of foreigners settled in 
Spain are in the 20 to 40 year old age range; in other words, clearly 
concentrated within the working age population. The groups with more 
members at working ages are Moroccans, Ecuadorians, and Romanians. 
In contrast, foreigners from EU countries are clearly older, with 18% 
over 65 years of age. Although the Portuguese, Greeks and Italians are 
primarily young, as corresponds to work-related migration, other groups 
such as the British, Germans, Scandinavians, Swiss and Belgians are 
clearly older, corresponding to what is known as international retirement 
migration. The British and Germans are the most numerous among 
retirees residing in Spain. These two population age structures reflect the 
two typical immigrant groups from Western Europe in Spain: those who 
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come “to relax” or enjoy their retirement and workers who are skilled 
and highly skilled (Kuehn, 2009). 
We can, therefore, conclude that economic immigration is contributing to the 
rejuvenation of the Spanish population and as will be analyzed in detail later, 
the demographic structure of this immigration reveals that immigrants will be 
net contributors for at least the next two decades. 
graph 2.5
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The distribution of the foreign population in Spain by sex also reveals specific 
characteristics. Overall, there is a slight predominance of men as a result of the 
primarily work-related and economic character of immigration to Spain and 
the segmentation of the labour market. 
This sculine profile of immigration is clearly visible among African and 
Asi n immigrant groups as well as among ce tain Latin American groups. 
However, among Romanians, Ecuadorians and Dominicans, the high proportion 
of women who decide to migrate on their own and not simply follow a male 
40 ImmIgratIon and the Welfare State In SpaIn
head-of-household has contributed to the feminization of immigrant groups 
from these countries. Thus, between 2000 and 2010 we can see a rising female 
presence in the immigrant population because of the relatively feminized 
migration flows from Latin America. In addition to the willingness of these 
women to emigrate, leaving their families behind, the phenomenon that explains 
the feminization of immigration is the existence of an employment niche in 
domestic and personal care services, highly segmented by sex. The acceleration 
of the family reunification process has also contributed to a greater balance 
between the sexes among immigrant groups. 
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The fact that economic immigrants occupy the lowest rungs of the labour 
market has contributed to the image of an immigrant population with low 
levels of education. As graph 2.6 shows, the reality is somewhat more complex.
The bibliography on the links between education level and migration shows 
that those who decide to emigrate are generally among the better educated 
from their society of origin (Beauchemin and Gonzalez, 2010). The reasons 
for this are clear. Emigration constitutes a difficult and challenging enterprise 
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demanding all types of capital (economic, cultural, relational, social, etc.); 
the better educated are also generally better prepared to meet these costs. 
This implies that although a specific immigrant group may have a relatively 
low education level in comparison to the autochthonous population of the 
receiving society, in general they constitute a selection of the best educated 
from their country of origin. Based on a 2007 survey from the National 
Statistics Institute (NSI - Instituto Nacional de Estadística)(2) we can analyze 
the education profiles of different groups of immigrants in Spain and 
compare them with the native-born population. Thus, we can see that the 
only foreign group with a lower education profile than the autochthonous 
population is the immigrant population from Africa, as the proportion of 
African immigrants who have primary school education or lower is twice 
that of the Spanish population, and the proportion who have some type of 
higher education is half that found among the Spanish. With a different 
breakdown among the different education levels, all the other immigrant 
groups reveal higher levels of education than the native-born. Three-fourths 
of the Romanians residing in Spain have secondary education, compared to a 
little over 55% in the case of the Spanish. Latin Americans present a profile with 
a slightly lower percentage of individuals with higher education, but with a 
slightly higher percentage in terms of secondary education and fewer with just 
a primary school education. The percentage of those with accredited higher 
education is also higher among Asians and Eastern Europeans. In short, we can 
conclude that foreigners who have settled in Spain generally have a higher level 
of education than the native-born Spanish.
 2.4. immigration and the labour market
Without minimizing the role played by other undoubtedly important elements, 
the primary explanation for the decision to emigrate is economic (Massey et al., 
1993).(3) As pointed out in economic analyses of migration, migratory flows are 
to a large extent explained by the existence of an imbalance in terms of wages 
(2) This survey is the first statistical tool specifically designed by the National Statistics Institute to provide greater 
knowledge about the new population residing in Spain.
(3) Other disciplines in the social sciences have included other factors to explain migratory flows and establish 
their relative autonomy from economic cycles. These include, among others: the importance of social networks, 
political and institutional constraints, the role of historical connections between sender and receiver countries and 
environmental factors.
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and capital available between sender and receiver countries. The large wage 
differential and employment opportunities in the receiver country are therefore 
among the most important factors in explaining the decision to emigrate. The 
“call effect” exists, and it is directly related to potential migrants’ expectations 
of finding a job in the receiving country. Starting from this basic understanding, 
the contribution of other approaches such as analyses of labour market 
segmentation (which explain how unemployment and demand for labour power 
in specific economic niches can exist simultaneously in receiver countries), the 
“new migration economy” (in which the basic unit of analysis in the process of 
deciding to migrate is not the individual but the family), or finally “global 
migration systems theory” (which highlights the need to analyze the economic 
systems of different countries within the context of the global capitalist system) 
together make up the central focus of economic analysis of migratory processes. 
Immigrants arriving in Spain from developing countries have found employment 
primarily in sectors with a high concentration of jobs not covered by local 
workers and thus with a demand for labour. The compatibility of this process 
with an unemployment rate substantially higher than the European average and 
a relatively low economic activity rate, even in periods of strong economic 
growth, can be explained primarily by labour market segmentation resulting 
from the increased expectations of the Spanish population. During nearly three 
decades of economic growth, which began in the mid-1980s, the Spanish 
population has come to reject certain types of jobs because of their low pay 
and/or difficulty while at the same time revealing little willingness for 
geographical or functional mobility. Many economic activities that have survived 
mainly thanks to the intensive use of manpower, low salaries and job insecurity, 
have been carried out by immigrant workers who have contributed in this way to 
the survival of certain productive sectors that would otherwise have disappeared.
Between 1996 and 2007 the Spanish economy created almost eight million jobs, 
expanding from 12.6 million employed in 1996 to 20.5 million in the second 
quarter of 2007. This represented more than 40% of all the employment 
generated in the OECD in that period. After this peak in employment, the global 
economic crisis, which has had a tremendous effect on the Spanish economy, 
has led to the destruction of more than two million jobs. Immigrant workers, 
who played a key role in this whole process, making up a large share of the new 
workers employed during the boom, have now taken on a disproportionately 
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high share of the cost in the form of unemployment. With their incorporation 
into the Spanish labour market, immigrant workers have contributed to the 
introduction of flexibility (in terms of hiring, working conditions, salaries 
and geographic and functional mobility), particularly in certain sectors and 
employment niches; however, at the same time, they have also provided a 
“buffer” from the most negative effects of the crisis for Spanish workers. 
At the end of 2001, the number of foreigners affiliated to the social security 
system was around 600,000 (a little less than 4% of affiliated workers). By the 
end of 2007 that number had increased to almost two million foreigners 
contributing to the coffers of the National Institute of Social Security (Instituto 
Nacional de la Seguridad Social, INSS) (10.3% of total affiliates). Despite the 
economic crisis, which has affected foreign workers with particular intensity, at 
the beginning of 2010 the number of foreigners affiliated to social security 
continued being close to 1.9 million people (around 10.5% of affiliated workers). 
table 2.5
Distribution of the foreign population by social security regime 
affiliation (November 2009)
regIme eu foreIgnerS non-eu foreIgnerS
total 
foreIgnerS total
general 429,545 803,946 1,233,490 13,433,108
Self-employed 109,694 89,405 199,099 3,165,517
agrarian 110,845 139,446 250,291 818,319
Sea-workers 1,040 3,825 4,865 54,530
domestic 22,187 152,703 174,890 289,432
Total 673,986 1,189,358 1,863,344 17,777,153
Source: based on data from the InSS.
As can be seen in the over-representation of immigrants in the agrarian and 
domestic regimes (table 2.5), the Spanish labour market acts as a clear 
mechanism for the segmentation of employment by sex, nationality and area 
of economic activity. And it is precisely this segmentation that explains to a 
large degree the differential impact of unemployment on different groups of 
foreign workers. In the last quarter of 2010 foreigners continued to represent 
9.3% of the workers in the general regime, 7.5% of the sea workers, 6.3% of 
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self-employed workers, 41.2% of those affiliated with the agrarian regime 
and more than 60% of those inscribed in the regime for domestic workers. 
Those immigrant groups working in the sectors most affected by the crisis 
have suffered the most serious consequences in terms of unemployment, 
while other groups have been comparatively less affected. As can be seen in 
Graph 2.7, the biggest losers have primarily been African immigrants (Sub-
Saharan as well as Moroccan, both with unemployment levels around 50% 
in the second quarter of 2010), a group that is mostly men and traditionally 
employed in construction, agriculture, and in low-skilled jobs in the service 
sector. Latin American immigrants have unemployment rates between 25 
and 30%, substantially higher than that of Spanish workers (around 18%), 
but considerably lower than that found among African workers. The 
explanation for their intermediate position can be found in the much higher 
proportion of women in this group, who as a result of being employed in the 
area of personal services have been less affected by the employment crisis. 
Finally, Asian immigrants have unemployment levels slightly lower than that 
of Spanish workers, which is connected to the greater propensity of these 
groups (especially Chinese, but also Pakistanis) to work within their own 
communities and in ethnically based business initiatives (in retail, restaurants, 
etc.) (Sole et al., 2007). 
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graph 2.7
evolution of the unemployment rate by worker’s geographic region  
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A significant proportion of jobs for immigrant workers are found in the 
underground economy (Círculo de Empresarios, 2010). Because of their 
nature, escaping regulatory controls and taxation, the precise dimensions of 
these economic activities are unknown, although various estimates calculate 
them to account for between 20 and 23% of GDP (Alañon and Gómez, 2004). 
These estimates would place Spain, along with Greece and Italy, among the 
countries of the OECD with the largest underground economies, the average 
for OECD countries being approximately 14% in 2010 (Schneider, 2010). 
This informal economic activity is concentrated primarily in agriculture, 
construction, certain manufacturing sectors (textiles, shoes and toys) and 
particularly in the service sector (restaurants, cleaning, domestic services and the 
provision of care) (Baldwin-Edwards and Arango, 1999). 
Participation in the underground economy constitutes the only possibility of 
employment for undocumented immigrants, as well as for other immigrants 
who may have work permits but are unable to find work in the formal economy. 
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In addition to poor working conditions, workers employed in the underground 
economy do not contribute to social security and are therefore excluded from 
contributory social insurance systems, increasing their vulnerability to life 
cycle risks associated with employment. Aware of this situation, in recent 
decades, the Spanish government established different mechanisms aimed at 
regularizing the situation of undocumented immigrants. For policy makers 
these regularization processes are a response to the loss of tax revenue and unfair 
competition from businesses that do not make contributions to social security 
for their workers and that as a result, have lower labour costs.(4) The utilization of 
annual quota systems and regularization based on long-term settlement (arraigo) 
are mechanisms established by the government to reduce the number of 
immigrants in the underground economy (Moreno Fuentes, 2005). 
Despite the current economic crisis with its high attendant unemployment 
among foreign workers, immigrant labour has become a structural component 
of the Spanish labour market (Oliver, 2006). 
 2.5. conclusions
Departing from a situation of underdevelopment and great institutional 
weakness, in the 1980s the Spanish system of social protection began a process 
of relatively rapid convergence with the welfare regimes of other European 
countries. The universalization of certain basic social rights (education and 
health care) and the development of programmes responding to life cycle risks 
(retirement, disability, etc) have led to the consolidation of a welfare regime 
similar to that found in other countries of southern Europe. This balance of 
responsibilities and functions in the area of welfare between the state, the 
market and civil society has not been fully developed and now faces a dual 
challenge of great importance: first, the questioning of its viability in an 
increasingly globalized economy based on premises that are ideologically 
hostile to the existence of a welfare state that guarantees social rights; and 
secondly, confronting the rapid transformation of the social and demographic 
(4) The last two regularization processes (2000 and 2005) were particularly important, as they regularized 630,000 
and 690,000 undocumented immigrants respectively. The last one transferred responsibility for the process to em-
ployers with the aim of generating legal work contracts and in this way increasing contributions to social security. 
Thirty two percent of the applications for regularization in 2005 were for the domestic service and caregiving 
sector; 21% were for construction; 15% for agriculture and 10% for the restaurant and tourism sector.
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structures on which this balance was based (ageing, changes in family structure, 
redefinition of gender roles, etc). 
In this context, the arrival of immigrants in Spain, attracted by an economic 
growth pattern based to a large extent on the availability of flexible low-
skilled labour, has been a challenge and at the same time a boost for the 
existing system of social protection. On the one hand, the immigrant 
population has called into question the premises on which the eligibility and 
deservingness criteria of the Spanish welfare state have been based, while its 
demands for benefits and services have increased; on the other hand, 
immigrant labour has transformed the structures for the provision of care as 
part of a complex process of change in the pattern of allocation of 
responsibilities within families. The integration of these workers and their 
families is one of the most important challenges that Spanish society will 
face in the coming decades. In this process, the welfare state will play a 
central role and the study of the relationship between immigration and the 
system of social protection therefore constitutes a critical issue. In the following 
chapters we will analyze in detail this relationship, pointing out its main 
characteristics as well as the precise nature of the challenges to be addressed.
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 iii.  the access of immigrants to social 
benefits 
The first issue that we want to explore in the relationship between migration 
and the welfare state is immigrant access to social protection benefits and 
services. The breadth and depth of protection they have access to is defined by 
both their legal situation (linked to immigration policies) and the nature of the 
welfare regime (associated with the deservingness principle upon which the 
social rights recognized by the regime are based). 
 3.1. citizenship and social rights
The access of the immigrant-origin population to social protection systems in 
receiving countries has been an issue of great academic debate. Some authors 
argue that national welfare states, by their very nature, constitute closed systems 
with clearly defined borders, which define who the members of the community 
are and, therefore, the beneficiaries of its protection (Freeman, 1986: 52). 
Linking the right of access to social protection schemes with ‘belonging’ to a 
national community is consistent with the previously discussed theory of exclusion. 
Supporting this hypothesis, the arguments for the creation and expansion of social 
protection systems have generally been framed within a rhetoric of ‘national 
solidarity’ and/or ‘citizenship rights’ (Brubaker, 1992).
In opposition to the vision of European welfare states as inherently exclusive 
systems are the arguments of those authors who advocate a theory of rights. 
According to these authors, states have been considerably receptive to 
incorporating populations of foreign origin into their systems of social 
protection, extending their coverage to the entire resident population (although 
they have done so at different rates). Such inclusion can essentially be 
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explained by the translation of international agreements and conventions for 
the protection of human rights into the legislation of individual states (Soysal, 
1994; Jacobson, 1996); and in addition, by the role played by courts in the 
defence of individual rights (Joppke, 1999: 39) or by the actions of bureaucrats 
with the responsibility for implementing social programmes (Guiraudon, 
2000:17).
The reality seems to lie somewhere in between these two positions. 
Although universalist arguments are correct regarding the extension of 
civil and social rights to a significant number of foreigners with permanent 
permission to reside and work in their host country, it is also true that this 
group constitutes only a part of the total number of resident foreigners. 
Thus, while some categories of non-nationals have full access to social 
protection systems with the same rights as nationals, other groups 
(undocumented immigrants, tolerated refugees, asylum applicants, etc.) 
have been, implicitly or explicitly, partially excluded from these systems. 
In addition, as the work of Morissens and Sainsbury shows (2005), there 
are great differences in the same state between the social rights of citizens 
and immigrants with legal residency; according to the authors, these 
differences are even greater in the case of immigrants who have darker 
skin than the autochthonous population. 
Differences between states in this respect are also considerable, reflecting 
different processes in the institutionalization and extension of social rights 
and the regulation of nationality and citizenship (Marshall, 1964). 
Regarding this, Sainsbury (2006) shows that non-citizens enjoy greater 
rights in broad welfare states (such as Sweden and Germany) than in 
incomplete welfare states (such as the United States), explained by the 
different nature of their welfare regimes. Along similar lines, Dorr and 
Faist (1997) argue that the essential difference between countries regarding 
the socioeconomic integration of immigrants lies in the institutional 
framework of their welfare regimes. According to these authors, rights of 
residence in fact play a similar role in all the countries they studied, given 
that in all of them immigrants are classified into equivalent entry categories 
with similar rights. 
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 3.2. Deservingness and rights of access to welfare regimes
Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare regimes (1990) is a useful starting 
point to analyze the normative premises determining criteria of deservingness 
(who deserves protection) and right of access (the requirements and procedures 
to access benefits and services) to social protection systems in receiving 
societies are based. 
The social protection schemes of European countries have been established 
through a historical process conditioned by economic, social and political 
factors specific to each country. Social democratic welfare regimes, typical of 
Scandinavian countries, developed out of a universalist philosophy based on the 
extension of individual social rights and on the central role of the state in 
the redistribution of wealth. According to these principles, the welfare state acts 
as one of the primary mechanisms for social equality. These regimes, the result of an 
alliance between different social classes, arose in societies with high levels of 
ethnic homogeneity and a strong sense of collective belonging with the aim 
of protecting the members of the ‘national community’. The extension of social 
rights was based on ‘residing’ within the territory of the country. This has led to 
addressing immigration with a combination of strict surveillance of external 
borders (to control the number of resident foreigners) and internal controls over 
access to social protection systems (to verify the ‘legality’ of residence). This 
way of defining rights of access to social benefits has meant that the issue of 
immigration has traditionally occupied an important place in the political agenda 
of these countries. In addition, this welfare regime model has a significant 
impact on the economy of these countries in terms of salaries, production model, 
labour relations, and more specifically, in regards to the labour market in the 
welfare sector. These are states with high levels of public employment basically 
held by autochthonous women and with little margin for informality. 
Conservative-corporatist social protection regimes, typical of the central 
European countries, emerged out of old guild traditions and were structured 
around the principle of income maintenance. Participation in the labour 
market and affiliation to contributory social insurance systems guarantee 
access to basic social benefits for the contributor and his/her family so that 
they are able to face the risks that are part of the life cycle (illness, dependency, 
ageing). In this model, the strength of social protection is linked to the socio-
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professional category of the worker and is independent of his/her nationality. 
As a result, immigrants legally residing in the host country acquire the right to 
social benefits based on their participation in the formal labour market and under 
the same conditions as the native-born population. In these types of regimes, 
immigrant access to social benefits is not very problematic from a political 
perspective as rights to access to these programmes depend on participation in 
the labour market, which leaves little room for the appearance of a sense of 
‘grievance’ or of ‘unfair competition’ for welfare state resources. However, the 
establishment of public insurance schemes to expand social protection to groups 
excluded from the social insurance system (through minimum income schemes, 
non-contributory pensions, etc.) increases the space for the introduction of this 
issue into the political agenda. With the introduction of these schemes, the issue 
of foreigners’ access to social protection programmes becomes controversial 
and politicized to the degree that such programmes are perceived to be based on 
‘national solidarity’.
The liberal welfare regime, in western Europe only represented by the United 
Kingdom, is based on the individual being responsible for his/her own well-
being. Under this regime, the central role of covering risks throughout the life 
cycle (receiving an income after retirement, etc.) is assigned to the market 
with the state playing only a secondary role. The market is considered the most 
efficient mechanism for allocating resources, and the state is expected to 
intervene only to resolve the most serious problems caused by ‘market failure’. 
In this model, many social protection programmes are based on the principle 
of ‘means testing’; in addition to meeting only the most basic needs of the 
most disadvantaged populations, this attaches a strong social stigma to these 
programmes, making them potential objects for political mobilization. In this 
context, the expectation is that the immigrant origin population, like the 
native-born population, will rely on the market for protection from risks and 
to obtain needed services. Social protection programmes aimed at persons in 
situations of exclusion are based on a tradition of locally organized charity. 
These programmes refer more or less explicitly to ‘community’ solidarity, 
which makes those populations whose community membership is questionable 
particularly vulnerable. As a result, the stigma associated with such programmes 
combined with the issue of immigrant access to them (often labelled as 
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‘abuse’) makes the relationship between immigration and the welfare state a 
particularly important political issue.
The fourth welfare regime model is the Mediterranean type found in Spain and 
other southern European countries. This type of regime combines both social 
insurance programmes (pensions, unemployment benefits) and programmes of 
a universalist character (education, healthcare and, to a lesser extent, personal 
social services) with a traditional dependence on the family as the principal 
provider of care and attention to its members (Ferrera, 1996; Moreno, 2006). 
Under this regime, immigrants have access to social protection in two main 
ways. On the one hand, foreigners with permission to work access these systems 
under the same conditions as native born workers through social insurance based 
on participation in the labour market and affiliation in the social security system 
(as in the conservative-corporatist regime). On the other hand, immigrants have 
access to certain social protection based on residing in the country, in other 
words, access to programmes of universal social protection. In Spain, this would 
be the case with healthcare, education, some social service programmes and 
housing assistance – residency providing the right to benefits regardless of an 
individual’s legal situation. This dual character of the criteria defining rights 
of access also defines the space for the politicization of the issue of immigrants’ 
access to social protection systems. Thus, access to benefits through insurance 
systems – in which, as we will see, immigrants are net contributors – leaves little 
room for the political manipulation of attitudes of “competition” or 
“displacement” among the native-born population. In contrast, programmes of a 
universal character with rights to access based on residency, such as healthcare 
or other social services, are more likely to lead to anti-immigrant feelings, as in 
some cases and some geographical areas situations of competition or at least the 
perception of competition over scarce resources may arise.
 3.3. the access of immigrants to social protection systems 
As we have seen, participation in the formal labour market largely determines 
the social rights of immigrants in Spain through their affiliation to the social 
security system. At the same time, the conceptualization of certain areas of 
welfare as rights of the individual guarantees the formal access of all residents 
in Spain to a series of social protection programmes, such as healthcare and 
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education, regardless of their legal status. In this section we will analyze in 
detail the official mechanisms through which these social rights are realized 
and look at problems that appear in practice for achieving equality between 
the immigrant and the autochthonous populations.
  3.3.1. social security
The social security system is the foundation of the Spanish welfare state. 
Financed basically through the contributions of employees and employers, it is 
comprised of a series of insurance schemes to respond to specific social risks 
linked to the workplace (unemployment, workplace accidents, disability and 
retirement). The contributory nature of these insurance programmes implies 
that the basic criterion defining the right of access to most of the programmes 
managed by the National Social Security Institute (Instituto Nacional de la 
Seguridad Social or INSS) or other autonomous bodies linked to it (Public 
Employment Service (Servicio Público de Empleo or SPE), etc.) is affiliation 
to social security during a specified period of time: to receive a retirement 
pension or unemployment benefits a worker must have contributed during a 
stipulated period specific to each of the insurance schemes, and the pension or 
subsidy to be received will be proportional to the duration and quantity of the 
worker’s contribution. The INSS insurance schemes operate under a pay-as-
you-go and not a capitalization system. In other words, each worker contributes 
to a common fund, from which the necessary resources are extracted to meet 
the payments of benefits and subsidies that must be made at any one time.(5)
The principal exceptions to the necessity of making previous contribution to 
access the benefits of social security are the non-contributory pension and disability 
programmes. These schemes, providing relatively limited benefits and based on 
verifying that beneficiaries have no other sources of income, cover both Spanish 
nationals and foreigners legally residing in Spain who have not made social 
security contributions during the legally stipulated period and who meet all the 
conditions for applying for these benefits (age or degree of recognized disability).
(5) The capitalization mode refers to systems in which each worker possesses a personal account in which his/her 
contributions accumulate, and from which funds will be extracted to meet the benefits the worker has a right to in 
the future (as now occurs to some extent in the Swedish case since the end of the 1990s or in a number of Eastern 
European countries since reforms resulting from the collapse of the Socialist Bloc).
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Nationality does not play an important role in the established criteria defining the 
right of access to INSS benefits, as both Spanish citizens and immigrants with 
work permits and employment in the formal economy have access to these systems 
under equal conditions. This is one of the reasons why immigrants’ access to 
social security benefits rarely become an object of public or political debate, as 
they are only receiving a benefit that they previously contributed toward.
In recent years, the percentage of foreigners among INSS affiliates has 
remained fairly stable, between 10 and 11% in the case of men and around 
10% among women.
table 3.1 
evolution of social security affiliates by nationality
In percentages
natIonalItY 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Spain 96.1 94.4 90.3 89.7 89.5
rest of the eu (without romania) 1.0 1.2 1.7 2.3 2.2
rest of europe (without romania) 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.4
romania 0.1 0.3 0.9 1.2 1.6
latin america (without ecuador) 0.7 1.1 2.4 2.5 2.7
ecuador 0.4 0.8 1.5 1.3 1.1
africa (without morocco) 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5
morocco 0.8 1.0 1.4 1.3 1.3
asia and oceania 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8
Total Foreigners 3.9 5.6 9.7 10.3 10.5
Source: based on data from the InSS.
We can see in table 3.1 that the effects of crisis have been more visible 
among African and Moroccan workers, as their percentage among affiliates 
in the social insurance system has declined in the last three years. In addition, 
among Ecuadorean workers – with a high presence in sectors such as 
construction that have been greatly affected by the crisis – the number of 
affiliates has also significantly declined. In contrast, the sum of all Latin 
American affiliates (excluding Ecuadoreans) reveals only a slight variation. 
The other groups have also maintained relatively stable percentages of 
affiliation, beyond the variations produced by the statistical effects resulting 
from the incorporation of Poles, Romanians and Bulgarians into the EU.
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table 3.2
comparative evolution of foreign affiliates to social security by sex 
In percentages
natIonalItY
2006 2007 2008
men Women men Women men Women 
Spain 89.2 90.4 89.1 90.4 89.4 90.1
rest of the eu (without romania) 2.2 1.8 2.5 2.0 2.4 2.0
rest of europe (without romania) 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4
romania 1.0 0.9 1.3 1.0 1.4 1.1
latin america (without ecuador) 2.1 3.0 2.1 3.1 2.2 3.3
ecuador 1.3 1.8 1.1 1.6 1.0 1.5
africa (without morocco) 0.9 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.7 0.2
morocco 2.0 0.6 1.9 0.6 1.8 0.7
asia and oceania 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.9 0.6
Total Foreigners 10.8 9.6 10.9 9.6 10.6 9.9
Source: based on data from the InSS.
In the case of women immigrants, the affiliation figures shown in table 3.2 reveal 
a slight trend contrary to what might initially be expected, as their proportion 
among affiliates is not in decline but on the increase. The logic behind this 
dynamic is clearly linked to the fact that women immigrants that work in the 
formal economy are employed in sectors less affected by the crisis. In this regard, 
African and Moroccan women are better off than men of the same origin. 
Maintaining employment is key for immigrants because in many cases renewal 
of work and residency permits depends on having a job. In this regard, entering 
into an irregular situation due to the legal framework regulating the obtention 
and renovation of work permits is one of the risks threatening immigrants’ 
access to the social insurance system. Remaining employed in the formal 
economy and contributing to social security is a central condition for access to 
the benefits administered by the INSS. The persistence of undocumented 
immigration as well as the structural role of the underground economy in the 
Spanish production system create important obstacles to immigrants having 
access to the social insurance system and contributing to public finances.
The rise in the number of jobseekers and recipients of unemployment benefits 
among immigrants reflects the impact the economic crisis has had on 
immigrant participation in the labour market. Thus, 750,000 of the more than 
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4.5 million jobseekers registered with Spain’s Public Employment Service at 
the beginning of 2010 were foreigners.
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As graph 3.1 shows, the presence of immigrant groups among those collecting 
unemployment benefits has increased considerably in recent years. Latin 
Americans and Moroccans are among the most affected. In the last five years, 
the presence of these groups among the population receiving unemployment 
benefits has tripled. 
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graph 3.2
Percentage of total unemployed from the 10 major nationalities among 
foreigners in spain
data from december 2009
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The most numerous immigrant groups in the population are also the most 
numerous groups in terms of unemployment: in first place are the Moroccans, 
followed by Romanians and Ecuadorians.
The amount and duration of unemployment benefits immigrants receive are 
directly tied to the duration and level of their previous contributions. This has a 
number of important social and political implications. First of all, recipients of 
this benefit are receiving it because they contributed to the s cial insurance 
system, and they do so in proportion to their previous contributions, leaving 
little room for this to become a politicized issue. Secondly, the duration of these 
benefits is limited. Once unemployment benefits are used up, the unemployed no 
longer receive the subsidy. Some programmes providing aid to those whose 
unemployment benefits have run out are also open to immigrants legally residing 
in Spain,(6) although due to their non-contributory character they provide only 
minimum temporary assistance for persons in situations of difficulty. 
Currently, immigrant labour helps to balance the social security budget, given that 
this population is a net contributor to the system and claims few benefits. This is 
particularly true regarding retirement pensions, which as we saw in the previous 
chapter, constitute the largest expense in the social protection system.
(6) This is the case of the Temporary Program for Protection from Unemployment and for Integration (Programa Tem-
poral de Protección por Desempleo e Inserción) in effect from August 2010 until February 2011 (providing 426 Euros 
a month during a period of six months, which can be extended an additional six months, for those individuals whose 
unemployment benefits have run out) or the programme that has replaced it, which links receiving the subsidy to parti-
cipation in vocational training.
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graph 3.3
Beneficiaries of pensions by nationality
march 2010
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Currently, less than 1% of the recipients of pensions in Spain are immigrants 
(graph 3.3). Of this 1%, more than half are EU citizens; France with 16,400 
and Germany with 9,400 pensioners occupy the first positions on the list of 
foreign recipients of retirement pensions in Spain. The third country on the list 
of foreign retirees is Morocco (approximately 8,000 pensioners); the following 
country among those categorized as economic immigrants (Argentina, with 
around 2,200 pensioners) does not appear until the 9th position on the list. In this 
context it is quite clear that immigrants, the great majority of whom are in 
their most productive years, constitute a net contribution to the INSS budget, 
and they will continue to be for at least the next two decades (assuming that 
the number of immigrants remains constant without new arrivals). Evidently, 
this clear positive balance will not be as sharply defined in the future as the 
first cohorts of migrant workers settled in Spain in the mid 1980s begin to 
retire. In chapter 6, we will return to this question when analyzing the impact 
of immigration on the financial sustainability of the Spanish welfare state.
  3.3.2. healthcare
The Spanish public healthc re system is a clear example of the particularities 
of the Mediterranean welfare regime. Composed traditionally of a multiplicity of 
social insurance schemes, it underwent a slow process of consolidation beginning 
in the 1950s toward a relatively unified system within the social security system 
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and became the Spanish National Health System or NHS (Sistema Nacional de 
Salud) in the second half of the 1980s (Guinea and Moreno Fuentes, 2009). This 
development made it possible to extend healthcare coverage to virtually all the 
population with Spanish nationality by the beginning of the 1990s.(7) The relative 
lack of legislative clarity regarding the rights of foreigners, along with a restrictive 
interpretation of the General Law on Healthcare (Ley General de Sanidad 
(LGS)), meant that the universalization of healthcare coverage applied in 1989 
referred only to the Spanish.(8) Open and free access to the public healthcare 
system for immigrants remained conditioned by their contributions to the social 
security system. Citizens of the EU could access the NHS through the mutual 
recognition of healthcare coverage within the European Union between countries, 
while healthcare for refugees and asylum seekers was provided by the Red Cross 
in concert with the state. Undocumented immigrants were in the most 
precarious position, with access only to emergency services and the treatment 
of infectious diseases. Diverse parallel networks made up of NGOs, charitable 
healthcare services (dependent on autonomous community and municipal 
governments) and NHS healthcare professionals (on their own and voluntarily) 
provided care to these individuals. This partial and segmented coverage suffered 
from a severe lack of resources, provoking overlap in the provision of healthcare 
services and leaving important gaps in care for these groups, who were ultimately 
dependent on the goodwill of healthcare professionals. 
The first undocumented immigrants that formally received access to NHS 
services under conditions equal to those for Spanish citizens were pregnant 
women and children, after the approval of the 1996 Child Welfare Law (Ley de 
Protección del Menor) and the 1996 reform of regulations for the 
implementation of the 1985 National Immigration Law (Ley de Extranjería 
7/1985). The practical application of this legislation was frozen, however, 
because of the complexity of the relationship between the different government 
agencies responsible for implementing it, particularly the multiple levels of 
government involved (state, autonomous and even municipal).
(7) In 1982, 85.5% of the Spanish population was covered by the public system of healthcare insurance. After the 
application of the LGS, coverage reached 97.1% in 1987. In 2006, 98.3% of the Spanish population was covered 
by the public healthcare system. Of the 1.7% left without coverage, those of Spanish nationality were essentially 
individuals who, having their own economic resources, were not eligible for non-contributory schemes providing 
coverage.
(8) The legislation that defined the way in which individuals without economic resources could access the services 
of the NHS required Spanish nationality to be eligible.
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Healthcare coverage for undocumented immigrants became part of the 
political agenda at the beginning of 1999 as a consequence of the limited 
implementation of the legislation. Despite the relative weakness of the social 
groups advocating for the incorporation of immigrants into the healthcare 
system (third sector public health organizations and immigrant rights 
organizations), this movement found a window of political opportunity in the 
debate over the Organic Law 4/2000, 11 January, on the rights and liberties of 
aliens in Spain and their integration into society (Ley Orgánica sobre Derechos 
y Libertades de los Extranjeros en España y su integración social), generally 
referred to as Law 4/2000. This new law expanded healthcare coverage to all 
persons that could demonstrate that they were residing in Spain and lacked 
resources to cover the cost of their healthcare. The mechanism chosen to link 
healthcare coverage with the criterion of residency was enrolment in the 
municipal population register.(9) This formula resolved the issue over the use of 
the healthcare system by short-term visitors to the country (tourists, etc.). 
Despite its simplicity, the procedure for enrolling in the municipal register is 
an area in which bureaucratic discretion or the politicization of immigration 
can interfere with the effective access of immigrants to healthcare services. 
Obtaining the necessary healthcare ‘card’ depends on the requirements 
proposed by government officials of different government levels in the process 
(INSS, regional health services, state tax authority and municipal governments). 
As a result, in recent years cases have come to light of municipalities that have 
blocked undocumented immigrants from enrolling in the municipal population 
register, contravening Spain’s Basic Law on Local Government (Ley de Bases 
de Régimen Local), which establishes the requirements for enrolment.
Analysis of the data from the FOESSA 2007 survey provides us with an 
accurate picture of disadvantaged sectors access to the NHS. While 3% of the 
population above the poverty line (above the threshold of 60% of the median 
national income) stated that they did not have access to the National Health 
System, this percentage increases to 5.2% among those below the poverty line. 
A more complex categorization of social exclusion provides a more detailed view 
of the limitations of access to the NHS. Based on 39 indicators of economic and 
(9) Initially the mere presence of an individual in Spanish territory was sufficient to access the national healthcare 
system’s services, however, the specific “problem” of the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla required the in-
troduction of a filtering system that would impede the complete saturation of the healthcare services in those cities. 
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social exclusion from this survey households can be classified into four broad 
categories according to the number of social exclusion factors they are affected by: 
‘Integrated’ (households not affected by any of the measures of exclusion used); 
‘Precariously integrated’ (households affected by one of the nine dimensions of 
exclusion measured); ‘Vulnerable’ (households affected by two or three of the 
dimensions of exclusion), and ‘Excluded’ (households affected by four or more of 
the dimensions of exclusion) (Guinea and Moreno Fuentes, 2009). Based on this 
classification we can see that 8% of the individuals interviewed from ‘excluded’ 
households stated they had no type of healthcare coverage.(10) 
table 3.3
healthcare coverage in function of degree of social exclusion of household
tYpe of healthcare coVerage
tYpe of 
houSehold
publIc  
contrIbutorY
non  
contrIbutorY prIVate none
Integrated
3,727 71 387 0
97% 2% 10% 0%
precarious
2,013 33 157 0
95% 2% 7% 0%
Vulnerable
1,405 55 201 0
96% 4% 14% 0%
excluded
282 21 4 28
85% 7% 1% 8%
note: the percentages do not add up to 100 because they refer to multiple responses.
Source: based on data from the 2007 foeSSa survey.
As the category of ‘excluded’ makes up only 4.3% of the total number of individuals 
in the sample and the percentage of individuals in this category that state they have 
no healthcare coverage is below 10%, there are actually only 28 cases of individuals 
in this situation in the survey sample; as a result, it is not possible to draw 
statistically significant conclusions. However, the fact that all of these individuals 
are immigrants is certainly suggestive regarding the difficulties of access that 
undocumented immigrants may have to the National Health System.
(10) This result is to a certain extent based on a tautology, as the absence of healthcare coverage for any household 
members is one of the variables used to construct the exclusion index; but the concentration of persons in this 
situation in the category defined as “excluded” suggests that this figure reflects a specific social reality that is 
important to highlight. 
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table 3.4
type of healthcare coverage by household category and nationality
INTEGRATED 
PRECARIOUSLY 
INTEGRATED
VULNERABLE EXCLUDED
SPANISH OTHER SPANISH OTHER SPANISH OTHER SPANISH OTHER
Other 3,718 105 1,845 265 1,309 111 258 34
Only non-contributory 68 3 26 6 9 46 5 13
Without coverage 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 28
Risk of having only  
non-contributory
0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.29 0.02 0.17
Source: based on data from the 2007 foeSSa survey.
A significant number of foreign residents in Spain say they have access to NHS 
benefits through non-contributory healthcare assistance. Although only 
176 individuals from the sample rely on this as their only form of healthcare 
coverage, a comparison of the relative risk (11) of immigrants and the autochthonous 
population depending on this mechanism for access to healthcare (based on the 
absence of economic resources) reveals a substantial difference between them. 
table 3.5
relative risk of having only non-contributory healthcare coverage by 
type of household and nationality
  Integrated precarIouSlY Integrated Vulnerable eXcluded
foreigners vs. Spanish 1.5 1.6 42.4 9.1
Source: based on data from the foeSSa 2007 survey.
For immigrants that live in ‘integrated’ households the relative risk of counting 
on non-contributory assistance as the only form of healthcare coverage is 1.5 
times greater than for the native-born population in the same household category. 
This ratio increases to 9.1 in the case of immigrants living in “excluded” 
households, and among those that live in “vulnerable” households immigrants 
are 42.4 times more likely to count on this assistance than the native-born.(12) 
(11) The concept of relative risk, or the ratio between two risks, indicates the probability of an event occurring (in 
this case, depending solely on non-contributory healthcare assistance) among a specific group (in this case indivi-
duals classified by the type of household in which they live and by their nationality). 
(12) It should be remembered that, given the reduced size of the sample, this survey only permits us to identify 
tendencies rather than to estimate with absolute precision differences that exist in the population. 
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  3.3.3. social services and the safety net
The social services sphere constitutes the weakest link in Spain’s social protection 
system. Vaguely defined and characterized both by its complicated institutional 
organization and its inadequate funding, this area of social policy is poorly 
developed, as generally occurs in countries within the Mediterranean welfare 
model. Social services were established in Spain under Franco from previously 
existing charitable schemes, and following the same logic, they are intended to 
provide a minimum level of care or service to populations that are excluded 
from or insufficiently protected by the social security system. 
After the transition to democracy, the social service legislation passed by the 
autonomous communities reflected a willingness to introduce a more universalist 
orientation to these types of programmes with the aim of providing care to all 
citizens regardless of their employment situation or income level. The creation of 
the Ministry of Social Affairs at the end of the 1980s was also an attempt to 
improve cooperation between levels of government through general coordination 
plans (regarding the elderly, drugs, equal opportunity and youth). Among these 
plans the Concerted Plan for the Development of the Basic Provision of Social 
Services by Local Government (Plan Concertado para el desarrollo de 
prestaciones básicas de servicios sociales de las corporaciones locales) stands 
out, the aim of which is to increase cooperation between different levels of 
government in the design, development and financing of social services (Arriba 
and Pérez, 2008). Despite this, the desire to overcome the discretional character of 
charity has never been concretized at a practical level through a system of benefits 
of a universal nature, financed with taxes and guaranteeing the individual rights of 
the citizenry (Aguilar, 2009). Social services have remained limited to providing 
care for the most disadvantaged sectors of society, with the rest of the population 
relying on markets (formal or informal) for the provision of the services they need. 
In this relatively new system of social services, the moralist discretion of traditional 
charity has been replaced by the discretion of a professionalized bureaucracy. 
Included under the umbrella of social services are the main assistance mechanisms 
to facilitate the social integration and autonomy of the most vulnerable, those 
who do not have access to the contributory social protection systems and who 
lack economic resources. Operationally, the social services provided by the 
autonomous communities are divided into primary social care services and 
specialized services. Primary social care systems provide services of a general 
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character, which are normally managed by municipalities and aimed toward a 
broad spectrum of activities — from case evaluations to service provision, such 
as home care. Specialized services, generally run by the autonomous communities, 
are aimed at specific populations or respond to concrete problems. 
Also found among the responsibilities of social services is the management of 
the safety net: non-contributory pensions (NCP) and minimum insertion 
income (MII), both of which are means-tested programmes requiring income 
verification. The 1990 Law of Non-Contributory Pensions of the Social Security 
(La Ley de Prestaciones no Contributivas de la Seguridad Social or Ley 26/1990) 
established a pension system for persons over 65 years of age or with disabilities 
(with more than 65% disability) in situations of economic vulnerability. In 
addition, the autonomous community governments gradually put into effect 
minimum income schemes aimed at facilitating the social insertion of families 
at risk of social exclusion not covered by other social protection schemes (Arriba 
and Pérez, 2008). 
Finally, the last element of social policy that we will discuss in this section is 
the System for Autonomy and Care for Dependency (Sistema de Autonomía y 
Atención a la Dependencia or SAAD), launched after the passage of the Law 
on Promotion of Personal Autonomy and Care for Dependent Persons (Ley de 
Promoción de la Autonomía Personal y Atención a Personas en Situación 
de Dependencia or Ley 39/2006), often referred to as the Long-Term Care Act. 
This legislative development has come to be called the “fourth pillar of Spain’s 
welfare state” and is the most significant advance in the expansion of social 
protection in Spain in recent decades (Marbán, 2006). The passage of this law 
recognizes the subjective right to assistance and care for those facing functional 
dependence (defined as a lack of physical, psychological or intellectual 
autonomy implying the need for help in carrying out the basic activities of daily 
life). Since the passage of the law, this system has gradually been established 
based on a philosophy of the sharing of competencies and responsibilities 
among the different levels of government. In addition, the law assigns an 
important role to families both in the provision of care as well as in its financing 
when care is provided outside of the family. 
In seeking access to social services and benefits, both the autochthonous and 
immigrant populations encounter the same lack of organizational clarity (Guillén 
et al., 2002). However, the immigrant population faces certain additional obstacles. 
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Article 14 of Law 4/2000 entitles foreigners legally residing in Spain to basic and 
specialized social services and benefits under the same conditions as Spanish 
citizens. Foreigners with an irregular administrative status, on the other hand, have 
a right to basic social services and benefits through enrolment in municipal 
population registers. This distinction is not based on a clear legal definition regarding 
the content of basic and specialized services. As a result, while immigrants residing 
legally in Spain have access to the same services and benefits as Spanish nationals 
(in principle), each autonomous community has resolved in its own way the issue 
of undocumented immigrants’ access to its social services network: in some regions 
requirements are flexible in order to facilitate access, while in others parallel 
mechanisms have been established to attend undocumented immigrants, generally 
in collaboration with third sector organizations (Rodríguez Cabrero, 2003). 
The issue of immigrants’ access to social services has led to the fear of these 
services being flooded due to the vulnerability of immigrants, the result of their 
precarious employment, lower salaries, lack of family and social networks and the 
flawed coverage of other social protection systems. In addition, the generation of 
potential ‘social service tourists’ or the creation of work disincentives have led to 
concerns regarding possible ‘dependency’. The essential argument is that 
immigrants could become accustomed to depending on social subsidies, and this 
could discourage them from seeking work.
The autonomous communities provide most of the data regarding the use of 
social services,(13) which is then introduced by Spain’s Ministry of Health and 
Social Policy into its Social Service User Information System (Sistema de 
Información de Usuarios de Servicios Sociales (SIUSS)) database. The most 
recent information available, from the year 2008, gathers together data from 
13 autonomous communities and the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla 
(MSPS, 2009).(14) In table 3.6 we can see that in that year foreigners represented 
approximately 13.7% of the users recorded in the SIUSS, a percentage very 
similar to the 11.55% of the population in those regions that are foreigners.
However, if we focus instead on the total number of interventions, this group is 
clearly underrepresented. Of the total of 2,385,683 social service interventions 
(13) The fact that the gathering of this data is not obligatory means that the number of incomplete cases is quite 
large, limiting the significance of the data analyzed (Informe del SIUSS, 2008). The classification of users in the 
category “immigrant” should be noted with caution, as significant bias may have been produced.
(14) Does not include the Canary Islands, Castilla-La Mancha, Catalonia and the Basque Country. 
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in these autonomous communities and cities, 163,308 were considered as 
assistance to immigrants (representing only 6.85% of all the interventions).
Although the available information on minimum insertion income is not complete, 
the data do not confirm fears of a massive number of foreigners among the 
beneficiaries of these types of programmes. According to the data gathered and 
published by the Ministry of Health and Social Policy, in 2008 immigrants made 
up 11.2% of the beneficiaries of MII programmes in Spain, a percentage slightly 
below the actual weight of the immigrant population in Spain’s overall population, 
which was approximately 12.2% (MSPS, 2010)(15) In addition, if we take into 
consideration that immigrants are more likely to be among the most disadvantaged 
groups in the Spanish population, and therefore represent a greater proportion of 
the population at risk of social exclusion, it is clear that the range of coverage of 
MII programmes for the immigrant population is considerably below what would 
correspond to this group proportionately and that a significant number of 
immigrants are left without the protection provided by these programmes. 
table 3.6
Number and percentage of users of social services by nationality 2008*
natIonalItY no. of uSerS percentage of the total 
Total 1,279,189 100.00 
Spain 1,104,104 86.31
maghreb 42,098 3.29 
eu 35,302 2.76 
rest of europe 5,327 0.42 
asia 1,799 0.14 
central and South america 70,585 5.52 
Sub-Saharan africa 6,962 0.54 
rest of countries 8,009 0.63 
Stateless 5,003 0.39 
Total of foreigners** 175,085 13.69
* these data reflect information from 13 autonomous communities which contributed data to the SIuSS.
** the number and percentage ‘total of foreigners’ includes all users of a nationality other than Spanish.
Source: SIuSS 2008 report (ministry of health and Social policy, 2009).
(15) No information is available for Andalusia, Extremadura, the Basque Country and La Rioja.
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In table 3.7 we can see the great variation among autonomous communities in this 
regard, which is in part explained by different eligibility requirements. While in the 
majority of communities legal residency is required to be eligible for MII schemes, 
the Balearic Islands, Navarra and the Basque Country have extended coverage to all 
individuals enrolled in municipal population registers (regardless of their 
administrative status), while in Andalusia access to these benefits is denied to non-
EU immigrants (Laparra, 2008). As a consequence, while in some regions less than 
10% of the beneficiaries of MII schemes were immigrants in 2008 (specifically in 
Ceuta, Murcia, Asturias and Galicia), this percentage increased to 30% in the Basque 
Country, 33.6% in Catalonia, 55.5% in the Balearic Islands and 61.4% in Navarra. 
table 3.7
immigrants receiving minimum insertion income (Mii) 2009
AUTONOMOUS  
COMMUNITY
IMMIGRANTS 
RECEIVING MII
TOTAL  
RECIPIENTS  
OF MII
PERCENTAGE OF  
IMMIGRANTS 
RECEIVING MII 
RECIPIENTS OF MII 
FOR EVERY 10,000 
INHABITANTS 
RECIPIENTS OF MII 
FOR EVERY 10,000 
IMMIGRANTS
andalusia – 27,212 – 32.77 –
aragon 477 1,768 27.00 13.14 27.71
asturias 603 7,902 7.60 72.81  127.97
balearic Islands 1,075 1,937 55.50 17.68  45.25
basque country – 55,410 30.00  255.08 –
canary Islands 414 3,775 11.00  17.94 13.74
cantabria 291 2,223 13.00 37.72  76.38
castilla-la mancha 97 603 16.00 2.89  4.29
castilla y leon 330 2,748 12.00 10.71  19.68
catalonia 7,413 22,061 33.60  29.51 62.33
extremadura – 1,475 –  13.37 –
galicia 580 6,360 9.10 22.74 54.39
la rioja – 756 – 23.50 –
madrid 1,700 11,426 14.90 17.88 15.98
murcia 55 775 7.10 5.35 2.33
navarra 3,736 6,087 61.40 96.53 528.97
Valencia 696 4,001 17.40  7.85 7.82
ceuta 2 88 2.20  11.18 5.63
melilla 123 251 49.00 34.16  161.90
Total 17,592 156,858 11.20 3.55 31.14
Source: based on data from the report on minimum Income Insertion of the ministry of health and Social policy 
2009 (mSpS, 2010); moreno and aierdi urraza, 2008 and Ine.
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The basic characteristics of MII benefits (their limited quantity and strict conditions 
for eligibility), as well as immigrants’ long-term objectives (integration in the 
labour market, accumulating savings, etc.), mean that they only serve to provide 
temporary aid in periods of particular economic difficulty. Available data reveal 
that in fact, the way foreigners use these programmes proves them to be 
successful: brief participation and relatively rapid exit to enter the labour market. 
These benefits, therefore, are a form of one-off aid to prevent a deterioration of 
their beneficiaries’ economic situation and in some cases make possible other 
types of social service interventions (Serrano and Arriba, 2002).
It is very likely that the presence of immigrants among the beneficiaries of these 
types of income transfer programmes (both non-contributory pensions and 
minimum insertion income) will be greater in the future due to the declining 
economic situation, high unemployment and unemployment benefits ending. 
Other processes of sociodemographic change supporting this hypothesis are the 
acceleration of the family reunification process and the gradual arrival at retirement 
age of sectors of the immigrant population that have only had limited participation 
in the labour market and have not been able to secure the provision of a pension of 
a contributory character. 
  3.3.4. education
The growing presence of immigrant students also implies significant challenges 
for public policy in education. One series of challenges concerns immigrant 
students’ formal access to education under equal conditions with the native 
population. Legislation on immigration has established the right of school-age 
immigrant children to an education (article 9 of Law 4/2000), but recognition of 
this right has not been enough to ensure their effective access to education on 
equal terms.(16) As we will see in the following pages, the data show that immigrant 
children must overcome considerable obstacles to enter the Spanish educational 
system, and they generally do so under inferior conditions in comparison with 
native students, which contributes to poorer educational outcomes.
Of particular importance in terms of access to education is the degree of 
comprehensiveness and stratification of the educational system. Spain can 
(16) The right of immigrants to education was at first limited to legal residents, but this was subsequently changed 
to include all school-age children (Aja, 2000).
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currently be characterized as having a relatively comprehensive educational 
system, one which pursues educational equality through implementing a 
single system for all students.(17) However, this educational system is 
characterized by a fundamental tension between two traditional visions of 
education: a liberal-conservative one, which prioritizes the freedom of parents 
to choose the type of school they want their children to attend, therefore 
accepting a greater degree of differentiation in patterns of schooling; and a 
social democratic one, which sees education as a social right and places greater 
emphasis on equality and comprehensiveness (Carbonell and Quintana, 2003). 
The 1978 Constitution included both the principle of freedom as well as that 
of educational equality in order to facilitate a consensus between different 
political forces. As a consequence of this deliberate ambiguity, Spain’s 
educational laws have regularly undergone drastic changes in orientation, 
shifting between these two ideological positions (Bonal, 1998). The first 
education law under democracy, the 1980 Organic Act on the Right to 
Education (Ley orgánica 8/1985, de 3 de julio, de derecho a la educación 
(LODE)), was designed to break with the strict traditional division between 
academic and vocational education inherited from the dictatorship. The 
legacy of the Franco regime was a profoundly unequal educational system, 
polarized between private schools that taught the well-off classes, and public 
schools for those who could not afford the former (Calero and Bonal, 1999). 
In 1990, the government led by Spain’s Socialist Party (PSOE) passed the 
Organic Act on the General Organization of the Educational System (Ley 
organic 1/1990, de 3 de octubre, de ordenación general del sistema educativo 
(LOGSE)) with the objective of promoting equal educational opportunity. 
The Popular Party (PP) in turn, passed a new education law in 2002, the 
Organic Act on the Quality of Education (Ley organic 10/2002, de 23 de 
diciembre, de calidad de la educación (LOCE)), which for the first time 
recognized the rights of parents to freely choose the school there children 
would attend, while at the same time questioning certain of the elements in 
favour of equal opportunity explicitly guaranteed by the LOGSE. The LOCE 
sought to introduce a differentiated model of secondary education in which 
(17) Comprehensive systems are those in which all students follow the same curriculum and have a single 
type school for compulsory secondary education, while selective or differentiated systems group students 
based on performance or ability (Green, Leny and Wolf, 1999).
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students would follow different curriculums based on their marks. This 
educational reform, designed to reduce the comprehensiveness of the system 
was cut short with the return of the PSOE to power, and with the passage of 
the Organic Act on Education in 2006 (Ley organic 2/2006, de 3 de mayo, de 
educación (LOE)), which was intended to strengthen the comprehensiveness 
of the system and its inclusive character, through its objective of ‘quality 
with equality for all’. 
In this context, the arrival of students of immigrant origin has exacerbated 
the tension between educational equality and educational freedom. The 
increase in students of immigrant origin started to be visible in Spanish 
classrooms at the end of the 1990s, but became especially evident beginning 
in academic year 2001-2002 (and in particular in certain regions, such as 
Catalonia, Madrid, Valencia and Andalusia). Despite the significant increase 
in immigrant students, in the academic year 2009-2010, they still accounted 
for only 9.6% of the total student population in compulsory education, 
762,746 students of a total of 7,606,000 (MEC, 2010). This percentage is 
below the European average and far from that found in countries with a 
tradition of receiving immigrants, such as Germany, France and Sweden, 
where students of immigrant origin, if we include both first and second 
generation immigrants, make up a much greater proportion of the total in 
compulsory education. However, in these countries the majority of students 
of immigrant origin are second generation (having been born and educated 
in the host country), while in Spain, the majority of immigrant students are 
first-generation (or are part of the so-called generation 1.5 who came to 
Spain at a young age).
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graph 3.4
evolution of the percentage of non-university foreign students by 
education level: 2003-2009
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High enrolment rates in Spain indicate that despite the existence of certain 
obstacles immigrant students are finally being included in the educational 
system. The enrolment figures published by the Ministry of Education and 
Science for academic year 2008-2009 show the/a growing presence of 
immigrant students in all stages of compulsory education; particularly in 
primary education, where foreigners are more than 11.5% of the total 
students and in social guarantee programmes, where they represent 12.8% 
of students. In Compulsory Secondary Education (ESO) immigrants account 
for approximately 12% of the student body, although in recent years it is in this 
stage of education where the relative growth in students of immigrant origin 
has been the greatest, a consequence of the increase in migratory flows, but 
also of the implementation of the LOGSE, with its establishment of ESO and 
the extension of compulsory education from 14 to 16 years of age.
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Table 3.8 provides a comparison of the distribution of native-born students and 
students of immigrant origin by different educational stages for academic year 
2008-2009. The majority of students of immigrant origin are in the initial stages 
of education, 41% are in primary school and 16.7% in pre-school. Slightly under 
one third of immigrant students in 2008-2009 were in ESO (29%), while only 
4% were enrolled in the baccalaureate programme and 5% in vocational training. 
In contrast, the educational profile of native-born students is considerably 
different, with the proportion of students in post-compulsory stages of secondary 
education being higher, particularly in the baccalaureate, where the percentage 
is twice that of students of immigrant origin. 
table 3.8
Number and percentage of foreign students by education level: 
academic year 2008-2009
PRE-SCHOOL
PRIMARY  
EDUCATION
SPECIAL ED. ESO BACCALAUREATE
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING
TOTAL
Total 1,784,629 2,659,424 30,767 1,810,298 628,741 542,947 7,456,806
Foreigners 124,211 305,520 3,454 213,530 32,085 40,197 743,696
% 16.70 41.08 0.46 28.71 4.31 5.40 100
Spanish 1,660,418 2,353,904 27,313 1,596,768 596,656 502,750 6,713,110
% 24.73 35.06 0.40 23.78 8.88 7.48 100
Source: based on data from the ministry of education, 2010.
Although immigrant students do not face significant difficulties in entering 
the educational system, obstacles do appear in accessing certain areas of the 
system. Thus, 82% of foreign born students are enrolled in public schools, 
14.1% in the so-called escuelas concertadas (publically-funded private 
schools) and 3.8% in fully private schools (MEC, 2010). This concentration in 
public schools is more pronounced in certain autonomous communities or 
cities such as Melilla (95%), Ceuta (91%), Extremadura (91.3%) and Castilla-
La Mancha (90.7%) (MEC, 2010). The communities with a more egalitarian 
distribution of immigrant students between public and private schools are 
Cantabria (70.7%) and the Basque Country (67.8%) (MEC, 2010).
the acceSS of ImmIgrantS to SocIal benefItS  73
graph 3.5
Percentage of non-university students by nationality and type of 
school: academic year 2009-2010
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Despite the access of school-age immigrant children to compulsory education, 
only 10% of these children continue their studies upon reaching 16 years of 
age (López Peláez, 2006). This contrasts sharply with the general enrolment 
rate for persons of 17 years of age in Spain, which is 83% (OECD, 2010), 45% 
of whom follow an academic curriculum (the baccalaureate) and 38% 
vocational training (MEC, 2010). Students of immigrant origin make up 
4.03% (25,382) of the baccalaureate students and 5.15% (23,389) of students 
in vocational training. Particularly noticeable is the presence of immigrants in 
social guarantee programmes (designed for those students that have not 
achieved the objectives set for the ESO), a presence which has grown at a rate 
of nearly 25% annually in recent years (CIDE, 2006:4).
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graph 3.6
Percentage distribution of foreign students by education level and type 
of school
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Regarding higher education, there are few foreign students from non-European 
countries in Spanish universities. In public universities they make up 3.4% of 
the students, 2.3% in private centres affiliated with public universities, and 
2.5% in fully private universities (table 3.9). This data should be interpreted 
with caution, as it includes students who have come to Spain specifically for 
their university studies but does not include students of immigrant origin who 
now possess Spanish citizenship.
How do we explain the concentration of students of immigrant origin in certain 
sectors? As we have mentioned, immigrant children have more than double the 
probability of native-born children of attending a school with a high 
concentration of foreign students (OECD, 2010: 36) and a greater probability 
of going to schools with a greater proportion of students of lower socioeconomic 
status. This phenomenon, found in all OECD countries, is part of the process 
of the reproduction of social class. There is a broad academic consensus on the 
impact of parental socioeconomic and educational levels on the educational 
level attained by students (OECD, 2007, 20101), so that these patterns in the 
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distribution of immigrant students imply a considerable level of school 
segregation, which will have a negative impact on their educational outcomes. 
table 3.9
foreign students enrolled by type of university, school and origin
academic year 2009-2010
TOTAL
PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES PRIVATE  
UNIVERSITIESFULLY PUBLIC AFFILIATED SCHOOLS
Total students 1,404,115 100.0% 1,182,482 100.0% 62,412 100.0% 159,221 100.0%
Total foreign students 45,223 3.2% 39,869 3.4% 1,450 2.3% 3,904 2.5%
EU-27 16,002 35.4% 13,685 34.3% 529 36.5% 1,788 45.8%
Others 29,221 64.6% 26,184 65.7% 921 63.5% 2,116 54.2%
Source: based on data from the ministry of education and Science.
The concentration of immigrant students in schools in certain neighbourhoods 
also reflects patterns of residential segregation, as immigrant families tend to 
settle in areas where housing is more affordable and where they find 
communities of the same national origin. In addition, the strategies followed 
by native born parents in choosing schools can also accelerate the process of 
concentration if these parents avoid sending their children to schools with a 
high proportion of immigrant students. These strategies, aimed at maximizing 
the quality of education received by their children, are generally based on the 
premise that the education level in a school is negatively affected by the 
enrolment of immigrant students. The lower social status given to certain types 
of education, such as vocational training, also explains the concentration of 
immigrants in these programmes. This is traditionally the case in Spain, which 
explains the relatively low enrolment rates among native-born students in 
vocational training, considerably below the European and OECD averages.
Along with individual indicators of parents’ socioeconomic and educational 
levels, there are some institutional variables which can have a significant effect 
on school segregation. Social research on this issue has focused primarily on 
analyzing the impact of the degree of comprehensiveness of the education 
system on segregation, and this in turn on educational outcomes. Studies 
based on data from the Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA) have shown that less comprehensive systems (in other words, 
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differential systems) reproduce and reinforce economic, social and cultural 
inequalities to a greater extent (OECD, 2006b). The essential idea is that the 
social (socioeconomic and ethnic) composition of schools determines 
academic performance; therefore those systems that promote a higher degree 
of social heterogeneity within schools reduce inequality in outcomes among 
students (Duru-Bellat et al., 2004).
International comparative studies rank Spain among the most egalitarian 
countries of the OECD (MEC, 2010; OECD, 2010), as indicated by the high 
percentage of children of manual workers in tertiary education. Although the 
PISA index of economic, social and cultural status reveals Spain’s average 
score to be very close to the OECD average, Spanish students of lower 
socioeconomic and cultural status obtain better academic results than the 
average for the OECD, and the difference in academic results between students 
of higher and lower socioeconomic status is smaller. In addition, the schools 
that educate students of low socioeconomic and cultural status achieve better 
aggregate results than equivalent schools in other countries. 
Nevertheless, although Spain has a considerably comprehensive education 
system, and students are not tracked at an early age, the system does have 
other stratifying elements which negatively impact on educational outcomes. 
There is, in particular, a sharp segregation of the student population between 
public and private schools linked to the difficulty in regulating parents’ 
choice of schools for their children and the practices of private schools. The 
concentration and segregation of students of immigrant origin was exposed 
in a controversial study by the Ombudsman (Defensor del Pueblo) (2003), 
which led private schools to demand his resignation ‘for not guaranteeing 
the right of all people to freedom of choice regarding school’.(18) Different 
studies have shown that private schools apply selection practices that are at 
the limits of legality, for example, charging additional fees that are an 
obstacle to low-income families (Bonal, 2002; Alegre, 2008) or dissuading 
certain types of families from applying for a place in the school, redirecting 
them to other, most often public, schools (Calero and Bonal, 1999: 124). 
This situation has led the Council of Europe to ask Spanish authorities to 
give greater attention to the appearance of ‘school ghettos’, which are a 
(18) ‘La escuela concertada pide la dimisión del defensor del pueblo’ [Private schools call for the resignation of 
the ombudsman], Magisnet, 4-6-2003.
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consequence of the practice of the systematic enrolment of immigrant 
students in certain public schools and the active ‘avoidance’of their enrolment 
in private schools (ECRI, 2011). 
Not only do schools apply strategies for the selection of students, but often 
these strategies are based on or reinforced by specific policies (or by the 
absence of effective regulation) regarding the conditions for access to 
schools financed with public funds. The legislation established by the PP 
government to modify the LODE included measures such as permitting 
schools to have their own admissions criteria, reducing the weight of 
family income and expanding catchment areas (the area in which a family 
can choose a school) (Bonal, 2002). These types of policies have been 
criticized in some communities (Carbonell and Quintana, 2003) as they 
alter the conditions for choosing a school and increase the degree of 
freedom private schools have in the admission of students. In addition, 
international studies have shown that the degree of public regulation of 
schools or the freedom they have to choose students plays a fundamental 
role in the appearance of socioeconomic and ethnic segregation in the 
schools (Burgess et al., 2007). The potential effects of these policies on 
equality are considerable, as schools in systems lacking regulation compete 
among themselves for the best students, and students not selected end up 
in the least desired schools.
 3.4. conclusions
In this chapter we have found that the institutional frameworks characteristic 
of the economic system and the Spanish welfare state regime condition the 
access of immigrants to Spain’s social protection systems. In the case of 
social security, we have seen that the major obstacles to immigrant access 
to social insurance programmes result from the loss of employment (which in 
the long run implies the end of benefits), the persistence of the underground 
economy, the irregular administrative situation many face often resulting 
from the difficulty renewing work and residency permits and finally, the 
undocumented status under which many immigrants live.
Because of its relationship to the existence of institutional inertias, we have 
analyzed how the accumulation of insurance schemes as a way of universalizing 
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access to social protection programs (the case of the NHS) often leads to a 
situation in which those at greater risk slip through the interstices (Moreno 
Fuentes, 2004) — in this case, undocumented immigrants.
We have also seen that the decentralization of the Spanish welfare state has led 
to a dynamic of the diversification of access to those programmes that fall 
under the responsibility of autonomous community and local governments 
(for example, MII or education). This brings public decision making regarding 
the functioning of the welfare state closer to citizens, making it possible for the 
public to decide in their autonomous community or municipality the range of 
social protection services they want to extend to non-citizens. However, this also 
opens up space for the politicization of immigration, with results in some cases 
that are beginning to be problematic (the emergence of local political platforms 
which create or mobilize anti-immigrant sentiment for political gain).
Furthermore, we have seen in the educational sphere that the access of children 
of immigrants to school is mediated by a selection dynamic which tends to 
disproportionately concentrate immigrant children in public schools. In this 
case, existing institutional inertias are combined with a three-pronged strategy 
that is mutually reinforcing: on the one hand, the strategy of Spanish parents 
to avoid schools with a high percentage of immigrant children; on the other 
hand, the selective admissions policies of private schools, and finally, the 
reinforcement of both of these strategies through policies that fail to adequately 
regulate the degree of freedom parents and schools have, placing the principle 
of freedom before that of equal opportunity.
The functioning of the Spanish welfare regime under these premises has 
resulted in the emergence of inequalities which particularly affect immigrant 
populations. These inequalities will be addressed in the next chapter.
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 iV. immigration, inequality and equity 
Social protection systems can be analyzed from a dual perspective: by studying 
access to benefits and services (the dimension of equality), or by paying 
attention to the inequalities affecting specific groups, analysing the capacity 
of those social protection systems to meet the needs of those groups (the 
dimension of equity).
In the previous chapter we analyzed how the main characteristics of welfare 
regimes and their eligibility criteria determine the patterns of access to social 
protection systems for immigrant populations. In the present chapter we will 
see how formal eligibility does not in and of itself guarantee real access of 
immigrants to social protection programmes; nor does it assure that the results 
of these programmes will be fair. Bearing this in mind, we will look at the way 
Spain’s public administrations have attempted to respond to these inequalities 
through equity policies, within the limits permitted by their mechanisms to 
manage diversity.
 4.1. factors explaining inequalities
Before analyzing the inequalities faced by immigrant groups and the ways 
they are addressed through public policy, we will briefly review some of the 
causes which may be at the origin of these inequalities.
A first approach argues that the inequalities immigrants face are the result of their 
position in the social and economic structure of the receiving society. Thus, 
immigrants share the same disadvantages as the most economically vulnerable 
groups in the autochthonous population. Without necessarily denying the 
specificity of problems faced by immigrants resulting from their adaptation to a 
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culture different from their own, this focus suggests that generic measures to fight 
social exclusion are the most effective way to reduce these inequalities. Therefore, 
the key factor to consider is the position of immigrants in the class structure of the 
receiving society, as the dominant issue that can affect immigrant groups is one of 
relative material deprivation (McAll, 1992; Portes and Rumbaut, 1996; Portes and 
Zhou, 2005). This approach has, undoubtedly, made an important contribution 
toward explaining inequalities. What it suggests is that it is essential that studies 
utilize control groups from the native-born population of a similar socioeconomic 
background to that of the immigrant groups that are being studied.
A second approach focuses on the cultural and social particularities of immigrant 
groups as the source of the inequalities affecting them (Walters and Eschbach, 
1995; Crutchfield and Pettinicchio, 2009). These include social practices such as 
types of family relationships, dietary habits, etc. In other words, understanding the 
inequality that affects different immigrant groups involves analyzing the specific 
characteristics of each group and understanding their customs and practices in 
daily life, especially in relation to the mechanisms of social protection. However, 
while specific socio-cultural characteristics may be a significant part of the cause 
of inequality affecting immigrant groups, this does not mean we can fall into 
simplistic arguments that “blame the victim” for the disadvantages they face.
A third approach explains inequalities experienced by immigrants as linked to 
the way agencies in charge of providing welfare benefits and social services 
operate. Of particular importance is the role of those responsible for policy and 
programme implementation, especially those who are in direct contact with 
users, the street-level bureaucrats. According to this explanation, professionals 
and employees in direct contact with the public play an essential role in the 
production – and resolution – of the gap between policy and practice. Utilizing 
‘bureaucratic discretion,’ civil servants can introduce considerations and criteria 
of a personal and/or corporative nature in decision-making; for example, in the 
concession of a benefit or subsidy for an immigrant, or in the procedure to follow 
to have access to a solicited service (Lipsky, 1980). Discrimination because of 
racism or xenophobia would be included in this analytical framework, as civil 
servants motivated by their own prejudices may act in ways that have detrimental 
effects on the effective and equal access of immigrants to services. Studies 
published in the Netherlands (Ellermann, 2006), Spain (Martin, 2009), and 
Germany and the United Kingdom (Flam, 2007) provide evidence of the 
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existence of a gap between the values defending the extension of rights to 
immigrants and the restrictive practices that are actually implemented. Other 
studies, however, point to the possible positive effects of discretion through the 
practice of extending rights that contravene formally restrictive policies 
(Guiraudon, 2000; Moreno Fuentes, 2004). In the case of the Netherlands, 
Engbersen and his colleagues (1999) analyzed the implementation of a 1997 law 
excluding undocumented immigrants from all welfare benefits and found that 
the law was implemented in very different ways in different sectors. The authors 
attributed these differences to different levels of professionalization among civil 
servants. In sectors with higher levels of specialization and professionalization, 
such as healthcare or education, professionals in practice boycotted the law 
and continued providing services to immigrants regardless of their legal status. 
In contrast, in sectors with lower levels of professionalization such as social 
services or adult education, civil servants applied the law to the letter, excluding 
undocumented immigrants from services.
 4.2. Managing diversity 
Governments have addressed the specific inequalities faced by ethnically and 
culturally distinct immigrant populations in different ways. The ideal-typical 
models for managing diversity applied in different countries can be placed 
along a continuum ranging from assimilation to multiculturalism. The 
assimilationist paradigm sees the attainment of equal rights and opportunities 
by the foreign population as something which is influenced by their cultural 
adaptation to and acceptance of the basic principles of the political community 
in the receiving country. The end result of this process is greater cultural 
homogeneity within the national community. The multicutural model, on the 
other hand, aspires to integrate immigrants in the receiving society with 
the same rights and opportunities as native-born members of that society but 
without immigrants having to renounce their cultural identity. The end result 
would then be a pluralistic society in cultural and ethnic terms. 
Once applied, these ideal models are expressed in two basic types of responses 
to the inequalities faced by the immigrant population. On the one hand, there 
are attempts to ‘normalize’ the access of immigrants to the general social 
protection system covering the entire population (mainstreaming). The basic 
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assumption behind this approach is that the inequalities experienced by 
immigrants are primarily related to their socioeconomic position, so that the 
response should be no different than that applied for the rest of the disadvantaged 
population. A second approach to inequality, in contrast, attempts to identify 
the special problems or needs affecting immigrants seeking access to services 
and create special programmes (targeting) in response to this. The basic 
assumption behind this approach is that given that the inequalities affecting 
immigrants are caused by cultural or ethnic factors, concrete measures adapted 
to their specific needs are necessary in order to achieve equality of results.(19)
Both ideal models and their practical implementation present important 
contradictions that can be summarized in what is called the ‘dilemma of 
recognition’ (De Zwart, 2005). Both recognizing and not recognizing the ethnic 
and cultural identity of certain groups can have negative repercussions for the 
objectives of such policies: the integration of immigrant groups. Therefore, 
governmental authorities are in a paradoxical situation which is difficult 
to resolve. In France, assimilationist (or republican) model par excellence, 
socioeconomic indicators are worse for immigrants than the native-
born population. Although cultural and language deficiencies are often cited 
to explain the poor conditions of first generation-immigrants, these factors 
cannot explain the equally poor conditions of a second generation born 
and socialized in France. The lack of attention paid to equity in France has 
hidden the difficulties of access to social rights and the discrimination suffered 
by the immigrant population. Today we are witnessing a relative relaxation of 
the republican discourse in France due to the increasing recognition of the 
discrimination that exists toward certain immigrant groups within French society 
(Simon, 1999). On the other hand, in countries close to the multicultural model, 
such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the implementation of special 
policies for groups with specific difficulties and aimed at reducing inequality, 
has been to a certain degree counterproductive. ‘Affirmative action’ policies 
require defining and recognizing the groups involved, and this necessarily 
means accentuating ethnic and cultural differences and therefore, stigmatizing 
these problematized groups. The multicultural model implies, then, the 
reification and reproduction of ethnic and national groups, encouraging their 
(19) An intermediate position consists in identifying the special needs of the immigrant population, but responding to 
them through general services by adapting them to issues of access with complementary measures (Vermuelen, 1997).
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segregation with respect to the rest of society, which is also reflected in their lower 
socioeconomic indicators and inequalities. 
The problem of social inequalities affecting immigrant groups, as well as the 
role of the welfare state in reducing inequality and improving the integration of 
these groups into society, have not been explicitly addressed in Spain until very 
recently. To a large extent this is a consequence of the general lack of debate over 
equity in Spanish society, something in part explained by the short period of 
time since universal social protection programmes were established. Spain’s 
limited experience as a country of immigration also means there has been little 
debate on ways to manage the diversity that accompanies foreign immigration.
At the state level, after certain initial experiences limited to essentially 
symbolic actions,(20) the approval in 2007 of a Strategic Plan on Citizenship 
and Integration (Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración or PECI) for 
2007-2010 was a clear step in the direction of trying to develop an immigrant 
integration policy in Spain. The PECI has basically been an attempt to establish 
a general framework to be used as a guide for the regional policies of Spain’s 
autonomous communities for the integration of immigrants in Spanish society. 
Specifically, the PECI contributes a series of concrete objectives in diverse 
areas (a number of them linked to the welfare state) with the financial support 
of the Immigrant Reception and Integration Support Fund (Fondo de Apoyo a 
la Acogida e Integración de Inmigrantes y al Refuerzo Educativo).(21) The 
essential objective of this policy is to ‘ensure equality for immigrants through 
the full exercising of their civil, social, economic, cultural and political rights 
as well as their access to public services (particularly education, employment, 
social services, healthcare and housing) in equal conditions to those of the 
autochthonous population’. Inspired by the ‘Common Basic Principles for 
Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union’ adopted by the EU in 
2004, which define integration as ‘a dynamic, two-way process of mutual 
accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States,’ the PECI 
expresses the will to ‘ensure the immigrant population’s access to public 
(20) Both the 1994 Plan for Social Integration of Immigrants [Plan para la Integración Social de los Inmigrantes] and the 
2001 Global Programme of Regulation and Coordination for Aliens and Immigration (GRECO) [Programa Global de Regu-
lación y Coordinación de Extranjería e Inmigración] had no budget, functioning primarily as statements of good intentions.
(21) This is split equally between autonomous communities and municipalities to help finance social policies 
aimed at immigrant populations. Sixty percent of the fund is intended for reception and integration programs for 
immigrants, and 40% for educational enhancement programs. In 2005 the allocation for the fund was 120 million 
Euros, and 200 million were allocated in subsequent years.
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services,…in equal conditions to those of the autochthonous population.’ In 
order to accomplish this, it proposes to ‘adapt public policies, particularly in 
education, employment, social services, health, and housing to the new needs 
generated by the immigrant population. This process must be both quantitative, 
responding to the increase in new citizens and users that must be attended to 
by public services, and qualitative, properly managing the diversity of new 
demand and including any intercultural elements that may be required.’
Along with the principles of equality, non-discrimination and citizenship, the 
PECI establishes the ‘principle of interculturality, a mechanism so that persons of 
different origins or cultures can interact with esteem and respect for cultural 
diversity’. Thus, immigrants must respect existing basic values and social norms, but 
they are also invited to participate in the construction of a new ‘just, inclusive and 
cohesive’ society, in order to create a sense of belonging. Interculturality is conceived, 
then, as an approach far different from the assimilationist model, since it is based on 
respect for the diversity of individuals and social groups, but it is also removed 
from the excesses of the multicultural model because it aspires to prevent the 
appearance of cultural groups isolated among themselves (Cachon, 2008). Those 
who drafted the PECI considered ‘interculturality’ to be intrinsic to the Spanish 
reality, a society made up of diverse cultures and organized politically into a state 
of autonomous communities institutionally reflecting this internal pluralism.
In order to adapt the structure of governance of migration policy to the 
reality of a decentralized state, the PECI establishes the Higher Council 
on Immigration Policy (Consejo Superior de Política de Inmigración). 
Recognizing that competencies for many welfare policies correspond to the 
autonomous communities and that these are central to the development of 
an immigrant integration policy, the council tries to ensure that there is 
coordination between the various levels of state government.
Today, most of the communities have their own plan or programme for the 
social integration of immigrants residing in their community. Following 
the lead of Catalonia, which developed its first Interdepartmental Plan for 
Immigration (Plan Interdepartamental de Inmigración) in 1993, other regional 
plans began to appear starting in 2000. Their aim has been to coordinate and 
systematize already developed though previously disperse actions taken by the 
autonomous governments in order to encourage immigrant integration in 
diverse areas such as healthcare, social services or education. The starting 
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point for these plans is therefore the recognition that immigration is an issue 
affecting multiple public policy sectors, particularly in the area of welfare.
These regional integration plans are all very similar in their objectives and 
operating principles. The majority pursue equal opportunity (Martinez de 
Lizarrondo, 2008) based on ‘normalisation’ as the means to attain equality.(22) 
As was previously pointed out, ‘normalisation’ means not creating special 
mechanisms to serve the immigrant population but rather orienting them 
toward general services. It is, therefore, based on an individualist-universalist 
approach to rights, extending equal rights to everyone, instead of granting 
different rights to specific groups. This approach is applied through 
socioeconomic policies aimed at improving the social mobility of immigrants 
through universal or general channels available to the entire population.
The majority of integration plans contain social service measures, such as 
policies for initial arrival, access to social assistance and policies for reconciling 
work and family life. This aid oriented approach, reflected in the placement of 
integration services in social service departments, involves applying the 
operational methods of these departments, which are generally based on 
outsourcing the implementation of programme measures to private agencies 
(Carrasco and Rodriguez Cabrero, 2005; Tamayo and Carillo, 2002). In addition 
to budgets often being inadequate (Bonino, 2003), integration measures also 
involve a certain contradiction with the strategy of ‘normalisation’, as their execution 
through non-profit agencies involves the development of special measures. In any 
case, the very process of ‘normalising’ immigrant access to services available for 
the whole population requires a certain adaptation of these general services so 
that they can meet the needs of groups with specific difficulties (language, 
cultural practices, etc) for their direct integration through general channels.
The similarities among regional plans, while important, must also be qualified, 
as there are fundamental differences in the ways Spain’s autonomous 
communities manage diversity. ‘Normalisation’, the guiding principle in all 
the regional plans for assisting immigrants, has faced considerable obstacles 
in practice. Most of these plans offer general measures combined with some 
degree of special measures designed for certain groups (women, youth) with 
(22) The basic principles framing the regional integration plans are: equality of rights and opportunities, normali-
zation, cross-sector approach, gender equity, decentralization and social participation (Pajares, 2007).
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specific difficulties (in Murcia, the Canary Islands, Catalonia). While some 
are more pro-active (more direct intervention of public institutions, as in the 
Basque Country), others have adopted a more laissez-faire attitude (Madrid). 
Some favour more direct socialisation measures to encourage acculturation 
and the defence of the national community (Catalonia), while others favour 
maintaining the cultural identity of origin (Navarra, Basque Country). In 
addition, the communities that have a more differentiated political identity and 
that aspire to greater levels of self-government are those that demand greater 
powers in managing migration policy (Martinez de Lizarrondo, 2008: 22). An 
example of this is found in the statutes of Catalonia and Andalusia in regards 
to the administration of work permits. 
The high level of decentralisation regarding integration policies leads to 
considerable inequalities between communities and municipal governments, as 
those communities with greater financial resources have greater capacity to 
develop programmes than those with budget difficulties (Aja, 2004; Tamayo and 
Carrillo, 2002). Consequently, immigrants, as well as the rest of the population, 
may experience considerable differences in accessing welfare services depending 
on where they live (Laparra and Martinez de Lizarrondo, 2008).
In this complex scenario of multi-level governance of integration policy, 
municipal governments have played the most important role in practice. In 
fact, it was municipal governments that began to develop plans for the 
reception of new immigrants starting in the mid-1990s, often in response to 
conflict situations they were unable to manage (Bruquetas et al., forthcoming; 
Maluquer, 1997). Related primarily to policy areas in which municipal 
governments have competencies (social services, management of public 
space, local coexistence), local initiatives often emphasize the sociocultural 
dimension of integration. This level of government is also of particular 
interest because it is often where anti-immigrant attitudes first emerge 
among sectors of the autochthonous population and where political groups 
find it easiest to mobilize these sentiments in order gain power.
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 4.3. inequalities and equity policies
In the following sections we will analyze the empirical data available on inequalities 
affecting immigrants in relation to different areas of social policy and we will look 
at the ways Spanish public administrations have responded to these inequalities.
  4.3.1. healthcare
In the previous chapter we analyzed changes in immigrants’ right to access the 
services provided by the Spanish National Health System (NHS), revealing 
the process by which this access had been extended to include practically all 
persons residing (registered) in the country. The formal universalization of 
healthcare does not, however, guarantee equal access to healthcare services for 
all social groups, as eligibility alone does not imply equal use of these services; 
nor does it mean that everyone receives the same level of service (Navarro and 
Benach, 1996). The fact that access to NHS coverage has not been recognized 
as a right automatically linked to residence in Spain is at the origin of many of 
the difficulties of effective access to healthcare for groups in more precarious 
administrative situations. In addition to being subject to different administrative 
procedures and exposed to a greater degree of administrative discretion, those 
accessing the NHS through assistance programmes do not have the right to 
pharmaceutical benefits, which means that they have to pay the full costs for 
medications or seek assistance from municipal social service programmes.
table 4.1
Percentage of population that has not received medical treatment in the 
last 12 months despite needing it, and the reason given for this
dId not receIVe 
medIcal 
treatment
reaSon gIVen for not receIVIng  
medIcal treatment
economIc
InabIlItY
lacK of  
tIme
prefer 
WaItIng
Spain 6.4  4.0 30.5 24.6
rest of the eu-15 6.6  5.7 24.5 30.2
eastern europe 8.7  7.1 42.9 14.3
latin america 8.4 13.8 53.9 13.8
africa 5.0 10.0 30.0 10.0
Total 6.5  4.5 31.4 24.1
Source: based on data from the ecV 2004-2008.
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As the data in Table 4.1 shows, immigrants tend to state more often than 
Spanish nationals that they were unable to get the medical treatment they 
needed. The only exception to this pattern is found among African respondents, 
perhaps because of a different, culturally conditioned perception of the 
concepts of health and illness and/or because of different notions regarding 
the way to use healthcare systems based on experiences in their countries of 
origin. The reasons cited by nationals and foreigners to explain the lack of access 
also reflect differences. Foreigners, for example, are more likely to relate not 
receiving medical attention to a lack of economic resources and time; they are 
also less likely to relate their lack of the use of the healthcare system to a 
preference to wait for the illness to take its natural course.
The percentage of persons without access to a dentist is higher than for 
healthcare among all groups. All foreign groups state that they have more 
difficulty covering their dental needs than the autochthonous population. 
The reasons cited, in this case, are fundamentally economic, which is 
explained by the limited dental coverage provided by the NHS. 
table 4.2
Percentage of population that has not gone to the dentist in  
the past 12 months despite needing to, and the reason given for this
dId not go 
 to the dentISt
reaSon gIVen for not goIng to the dentISt
economIc
InabIlItY
lacK of  
tIme
prefer  
WaItIng
Spain  8.8 54.6 12.9 5.0
rest of the eu-15 10.5 69.9 14.5 3.6
eastern europe 13.6 62.5 15.6 1.6
latin america 14.2 75.6 13.6 1.2
africa 13.4 81.4  4.7 –
Total  9.0 56.3 12.9 4.7
Source: based on data from the ecV 2004-2008.
Beyond the immigrant population’s right to healthcare and the formal and 
informal obstacles faced in accessing healthcare services, it is also important 
to examine differences in the use of the healthcare system. Inequalities in the 
use of services related to social class are well-known. Lower socioeconomic 
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classes tend to have less access to preventative services, wait longer to see 
specialists and are more likely to use emergency services (Regidor et al., 
2002; Palanca, 2002). These disparities can be explained by the educational 
level of potential patients, differences in time availability and/or the existence 
of co-payments for some services (for example, for certain eye care and dental 
care). These factors point to the existence of external conditions that are 
beyond the control of patients, which lead to different opportunities for access 
to healthcare based on income and/or education level. 
As can be seen in Table 4.3, members of households whose primary 
breadwinner is a worker or salaried employee stated that they had gone to 
the primary care or paediatric clinic an average of 1.21 times in the four 
weeks prior to the interview; the frequency is slightly lower for members of 
households whose main breadwinner is an executive or employer, with an 
average of 0.97 times. The proportion is reversed in the case of appointments 
with specialists (0.66 times for executives or employers and 0.5 times for 
salaried employees). 
The use of emergency services also seems to vary among social classes: 
while 25.7% of executives or employers and/or their families had gone to an 
emergency room in the 12 months prior to the interview, 32% of salaried 
employees had done so. The use of private health insurance is also 
significantly different: 32% of households headed by executives or employers 
have mixed healthcare coverage (making it possible to use both the public 
and private healthcare systems), while this percentage decreases to 9% 
among salaried employees. In line with what has been indicated regarding 
the existence of disparities in access to healthcare based on social class, 
16.6% of members of households of executives or employers that had been 
hospitalized stated they had been on a waiting list for treatment, while this 
percentage rose to 30% for members of households of salaried employees.
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table 4.3
Use of healthcare services by socio-professional category  
(in the previous four weeks)
categorIeS*
percentage 
that haVe 
VISIted the 
doctor 
aVerage  
VISItS to 
prImarY 
aSSIStance  
or paedIatrIcS
aVerage  
VISItS to 
SpecIalIStS
percentage 
that haVe 
gone to the 
emergencY 
room (laSt  
12 monthS)
percentage 
that haVe 
mIXed 
healthcare 
coVerage 
(publIc and 
prIVate)
I 33 0,97 0,66 26 32
II 36 1,10 0,61 31 21
III 39 1,13 0,59 30 15
IVa 39 1,17 0,50 32  8
IVb 39 1,21 0,48 32  9
V 41 1,19 0,48 32  4
not known 40 1,15 0,70 33 17
Total 38 1,15 0,54 31 13
note: the percentages do not add up to 100 because they are responses with multiple answers.
*I: managers of public administration agencies and businesses with 10 or more employees, professions associated 
with university and post-graduate degrees. II: executives of businesses with less than 10 employees, professions 
associated with university associates degree/two-year degree, advanced technicians, artists and athletes. 
III: administrative and professional employees in support of administrative and financial management, personal 
service workers and security, self-employed workers, supervisors of workers in manual labour. Iva: Skilled manual 
workers. IVb: Semi-skilled manual workers. V: un-skilled workers.
Source: based on data from the enS 2006.
Differential use of health services by the immigrant population can be 
largely explained by socioeconomic situation. However, although immigrants 
and autochthonous workers share the same user profile, there are undoubtedly 
particular factors related to the specific cultural differences of each immigrant 
group and to their previous experiences with healthcare systems in their 
countries of origin. Data from Spain’s National Health Survey (Encuesta 
Nacional de Salud or ENS) in 2006 provides us with some interesting 
information regarding the differential use of health services by these 
groups.(23)
(23) Unfortunately, the survey does not allow us to focus precisely on the immigration population, although it does 
undoubtedly provide us some important information regarding this population. 
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table 4.4
Use of healthcare services by nationality (in the previous four weeks)
 
percentage 
that haVe 
VISIted the 
doctor 
aVerage VISItS 
to prImarY 
aSSIStance or 
paedIatrIcS
aVerage VISItS 
to SpecIalIStS
percentage that 
haVe gone to 
the emergencY 
room (laSt  
 12 monthS)
percentage 
that haVe mIXed 
healthcare 
coVerage (publIc 
and prIVate)
Spanish 40 1.15 0.55 31 14
foreigners 29 1.08 0.46 32  9
not known 31 1.12 0.51 32 21
Total 38 1.15 0.54 31 13
Source: based on data from the enS 2006.
Differences in the use of the healthcare system are significant, as can be seen with 
primary care services, as shown in Table 4.4. While Spanish interviewees stated 
that they had visited the general practitioner an average of 1.15 times in the 
previous four weeks, foreigners reported having done so 1.08 times. Foreigners 
also reported a slightly lower frequency of appointments with specialists (0.46 
appointments) than the autochthonous population (0.55 appointments). Obtaining 
non-emergency tests produced the same differential pattern between the 
autochthonous and foreign populations (15.4% and 12.3%, respectively). Use of 
emergency services was slightly higher among foreigners, however, than among 
the autochthonous population. Regarding hospitalization and waiting lists, there 
does not appear to be notable differences. However, there do appear to be 
significant differences in the role of emergency rooms as a gateway to in-hospital 
treatment, as this was the way that 65% of foreigners who were hospitalized 
were admitted, compared to 57% of the Spanish. These data suggest a relatively 
different pattern of access to the healthcare system’s services among the 
population of immigrant origin, and they are fully consistent with the findings of 
other studies (Fundación Pfizer, 2008; Regidor et al., 2008).
The relationship between relative deprivation in a number of areas (income 
level, education, housing and environmental conditions, etc.) and state of 
health is well documented. As the empirical evidence regarding the existence 
of inequalities in healthcare shows, the disadvantaged are particularly 
vulnerable, suffering poorer health than the rest of the population (Daponte, 
2005). Although the intricate interaction of factors (material, social, cultural, 
psychological and attitudinal) that cause the appearance of these gradients of 
health has not been fully elucidated, it is clear that this relationship works 
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through a complex two-way process; in other words, difficulties in living 
conditions impact negatively on individuals’ health, and at the same time, 
health problems limit individuals’ possibilities to fully develop their potential. 
Data available on health inequalities in Spain, although not extensive, focus 
largely on disparities between regions (Benach et al., 1998; Benach, 2002). 
Various studies have shown, however, that there is a significant health gradient 
among the different social strata: the most disadvantaged groups suffer a 
greater variety of illnesses, more serious illnesses and are more likely to suffer 
chronic and/or incapacitating illnesses (Navarro and Benach, 1996; Urbanos, 
1999). Thus, in 1995 while 27% of the more affluent population stated that 
they were in ‘poor health’ (fair, bad or very bad health), the percentage rose to 
40% among the most economically disadvantaged. Daponte reached similar 
conclusions (2005) in his study on education level and health: in 2001, those 
with a lower education level had two to three times greater risk of having poor 
health than did those with a university level education. 
Similarly, morbidity surveys revealed a significantly higher incidence of a number of 
health conditions and illnesses (respiratory disorders, hypertension, diabetes or 
chronic illnesses) among the lowest social classes (Regidor et al., 2002). 
Unemployment also has a similar effect on health inequalities as does social exclusion 
(Subirats et al., 2004). The improvement in key health indicators among the Spanish 
population, parallel to the increase in aggregate socioeconomic level, does not 
appear to be distributed equally but rather in function of income level so that health 
inequalities in Spanish society have in fact increased (Regidor et al., 2002). 
table 4.5
relative state of health of the population by geographic origin
percentages
faIr or poor  
health
dISabIlItY or lImItatIon 
chronIc IllneSS In daIlY lIfe
Spain 32.3 29.7 24.4
rest of the eu-15 19.8 20.7 15.9
eastern europe 19.0 14.0  8.1
latin america 16.9 13.6 12.2
africa 25.1 18.4 13.2
Total 31.5 28.9 23.7
Source: based on data from the ecV 2004-2008.
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Analyzing the data from the Living Conditions Survey (Encuesta de 
Condiciones de Vida or ECV) 2004-2008 makes it possible to study health 
inequalities in the Spanish population in greater detail and in particular, their 
impact on immigrants. This survey includes a question on ‘subjective health’ 
(how respondents evaluate their own general state of health), and two questions 
on ‘objective aspects’ of health: whether the respondents suffer from chronic 
illness and whether they have experienced significant limitations in daily life 
for reasons of health in the six months prior to the interview. 
As can be seen, the health of the foreign population is generally better than that of 
the autochthonous population for each of the three indicators included in the table. 
Thus, we see that approximately one-third of Spanish nationals state that they are 
in fair or poor health, whereas this proportion drops to one out of four among 
Africans, approximately one out of five among Europeans and one out of six 
among Latin Americans. The results are similar with respect to suffering from a 
chronic illness or having experienced limitations in daily life for reasons of health. 
At first glance, these results seem to contradict the aforementioned literature, since 
a large number of immigrants are found on the lower rungs of the social ladder, 
with the worst jobs, the highest levels of unemployment and living in the most 
precarious social and material conditions, all of which would suggest that their 
health would be worse than that of the autochthonous population. The explanation 
lies primarily in the younger age of the foreign population, which is mainly 
made up of economic immigrants coming from developing countries, but also in 
the ‘self-selection effect’ associated with migration: individuals who decide to 
migrate are usually healthier than those who opt to remain in the country of origin. 
In order to control for the effect of age on these differences, as well as for the 
relative impact of a series of sociodemographic factors on the probability of 
having poor health, we have carried out a series of multivariate analyses using 
a logistic regression model.(24)
The parameter most clearly related to poor health is unemployment. The 
unemployed are twice as likely to have fair or poor health as the employed; 
(24) Intuitively, we can understand odds ratio as the probability of an event occurring in a particular group in relation 
to the probability of it occurring in another group. An odds ratio equal to one indicates that the probability of the event 
occurring is identical in both groups. When this value is greater than one, the probability of the event occurring in the 
first group (located in the numerator of the ratio) is greater than it occurring in the second group (the denominator of 
the ratio). When the value of the odds ratio is less than one, the interpretation is the opposite: the probability of the 
event occurring in the first group is less than the probability of it occurring in the second.
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their risk of suffering from a chronic illness is 67% higher, and their risk of 
suffering limitations in daily activities due to a health problem is double. As a 
counterpoint, those who have attended university have a significantly higher 
probability of enjoying better health than those who do not have a university 
education; those who are married are also slightly more likely to have better 
health. All these factors are known in the literature on health inequalities, and 
the data from this survey confirms them.
table 4.6
odds ratio for likelihood of experiencing some kind of health problem 
(for the members of a group or category in comparison with those not 
belonging to this group) 
faIr or poor  
health
dISabIlItY or  
chronIc IllneSS
lImItatIon  
In daIlY lIfe
ue-15 0.801 0.628** 0.886
eastern europe 2.509** 0.973 0.894
latin america 1.419** 0.823* 1.034
africa 1.376* 0.611** 0.659*
unemployed 2.022*** 1.671*** 2.115***
married 0.885** 0.934* 0.885***
university educated 0.499*** 0.868** 0.664
*level of significance of 5%
**level of significance of 1%
***level of significance of .1%
Source: based on data from the ecV 2004-2008.
In relation to immigrant’s health, we find that their relative advantage largely 
disappears if we control for age. Although the odds ratios are not statistically 
significant in some cases (possibly because of the size of the sample), the 
indicators we can take into consideration suggest that immigrants’ relatively 
good health must be qualified. The risk of having fair or poor health is 
2.5 times greater for East Europeans than for the Spanish; for Latin Americans, 
the risk is 41% greater, although their risk of suffering a disability or chronic 
illness is approximately 20% lower. The case of Africans is very similar; their 
risk of having fair or poor health is 37% greater than that of the Spanish, but 
their risk of suffering a disability or chronic illness is approximately 60% less. 
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The explanation for these results is also consistent with other studies on health 
inequalities and immigration. The relative advantage seen in Table 4.5 can be 
largely explained by the fact that the immigrant population is younger. Once 
this effect is taken into account, the immigrant population is more likely to 
manifest fair or poor health than the autochthonous population. This is due 
to their poorer living conditions. Despite this, immigrants tend to report fewer 
disabilities, chronic illnesses or limitations in daily activities because of the 
previously mentioned ‘self-selection effect’; the result of which is that those 
who leave their countries have better health than those who remain (individuals 
with health problems are less likely to migrate because of the uncertainty, 
risks and difficulties associated with migration).
In line with empirical data from countries with a longer tradition of immigration, 
it is to be expected that as the immigration population settles in Spain and the 
second generation grows up, their health indicators will deteriorate (to the point 
that they will have poorer health than the autochthonous population) due to their 
poorer living conditions.
As we have pointed out, health inequalities affecting immigrants are related to 
their living conditions in the receiving society, culturally determined practices 
and habits, and institutional factors related to the way the healthcare system 
operates. Intervention in these different dimensions regarding inequality takes 
different forms. While the healthcare sector may not have a direct impact 
on living conditions, it can have an influence on the habits and customs of 
different immigrant groups (although perhaps with limited success) through 
educational and informational campaigns targeting these groups. Regarding 
the institutional aspect, the intervention of healthcare authorities may indeed 
contribute to significantly reducing the barriers between immigrants and 
healthcare professionals by establishing linguistic or cultural mechanisms to 
facilitate communication. It is also very useful to train social work and healthcare 
professionals in the basic aspects of managing cultural diversity in their work. In 
this respect, there have already been a number of initiatives implemented by some 
autonomous community governments.
  4.3.2. social services and the social safety net 
In the previous chapter, we analyzed a number of programmes falling under 
the generic heading of social services and the social safety net. Although there 
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is a lack of coordination among these programmes, they all share one common 
goal: they seek to facilitate social integration and individual autonomy. 
Although many of the programs included in this group of social protection 
mechanisms were established to meet the needs of all the population regardless 
of individual resources, their lack of financing and therefore human and 
material resources has meant that they have essentially become aid programs 
for disadvantaged populations or those at risk of social exclusion.
table 4.7
Percentage of population below the poverty line based on different 
thresholds, by geographic origin
threShold baSed on houSehold Income
60% of medIan 40% of medIan 25% of aVerage
Spain 18.1  6.1 3.1
rest of eu-15 24.0 10.2 6.2
rest of europe 21.5 12.3 6.9
rest of World 29.6  9.5 5.4
Total 18.8  6.4 3.3
Source: based on data from the ecV 2008.
As Table 4.7 shows, poverty rates among the immigrant population are much 
higher than for the Spanish population. Different economic thresholds or poverty 
lines have been used in studies on poverty to determine who is considered 
economically disadvantaged. If we adopt a relatively high threshold, such that we 
consider the poor to be those who have earnings below 60% of median income for 
the population, a little over 18% of Spanish citizens would be found in this situation, 
according to ECV data from 2008. For East European immigrants, the percentage 
below this threshold is three points higher, while for residents of the EU-15 it is six 
points higher. Immigrants from the rest of the world (Latin Americans, Africans 
and Asians) suffer a poverty rate of nearly 30%. When we lower the poverty line, 
setting it at 40% of median income, the poverty rate decreases to 6.1% for the 
autochthonous population, but it is more than 50% higher for those from the rest 
of the world (9.5%), and the rate is double among immigrants from Eastern Europe 
(12.3%). If we use an even more restrictive threshold, established at 25% of average 
income, the poverty rates are again cut approximately in half: more or less 3% of 
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the autochthonous population would be under this severe poverty line; almost 7% 
in the case of Eastern European immigrants and 5.4% among those from the rest 
of the world. We do not have more recent data to estimate evolving trends, but 
poverty rates today must be considerably worse because of the increase in 
unemployment, which particularly affects immigrants. 
Analysis of the Social Services’ User Information System (Servicio de Información 
de Usuarios de Servicios Sociales, SIUSS) database indicates that immigrants 
proportionately use social services much less than the autochthonous population. 
Thus, comparing the number and type of social service actions taken in 2008, 
provision of services to immigrants made up 6.4% of the total, which is a 
significantly lower percentage than their presence represents in Spain’s population.
table 4.8
Number and percentage of social service interventions in different 
areas of action 
CLASSIFICATION  
OF USERS
TOTAL
INFORMATION, 
GUIDANCE, 
EVALUATION AND 
MOBILIZATION OF 
RESOURCES
SUPPORT FOR 
HOUSEHOLD 
AND HOME 
ASSISTANCE
ALTERNATIVE 
HOUSING
PREVENTION 
AND SOCIAL 
INSERTION 
COVERAGE  
OF BASIC 
NEEDS
Immigrants, refugees 
and asylees 
139,684 81,431 4,074 1,566 14,693 37,918
6.4% 8.0% 0.9% 1.8% 11.2% 7.8%
Rest 2,042,218 929,039 451,528 87,444 116,296 449,008
93.6% 92.0% 99.1% 98.2% 88.8% 92.2%
Total 2,180,830 1,018,024 455,530 88,970 130,897 487,406
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: based on data from SIuSS 2008 report.
While recognizing certain limitations of the data,(25) it is also noteworthy that 
60% of interventions involving immigrants had the objective of providing 
them with information regarding their rights or referring them to other 
institutions or bodies. In the case of Spanish citizens these actions represented 
(25) As we saw in the previous chapter, this database includes information from 13 autonomous communities plus the 
autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla; therefore there may be a bias stemming from those communities that are not 
included (the Canary Islands, Castilla-La Mancha, Catalonia and the Basque Country). Moreover, the possibility of 
bureaucratic discretion must be taken into account in the generation of data by social workers who fill in the SIUSS 
application and who classify users into the different categories (a number of interventions with the immigrant popu-
lation impossible to determine may have been classified under other intervention categories). 
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approximately 45% of interventions. The percentage of actions to facilitate 
beneficiaries’ social insertion was nearly double in the case of immigrants in 
comparison with the autochthonous population (10.7% compared to 5.7%, 
respectively) and coverage of subsistence needs represented 27% of 
interventions for immigrants, compared to 22% for nationals. In contrast, 
interventions to support households or provide home assistance represented 
only 3% of the cases in the case of immigrants, compared to 22% in the case 
of Spanish nationals. 
These distinct user profiles reflect both the younger age of the immigrant 
population and the self-selection of this population referred to in the previous 
section. Immigrant groups have much less need for domestic services 
(provision of care to dependent persons either due to age or physical or 
psychological disability). However, these differences may also point to 
different patterns of intervention by social services, which, following 
consultation and the assessment of immigrant cases, may divert these cases to 
third sector organizations which are thought to be better adapted to deal with 
immigrant users.
In the early 1990s, some municipal and regional governments began to develop 
systems specifically to provide social assistance to immigrants. These 
specialized services are generally based on setting up small support networks 
managed by third sector organizations and financed with public funds. The 
guiding idea behind such initiatives was that this way of operating would 
provide advantages in terms of knowledge, flexibility and ability to adapt to 
groups with differing needs. In addition, it was thought that working with third 
sector organizations would facilitate rapid intervention and the implementation 
of ad hoc solutions. Third sector social organizations would also contribute to 
introducing consistency in the actions of the various levels of government, 
merging them into their daily activity, combining funding sources, intervening 
through different projects with the same population group, coordinating with 
other entities, etc. The difficult balance referred to before between 
‘normalisation’ through general channels and establishing specific schemes, is 
seen very clearly in the provision of assistance to immigrant groups on the part 
of social services.
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graph 4.1
comparative distribution of social service interventions between 
foreign and autochthonous populations
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In the face of government inhibition or hesitation, third sector organizations 
have often been the first to take the initiative, offering initial assistance to 
alleviate the most immediate social needs of disadvantaged immigrant groups 
(Gil Araujo, 2006). Furthermore, due to a general lack of knowledge in 
immigrant communities about how the system works and also because of 
problems of access to social services, it has been primarily through third sector 
organizations that immigrant demands have been handled. NGOs and 
immigrant associations have provided and facilitated different types of support 
services in the absence of public initiatives: provision of basic necessities 
(food or clothing), employment support (information, training, job banks, 
legal advice) and housing (residences, shelters for immigrants without 
resources or with specific problems). They have also taken action to raise 
awareness about these issues as well as to advocate for immigrant rights 
(Guillén et al., 2002; Colectivo Ioé, 2004).
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The danger of these types of schemes is that they are coordinated by the 
private sector (albeit non-profit), which for many represents an abdication of 
government responsibility. It is not a question of advocating uniform 
attention, but that the obligation of government is to ensure equal or 
equivalent treatment regardless of where assistance is provided. In addition, 
there is the risk of creating parallel networks specialized in assisting the 
immigrant population, which offer the same services and benefits as provided 
by the public social service network and meet needs not substantially 
different from those of the rest of the population. The creation of specific 
mechanisms also increases the risk of stigmatization and segregation of the 
targeted groups (Guillén et al., 2002). This is a risk of particular importance, 
given the existence of a discourse which tends to blame immigrants for 
receiving preferential treatment from government services.
In the context of scarce resources for social services, situations may arise in 
which autochthonous beneficiaries are displaced by immigrants due to the 
application of need-based criteria.(26) This totally neutral process is, on 
occasion, perceived as treatment favouring immigrants. This perception of 
competition for public resources, which we will analyze in chapter 5, is in 
part the result of inadequate resource allocation for programmes facing 
growing demand due to an increasing population. Once again, it is not 
possible to calculate the magnitude of this problem due to a lack of data for 
programmes that are managed at the local level, as there is no centralized 
system for collecting and processing this data. However, this does not mean 
that we can ignore the importance of this issue as it can be easily exploited 
by opportunist politicians who want to capitalize on the feelings of 
vulnerability and distrust toward immigrants among certain of the most 
disadvantaged sectors of the autochthonous population.
  4.3.3. education
In addition to the tension between equality and freedom described in chapter 3, 
the Spanish education system is characterized by an inherent tension between 
equality and diversity. The cultural and linguistic diversity of the Spanish state 
itself raises the need or desirability for differentiated interventions for specific 
(26)  This can be extended to other areas of welfare not explicitly included in this study, such as daycare centres 
for children between 0 and 3 years of age, or subsidies to pay for school meals.
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groups, schools or geographic areas. This tension has been exacerbated by 
the incorporation of immigrant students into classrooms in Spain.
Broadly speaking, immigrant students have poorer academic results than do 
their native-born classmates, both in terms of achievement (final levels 
reached) and performance (scores). Our data corroborates the findings from a 
long tradition of international studies which have shown that immigrant 
students have poorer academic results, higher drop out rates and lower retention 
rates at post-compulsory levels. 
Regarding achievement indicators, in general immigrant students in Spain do 
not reach the same educational levels as autochthonous students. First, as we 
saw in chapter 2, only 10% of this group continues their education beyond the 
compulsory age (Lopez Pelaez, 2006). Moreover, the number of immigrant 
students in baccalaureate courses is less than half those doing Compulsory 
Secondary Education (Educación Secundaria Obligatoria or ESO) (CIDE, 
2006). Although the difference between vocational training programmes, where 
immigrants represent 5.15% (23,389) of the total and the baccalaureate, 
where they represent 4.03% (25,382) (CIDE, 2006) does not seem great, it is 
significant that it is the reverse of the preference of autochthonous students for 
each of these levels of education.(27) We also saw in chapter 3 that there is a 
growing concentration of immigrant students in social guarantee programmes, 
set up for students who have not fulfilled the requirements of ESO. 
Drop out rates for immigrant students are also higher than those of native-
born students. A 2009 study on social inclusion in Spain (El informe de 
Inclusión Social en España 2009 [The Report on Social Inclusion in Spain 
2009]) pointed out that the drop out rate for immigrant youth is 2.1 times 
higher than for students born in Spain (Marí-Klose, 2009.(28) This rate 
refers to leaving school after finishing ESO but without an upper secondary 
school diploma. In Catalonia, a study of 18 schools showed that 10.7% of 
recently arrived foreign students do not finish the academic year (Serra 
(27) The education statistics from the Ministry of Education offer slightly different data for the same academic 
year (2006-2007): 25,120 immigrant students in the baccalaureate (4.1%) and 23,497 in vocational training 
programmes (3.9%). 
(28) This study used logistic regression analysis to assess the influence and covariance of variables such as parents’ 
education, sex, immigrant status and the autonomous region on the probability of dropping out of school. 
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and Palaudàrias, 2010).(29) Moreover, 42.5% of foreign students incorporated 
into ESO after so-called reception classes do not finish (Serra and 
Palaudàrias, 2010). The same study also found that immigrant students 
who go on to post-compulsory secondary education do the baccalaureate 
more often than vocational training programmes by a ratio of 8 to 1, even 
though only 5.8% of immigrant students who begin post-compulsory 
secondary education finish. Notable differences also appear in retention 
rates among students of different nationalities: those more likely to 
successfully finish ESO are Argentineans (80%), Colombians (65%), 
Moroccans (57.7%) and Romanians (53.5%). 
Regarding academic performance, the data available in Spain also confirm that 
there is a gap between immigrant and native-born students. The primary source 
of data are the reports from the Program for International Student Assessment 
(PISA) (2000, 2003, 2006 y 2009), which supplies rigorous and comparative 
data on school performance of autochthonous and immigrant students in OECD 
countries.(30) A student is considered an immigrant if both his/her parents were 
born outside the country of residence, whether the student was born outside the 
country of residence (first generation) or not (second generation). The 2006 
report in Spain was based on an evaluation of 20,000 students, which included 
a state-wide sample as well as samples from ten autonomous communities: 
Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, Cantabria, Castile and Leon, Catalonia, Galicia, 
La Rioja, Navarra and the Basque Country. 
(29) In addition to official data from the Department of Education of the Generalitat of Catalonia, Serra and 
Palaudàrias (2010) surveyed students in the 4th year of ESO and interviewed school administrators in their study. 
(30) In 1997 the OECD launched the international PISA project (Programme for International Student Assessment) 
with the aim of comparing educational systems through a comparison of the performance of their students. Since 
2000, PISA has evaluated the academic performance of 15 year old students in OECD countries in three fields: 
reading, sciences and mathematics. 
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table 4.9
Pisa results on immigrant students’ reading comprehension (point 
differential with autochthonous students)
actual dIfferenceS dIfferenceS controllIng for SocIoeconomIc characterIStIcS
Second 
generatIon 
fIrSt 
generatIon
Second 
generatIon 
fIrSt 
generatIon
austria –79  –48 –46 –21
belgium –81 –101 –42 –74
denmark –64  –79 –34 –47
france –36  –45  –5 –19
germany –83  –70 –42 –39
greece  –  –37  – –17
Ireland  –  –14  – –19
Italy  –  –69  – –54
luxembourg –61  –69 –17 –29
netherlands –61  –65 –23 –40
norway  –  –63  – –40
portugal  –  –69  – –64
Spain –34  –55  –7 –47
Sweden –29  –68 –15 –48
Switzerland –48  –65 –22 –60
united Kingdom  –7  –44  6 –34
oecd –46  –51 –17 –35
Source: pISa report 2006.
According to PISA 2006, 7% of students enrolled in Spanish schools were 
born outside of Spain, and their reading comprehension scores were 55 points 
below those of their autochthonous classmates (OECD, 2007). Moreover, if 
we control for students’ socioeconomic status, we see that this gap remains 
high (47 points). Immigrant students perform worse than their native-born 
classmates of comparable socioeconomic status. This means that after 
adjusting the data for social class, a wide difference in scores must still be 
explained. Unfortunately, PISA does not distinguish between the scores of 
immigrant students from different origins. In PISA 2009, the difference 
between scores of immigrant (not born in Spain, i.e. first generation) and 
native-born students increased to 60 points. Again, the socioeconomic status 
of students explains only a small part of this variation, but still does not explain 
the 44-point gap between them.
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table 4.10
reading results of first and second generation immigrant students 
(Pisa 2009): average scores and point differences with autochthonous 
students
autochthonouS Second generatIon
ImmIgrantS 
(fIrSt 
generatIon)
of ImmIgrant orIgIn 
(fIrSt and Second 
generatIon)
average for Spain 488 464 428 432 
difference in scores  – –24 –60 –56
oecd average 499 468 449 457
Source: based on data from pISa 2009 (oecd, 2010: 170; table II.4.1).
In 2003 a study from the Spanish Ombudsman’s office [Defensor del Pueblo] 
and the Spanish Commission for UNICEF [Unicef-Comité Español], directed 
by Ochaita and Espinosa, revealed that immigrant students perform worse 
starting in the second year of ESO. Although they finish the fifth grade in 
primary school with lower scores than autochthonous students and then catch 
up with them in the sixth grade and the first year of ESO, starting in the second 
year of ESO there is a significant drop in the percentage of immigrant students 
in the appropriate educational level for their age (Defensor del Pueblo, 2003: 
p. 68, vol. II.).
Other studies at the regional level also show that immigrant students perform 
worse in school than autochthonous students. A study published by Anghel 
and Cabrales (2010) utilizing data from the Community of Madrid’s 2006 
through 2009 exams on Competencias y Destrezas Indispensables [Essential 
Competencies and Skills], reached similar conclusions. After controlling for 
parents’ economic level, immigrant students still obtained worse results than 
nationals of a similar socioeconomic status. The 2006 Panel on Families and 
Children in Catalonia (El Panel de Familias e Infancia 2006 de Catalunya) 
also found that 33% of immigrant students received a failure mark in their 
final evaluation period, and 20% obtained passing marks (compared to 19% 
failures and 16% passing marks among native-born students).
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table 4.11
average marks of adolescents in the final evaluation period by country 
of birth 
percentages
SpaIn countrIeS WIth loW or medIum gdp*
excellent 5.7 0.9
good 42.0 23.0
Satisfactory 17.0 23.0
passing 16.0 20.0
failure 19.0 33.0
Total 100.0 100.0
* countries ranked below the first third in relation to gdp per capita.
Source: panel de familias e Infancia of the cIImu, 2008.
These and other similar studies have shown that there exist clear educational 
inequalities between immigrant and native-born students. However, it 
continues to be difficult to explain why this is the case (Montero-Sieburth and 
Batt, 2001; Stevens, 2007). One of the most important explanatory variables is 
social class.(31) The PISA studies (2000, 2003, 2006 and 2009) have 
demonstrated that students’ academic performance is directly related to 
families’ social, economic and cultural status. The education level attained by 
parents, particularly the mother, is one of the determinants of the results 
obtained by their children. In Spain, students whose parents did not complete 
compulsory education obtained scores 85 points lower than those whose 
parents attended university, according to data from the 2006 PISA Report. 
There is a 135 point difference between students coming from households 
with 10 books or less and those coming from households with over 500 books. 
This indicates that children are socialized through the cultural capital of their 
parents, by their parents’ attitudes toward culture and education and by the 
cultural resources their parents offer to them (access to cultural activities, 
books in the home, etc). 
(31) Generally, students’ social class is understood in terms of the educational level of the parents or by ‘cultural 
capital’, measured through indicators such as level of studies completed by the mother or the number of books 
available in the student’s home.
106 ImmIgratIon and the Welfare State In SpaIn
The cultural capital of parents is also correlated with retention rates, as the 
probability of children continuing their education after 16 years of age decreases 
when the parents have a low occupational status. Research on the general 
population has shown that while the participation rate in post-compulsory 
secondary education for children of parents with professional degrees is more 
than 85%, this decreases to 52% among children of skilled manual workers and 
to 27.5% among children of unskilled workers (Calero, 2006).
Portes, Aparicio and Haller (2009) in their study on immigrant students in 
Madrid found immigrant parents’ average occupational status scores to be 
relatively modest: 93.4 for fathers and 81 for mothers, according to the 
occupational status scale created for Spain by Carabaña and Gómez Bueno, 
with a minimum score of 25 and a maximum of 266 in their sample. Mothers 
and fathers of immigrant students in publically-funded private schools 
(escuelas concertadas) had somewhat higher occupational and educational 
status than did parents of students in public schools. Average occupational 
status for mothers and fathers with children in these private schools was over 
100 points on the scale, and 27% of these parents had attended university, 
compared to 18% of parents of public school students. Given the influence of 
parents’ social, economic and cultural status on children’s performance in 
school, it is to be expected that children tend to reproduce their parents’ status 
in their performance.
The 2006 Panel on Families and Children in Catalonia also found the education 
level of immigrant parents to be generally below that of autochthonous parents. 
Immigrant parents are less likely to have a primary school certificate than 
autochthonous parents, have higher percentages of secondary education than do 
nationals and significantly lower rates of vocational training. At the same time, 
a greater proportion of immigrant parents have university education than 
autochthonous parents. 
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table 4.12
education level of parents of adolescents by country of birth of child 
percentages
SpaIn countrIeS WIth loW or medIum gdp*
Mother’s education level
Without primary school education 5.4 11.0
primary school 30.0 26.0
Secondary school 20.0 29.0
Vocational training 20.0  6.4
university degree 24.0 29.0
Father’s education level
Without primary school education 5.7  7.8
primary school 32.0 32.0
Secondary school 19.0 26.0
Vocational training 20.0  9.8
university degree 23.0 25.0
* countries ranked below the first third in relation to gdp per capita.
Source: Panel de Familias e Infancia of the cIImu, 2008.
Despite the undeniable influence of parents’ socioeconomic and education 
levels, these variables do not completely explain why the academic performance 
of immigrant students is worse than that of autochthonous students. It is true 
that the most pronounced differences are between foreign students with low 
socioeconomic levels and autochthonous students. However, there are also 
significant differences in performance among students from different countries, 
which cannot be attributed solely to differences in parent education levels 
among immigrants of different nationalities. 
The relative difference between the results of immigrant and native-born 
students is greater when the immigrant students speak a language other than 
the language of instruction. The ratings gap with native students is also 
considerably higher for first- generation immigrant students than for second-
generation students (a difference of 55 points versus 34 points in 2006 (PISA 
2006) and of 60 points compared to 24 in 2009 (PISA 2009)). This suggests 
that the migration experience in itself causes an additional difficulty; 
particularly important are the age of arrival in the receiving country, level of 
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prior schooling and the degree of knowledge of the language of instruction 
(Alegre, 2008).
Given the high proportion of students from Latin America, the majority of 
immigrant students should not encounter major problems in school in the 
autonomous communities where the language of instruction is Spanish. 
According to the survey carried out in Madrid by Portes and colleagues (Portes 
et al., 2009), 73% of students of immigrant origin interviewed said they speak 
Spanish perfectly and 23% said they speak it well; the responses were similar 
with respect to reading and writing. However, the study cited earlier, by Anghel 
and Cabrales (2010) for the Community of Madrid, shows that Latin American 
students obtain the poorest results of all the nationalities, even on exams on 
Spanish and dictation.
In addition, educational institutions and policies play a central role in explaining 
inequalities in performance. Above all, as was explained in Chapter 3, the 
stratification of the education system can reinforce or weaken school segregation 
and this in turn negatively affects school performance. Comparative 
research based on PISA data has concluded that differential systems (i.e., less 
comprehensive) tend to increase the inequalities in academic results resulting 
from students’ social class (Duru-Bellat et al., 2004; OECD, 2007). Inequalities 
in performance between immigrant and autochthonous students tend to be 
reinforced due to the high levels of school segregation caused by early tracking 
of students into itineraries or levels. Alegre and Ferrer (2010) in their comparison of 
23 OECD countries based on PISA data looked at the relative influence 
of different variables on education systems. Their results confirm, first of all, 
that the socioeconomic composition of the student body largely explains 
academic performance, so that the higher the proportion of students of low 
socioeconomic status, the lower the average performance level in the school. 
But at the same time, they showed that the level of stratification of the education 
system reinforces the effect of class, in such a way that education systems that 
tend to track students at an early age produce higher degrees of school segregation, 
concentrating low-performing students (often with low socioeconomic status) 
in pathways of lower academic value (OECD, 2010; 41-43). 
Another element of stratification in the education system that has negative 
repercussions on performance is diversity in the network of schools (public 
schools, publically-funded private schools and fully private schools). PISA data 
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show that in Spain the difference in mean scores by type of school favours 
private schools by 38 points. But if the effects of the PISA index of economic, 
social and cultural status are taken into account in analyzing student results, the 
differences among schools are not statistically significant. This indicates that 
quality of instruction in the different schools is comparable and, therefore, that 
the difference in school performance is largely explained by the effect of 
student social composition. The pronounced educational segregation between 
public and private schools that exists in Spain, therefore, has significant effects 
on the educational opportunities of immigrant students.
The literature also points to the school as a possible source of inequality. 
According to Bourdieu’s theory of reproduction, the school plays a basic role 
in social reproduction, since it assumes the culture of the dominant groups to 
be the standard, making access to educational qualifications difficult for those 
students who do not have the legitimate cultural capital (Bourdieu and 
Passeron, 1970). However, other studies have shown relative variations among 
schools in the same country. The so-called “school effect” has opened debate 
on the extent to which the influence of schools on educational outcomes depends 
mainly on the socioeconomic and ethnic composition of students (Coleman, 
1966) or more on the organizational and pedagogical structures adopted in 
each school. The study done by Alegre and Ferrer (2010) showed that the 
margin of autonomy schools have in the admission of students and in their 
distribution by level has significant effects on school segregation. These 
authors conclude that schools’ student selection strategies can accentuate 
inequalities more than families’ school selection strategies.
Finally, we can examine the role played by culture and language in differences 
in performance among different immigrant groups. In the previously cited 
study of Anghel and Cabrales (2010) carried out in the Community of Madrid, 
these authors found important differences in academic performance among 
students of different nationalities after controlling for parents’ education 
level. Thus, despite the fact that immigrant students overall do not perform as 
well as autochthonous students, Chinese students had better results in maths 
than Spanish nationals; Romanians obtained better results in dictation, maths and 
language, and Latin Americans had poorer results on all areas of the exam. 
Moroccan students were on the same level as autochthonous students in maths 
and general culture, but their results were lower in dictation, reading and 
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language. Analyzing PISA data, it could be argued that Chinese students 
obtain very similar scores in all countries. These differences are a refutation 
of more nuanced versions of cultural deficit theory from the 1970s, which 
blamed school failure largely on differences between the languages spoken in 
the home and at school. Studies based on this theory associated poor 
educational performance (and also the lowest scores) with students’ loss of 
their native language and the fact that the discontinuity between the language 
experiences in the home and at school confused immigrant students, which 
resulted in lowered academic aspirations (Ogbu, 1987). However, the findings 
of Anghel and Cabrales show that not all national groups perform poorly; 
moreover, their findings indicate that Latin American students are those with 
the worst results. We cannot, therefore, assume that the linguistic and cultural 
codes of immigrant students in general do not meet the standards of the Spanish 
education system; instead, we should explore to what extent the differences 
found by Anghel and Cabrales are related to the specific expectations and 
attitudes toward education among immigrants from different cultures.
From another perspective, some authors have introduced the role of ethnic 
identities, not only in terms of immigrant students’ identification with their 
culture of origin but also in terms of the support provided by their ethnic or 
national communities (Portes and Rumbaut, 1996). The previously cited 
survey of Portes, Aparicio and Haller (2009) concluded that immigrant 
adolescents’ friendship networks tend to reinforce ethnic identities. They 
found that less than half of immigrant adolescents’ friends were born in Spain 
and the majority were from the same country or region of the respondent. This 
information is hopeful in terms of immigrant academic performance in Spain, 
as the studies of Portes and others carried out in the United States showed that 
immigrant students who maintained contact with their cultures and ethnic 
group of origin obtained good academic results, while those that assimilated 
into North American culture had significantly lower academic performance 
(Portes and Zhou, 2005). 
Public policy in Spain has addressed the educational inequality faced by 
immigrant students and its possible causes. Although the underlying principle 
of the Spanish education system is equal treatment for all, the recognition of 
linguistic and cultural identities — crucial in the construction of the state 
of autonomies — has created a certain tension. Those responsible for designing 
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education policy have had to look for formulas to balance the objectives of 
equality and cultural diversity. The Organic Law 1/1990, of October 3, on the 
General Ordering of the Educational System (Ley Orgánica de Ordenación 
General del Sistema Educativo or LOGSE) was the first education law that 
explicitly mentioned the need to oppose ethnic and cultural discrimination 
(Terrén, 2001), but at the same time it aspired to create a system that would 
compensate for inequalities without relying on parallel structures for 
disadvantaged students (Grañeras et al., 1997). In other words, the LOGSE 
assumed a concept of diversity that emphasized individual diversity and 
ignored socio-cultural differences between groups (Aja, 2000).
A similar orientation was followed by the Compensatory Education Programme 
(1983) (Programa de Educación Compensatoria), which was inspired by the 
‘priority education zones’ in France that gave preferential attention to 
geographic areas or population groups with special educational needs. 
Although the implicit focus of this programme was the Roma minority, the 
official text did not refer explicitly to ethnic and cultural diversity as a cause of 
educational inequality; instead it focused on socioeconomic variables such as 
poverty and marginalization. Starting in 1986-1987, the programme was 
expanded to also include Moroccan students in the Raval neighbourhood of 
Barcelona (Ubero, 1997), and it continued expanding its target population to 
include immigrant students up until 2003 when it disappeared.
This indicates that initially programmes for the reception of recently arrived 
immigrants employed educational tools specifically designed for the Gypsy 
population (Garreta, 2006). The integration of the Roma minority in the 
Spanish education system went through several phases. During the Franco 
dictatorship, they were excluded from the education system; this was followed 
by a period of segregation in the ironically named ‘bridge schools’, and finally 
the Compensatory Education Programme was developed to promote the 
inclusion of Roma students in ordinary schools (Fernandez Enguita, 1996). 
Interestingly, internal migrants coming from other regions of Spain were 
treated differently from Roma and foreign immigrants. In Catalonia, for 
example, while students from Andalusia or other regions were included in 
immersion programmes in the ‘schools for minimum Catalanization’ (1983) 
(‘escuelas para la catalanización minima’), foreign students were enrolled in 
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compensatory education classes together with students with diverse educational 
problems (Siguan, 2000; Pascual, 1998). 
Regarding the specific challenges of foreign immigrant students, education 
authorities from the central and regional governments have also taken ad hoc 
measures. To promote a more equitable distribution of students among 
schools, most autonomous communities have designed various measures to 
regulate school enrolment (Alegre, 2008; Benito and Gonzalez, 2007). 
Municipal governments, also involved in education policy, have set up 
education commissions to manage policies aimed at equity in school 
enrolment. One primary measure consists of requiring schools that receive 
public financing to reserve a minimum number of places for special needs 
students during the registration period. Another option has been to require 
schools to reduce the class-size ratio during the registration period so that 
when the ratio is extended again, some places are available and may be filled 
by immigrant students who enrol after the deadline. This measure reflects the 
fact that a significant percentage of immigrant students enrol in school late. 
Finally, school zoning measures based on the creation of catchment areas for 
each school have been implemented so that admission into a school will 
depend on the family residing in that school’s area. Zoning limits the ability 
to choose the child’s school for all families, not just immigrants. There are 
three essential types of zoning: 1) a single zone in which all schools receiving 
public funds share the same catchment area; 2) different zoning for each public 
school, with alternative zoning for publically-funded private schools; and 
3) zones with more than one public school, with alternative zoning for 
publically-funded private schools (Benito and Gonzalez, 2007). A variant of 
this last model implemented in some Catalan cities consists of establishing 
zones with more than one public school and more than one publically-funded 
private school (Alegre, 2008).
In addition to all of the above, autonomous communities have used their 
competencies over education to develop compensatory policies specifically 
aimed at the immigrant student body (Garreta, 2006; Carabaña, 2006). When 
receiving newly arrived immigrant students in the schools, some communities 
have opted for an ‘integrated’ model in which immigrant students are included 
in mainstream education classes. Other regions have set up ‘parallel’ or ‘mixed’ 
systems, such as in Catalonia (reception classes), the Community of Madrid 
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(linking classes), Andalusia (temporary language acquisition classes), the 
Balearic Islands (reception programmes) and Castilla-La Mancha or Murcia 
(language support teams). In the parallel reception programmes, the newly 
arrived students must take reception classes for a limited period during which 
they are separated from autochthonous students until they achieve a minimum 
level of knowledge of the language of instruction. In mixed programmes, 
students also have specific reception courses which means that sometimes 
they are separated from autochthonous students; for example, they may attend 
a reception class in the morning and mainstream classes in the afternoon, or 
they may have reception classes for a certain number of hours per week and 
the rest of the time they attend mainstream classes. 
In spite of the effort to accommodate diversity, various authors have pointed 
out that educational practice continues to be more assimilative than 
intercultural. As a result, there is a gap between educational practices and the 
discourse of cultural pluralism. Thus, despite the compensatory measures 
aimed at newcomers, the official curriculum has remained largely intact; 
teachers have introduced very little intercultural education, and in some 
regions immigrants are pressured to adapt to the culture and language of the 
host society (Gareta, 2006).
 4.4. conclusions
Policies aimed at compensating for socially unjust inequalities pose normative 
dilemmas that are undoubtedly more complex than are initiatives that seek equality, 
as on occasion they involve the establishment of programmes directed only 
toward specific groups of the population. In this chapter we have seen how the 
settlement of an immigrant population in Spain has introduced paradoxes which 
are difficult to resolve; to the classic issue of redistribution between social classes, 
there is now the added variable of ethnic and cultural diversity (Young, 1990).
The autonomous communities have responded in different ways to inequalities 
in actions and outcomes affecting the immigrant population. In all, a large part 
of the response has been through general services that cover the entire population, 
based on an approach that aims to normalize the access of immigrants to social 
protection programmes. However, together with the priority given to normalized 
access to general services, regional plans also recognize the importance of 
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attending to needs arising from the migration experience and cultural 
specificities. It is here where regional plans essentially differ. The integration 
plans of various communities coincide then in the existence of an internal 
tension between the principles of equality and equity (Carrasco and Rodriguez 
Cabrero, 2005: 93), but differ in the type of solutions implemented.
There is a similar tension in the area of education. Education authorities 
have strived to find the best way to combine the incorporation of foreign 
students under equal conditions with the temporary use of parallel 
programmes. These efforts sometimes come into conflict with the views of 
native-born members of the society, particularly when they are aimed at 
promoting a more equal distribution of immigrant students among schools. 
Contrary to what is commonly believed, studies show that the presence of 
immigrant students per se does not lower the quality of education in a school, 
but rather, it is the socioeconomic composition of students in a school and 
the educational level of parents that significantly affect school performance. 
Thus, to reduce educational inequalities, it is essential to implement 
education policies to bring about an equitable distribution of students among 
all the schools in a town or city. 
Finally, equity policies resulting from balancing these tensions are faced 
with the challenge of obtaining the necessary social support. Raising citizen 
awareness is easier when the data permits us to show that arguments about 
immigrants abusing universal social services are unfounded (in the case of 
healthcare, for example). The empirical evidence presented shows that 
arguments about the overuse and abuse of the healthcare system by the 
immigrant population are totally without basis; this is consistent with studies 
published on the issue as well as with official data from the NHS. Measures 
in response to the inequalities experienced by immigrants, however, face 
great barriers in acquiring social legitimacy. This is also the case with social 
services, as scarcity of resources leads to needs-based selection criteria in 
determining who receives benefits, which may lead to the perception among 
the autochthonous population that the allocation of benefits to immigrants is 
a form of favouritism.
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 V.  the role of immigration in the provision 
of care
The majority of analyses regarding the role played by immigration in the evolution 
of the Spanish welfare state focus either on the demand dimension or on the 
financial balance resulting from the presence of immigrant groups in Spain. This 
involves studying immigrants as recipients of benefits and services of the state’s 
social protection systems and trying to measure the relationship between what 
they receive and what they contribute to public finances. Other analyses emphasize 
the role of immigrants in providing caregiving services to dependent persons. In 
trying to provide a comprehensive analysis of the complex relationship between 
immigration and the welfare state we will try to combine both of these focuses. In 
this chapter we analyze the way in which the welfare regime, the labour market 
and migratory policy find an important area of interconnection in the caregiving 
sector.
In recent years we have seen a spectacular increase in the demand for personal 
care services. This is a result of demographic changes and the increasing 
participation of Spanish women in the labour market and the need to balance 
work and family life. In response to this situation there has been a parallel growth 
in the private market for personal services (domestic services and care for 
children, seniors and other dependent persons), above all in the informal sector. 
Given the weak level of public intervention in the reproductive sphere, Spanish 
women working outside the home have increasingly turned to hiring immigrants 
to cover domestic and caregiving tasks. This not only reflects important changes 
in Spain’s caregiving model, but also radical transformations in the social 
division of labour, changes which could not have happened without the 
contribution of immigrant labour. Immigrant women have come to play an 
essential role not only in the participation of Spanish women in the labour force 
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and in how families function, but also in supporting and ensuring the sustainability 
of the welfare regime in Spain.
 5.1. crisis in the family caregiving model 
As we saw in chapter 2, Spain is characterized by a Mediterranean welfare 
regime. A distinctive feature of this model is ‘familism’, in which the 
individual problems of members of the family network (such as 
unemployment, housing problems, illness, etc.) tend to be defined as ‘family 
issues’. This involves significant intra-familial transfers, both tangible and 
intangible (Moreno, 2001), through the sharing of resources and expenses 
(Petmesidou, 1996). 
Particularly important in this regard is the redistribution of resources 
throughout the different stages of the life cycle, as well as the associated 
system of social expectations and commitments. In this context, parents 
accept the obligation to support their children until they can become 
economically independent and form their own families (Naldini and Jurado, 
1996). Parents also use their own social capital to help their children find 
work and sacrifice a significant part of their assets to help them in becoming 
homeowners. After emancipation, family networks make it possible for 
mothers that work to pursue their careers thanks to the involvement of 
grandparents (especially grandmothers) and other relatives in domestic tasks 
and the care of young children (Moreno, 2001). In later stages of the life 
cycle, individuals count on their families for assistance in the case of illness 
or economic need. Beyond being a mere complement to social protection 
mechanisms, the family functions as the provider of care par excellence of 
social services (Parella, 2003).
A crucial role carried out by the family is the provision of care to children, 
the elderly, the sick and disabled. This work is referred to by the generic 
term ‘caregiving tasks’, which cover all types of assistance aimed at those 
who need the help of others to carry out daily activities (Martínez Buján, 
2010), whether dependent persons, children or autonomous adults. 
Caregiving tasks can be carried out by the family, public services or through 
the purchase of services on the market. Based on data from the EDDES 
survey on social protection for dependency (Encuesta sobre Discapacidades, 
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Deficiencias y Estado de Salud), Rodríguez Cabrero (2004) estimates that 
61% of the individuals that provide personal care live in and belong to the 
household of the dependent person; in addition, the majority are family 
members (60.5%) and primarily, daughters (58%). 
The sense of well-being that is generated in families is primarily produced 
by women (32) in so far as mothers, daughters, wives, daughters-in-law, etc. are 
the principal caregivers of children, parents, spouses and in-laws. Studies on 
time use (Durán, 1999) indicate that in all European countries women dedicate 
more time to domestic and caregiving tasks than men. The greatest differences 
between men and women in the number of hours dedicated to domestic tasks 
and caregiving are found in the countries of Southern Europe. 
Currently, the family centred model of care is in crisis due to economic and 
sociodemographic transformations and changes in the structure of the Spanish 
family (Rodríguez Cabrero, 2004: 225). In the long run, these transformations 
will involve ‘new social risks’ (Taylor-Gooby, 2004) and may lead to the 
erosion of the contract between generations within Spanish families. The 
once robust mechanisms of intergenerational reciprocity, characteristic of 
the ‘familist’ regime, are being weakened. Intergenerational solidarity in the 
family sphere continues to enjoy social prestige, but the social and economic 
circumstances in which the family develops have changed. It is now increasingly 
difficult for individuals to dedicate the time necessary to care for other family 
members as may have been done up until recently. The generations of women 
that have cared for their parents, husbands, children and grandchildren have 
aged and now need to be cared for. At the same time, younger women’s 
aspirations and the daily dynamic of their lives do not seem to indicate that 
they will take on the same roles as their mothers and grandmothers.
The crisis in the model of caregiving is inseparable from the new sexual division 
of labour that began to develop in post-war European societies. The growing 
participation of women in the labour market is the clearest indicator of the 
passage from a sexual division of labour based on the male ‘breadwinner’ toward 
a model based on the ‘adult worker’ (Lewis, 2001). If in the former model men 
were responsible for paid work (the productive sphere) and women were in 
charge of domestic work (the reproductive sphere), in the latter model both 
(32) While social welfare (social services and benefits) is oriented toward achieving well-being in terms of the 
satisfaction of basic needs. 
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persons carry out certain functions in the labour market and the family. In a 
certain sense, the life course of women has masculinised, driven by their massive 
incorporation into the labour market and their tendency to remain in it even after 
marrying and having children (Esping-Andersen, 2009). However, this 
transformation in the productive sphere has not led to an egalitarian division of 
reproductive labour, which to a great extent continues to be the responsibility 
of women. The function of the ‘housewife’ has not disappeared, but has been 
reconfigured and become part of a ‘double shift’, as women work both inside 
and outside the home. 
In Southern European countries this new division of labour has developed at a 
slower pace, overlapping with the process of transition from an industrial 
society to a post-industrial one. As can be seen in table 2.5, labour force 
participation rates for women in Spain nearly doubled between 1976 (28.4%) 
and 2009 (51%). This increase is particularly significant among women 
between 25 and 54 years of age; in this age group the participation rate went 
from 29% to 77%, in other words, an increase of almost 50 points. This 
contrasts with women over 55 years of age, who barely increased their 
participation in the labour market during this time period.
table 5.1
evolution of women’s labour force participation rates in spain (1976-2009)
YEAR 
AGE
1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 2006 2009
VARIATION 
1976-2009 
TOTAL PERCENT OF 
AGE GROUP 2009
16-19 48.57 39.97 31.97 30.25 21.77 20.78 18.40 23.73 16.09 –32.48  4.49
20-24 53.49 54.71 54.53 61.20 57.95 57.27 56.36 62.89 62.20  +8.71  6.57
25-54 29.07 30.40 35.62 47.87 56.47 63.50 66.01 72.21 77.38 +48.31  53.81
55 + 13.84 11.24 10.05  8.99  8.46  8.80  9.68 12.42 14.97  +1.13  35.13
Total 28.53 27.77 28.96 34.56 37.86 41.73 43.15 48.56 51.70 +23.17 100.00
Source: based on economically active population Survey.
If we compare the trends in Spain with those of other countries we can see that 
Spain is the European country which has seen the greatest increase in women’s 
participation in the labour market in recent decades, gradually approaching 
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the parameters of the countries with a corporatist model, although still far 
from the patterns found among the countries with a social democratic model.
table 5.2
comparative evolution of women’s labour force participation rates
1995 1998 2002 2006 1995-2006
germany 67.4 69.1 72.8 74.4  +7.0
denmark 77.4 79.2 81.0 82.8  +5.4
Spain 42.0 46.8 57.0 67.0 +25.0
finland 71.1 75.6 79.6 78.9  +7.8
france 60.0 68.7 72.4 75.9 +15.9
greece 51.1 54.1 57.9 62.9 +11.9
Italy 49.0 50.6 56.1 61.1 +12.1
portugal 71.0 73.6 76.2 76.6  +5.6
united Kingdom 69.9 72.1 74.1 74.3  +4.4
Sweden 81.6 76.7 82.4 82.1  +0.5
EU-15 62.3 64.3 68.6 71.7  +7.4
Source: based on eurostat data.
The massive incorporation of women into the labour market has increased the 
problems involved in reconciling work and family life. Without the correlate equal 
participation of men in domestic tasks, the responsibility for care continues to 
be left to women, who are forced to find ways of reconciling both spheres. This 
issue is of critical importance in all European societies, but more so in 
Mediterranean countries where the state has traditionally delegated this 
responsibility to the family. In these countries, the tensions that women face, 
and particularly those that have the responsibility of caring for dependent 
persons, are considerably greater. A large number of women therefore interrupt 
their work careers after having children and face ‘endless workdays’ (Durán, 
1986; Marí-Klose et al., 2009). Moreover, families are forced to devote a 
substantial part of their income to purchasing domestic and caregiving services 
(Tobío and Díaz Gorfinkiel, 2003). In addition, new family models (single-
parent families, reconstituted families, etc.) have emerged, which have altered 
the norms and expectations of intergenerational solidarity. 
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Reconciling work and family roles has led to a growth in the demand for 
personal care services. In particular, there has been an increase in the 
demand for the care of the elderly. Moreover, an ageing population means 
greater demand for services for the disabled, given that the incidence of 
dependency is much higher among the population over 65 years of age. 
 5.2. caregiving policies and markets
The role that women and families have historically played in Spain as providers 
of care has been accompanied by very limited state intervention in support of 
families. This intervention has consisted of weak, fragmented and residuary 
social policies, together with the enforcement of families’ legal obligations to 
care for their members (Millar and Warman, 1996; Naldini and Saraceno, 2008). 
In Spain, care policies are lacking in resources, particularly regarding community 
services. These policies are fundamentally based on cash transfers and only 
marginally on the provision of public services. One indicator of this is that the 
availability of places in public childcare facilities per capita in Spain is one of 
the lowest in Europe. This relative lack of public childcare facilities indicates 
that women’s work providing care has been a substitute for the childcare services 
which the state provides in other European countries. Comparative data from the 
OECD for 2003-2004 shows that in Spain, 20.7% of children up to two years of 
age are in childcare, which is two percentage points below the average for all 
European countries. However, only 8.3% of children under three years of age are 
in public childcare centres, while 10.7% are in private ones (2006-2007).
The specialized literature has pointed out the correlation that exists between the 
development of social services and women’s employment, emphasizing above all 
the important role of childcare services. The development of childcare services 
and facilities permits women to join the labour market (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
Although some steps have been taken to increase the number of places available in 
public childcare facilities, there still seems to be a long way to go. 
Policy aimed at reconciling work and family life in Spain has been focused above all 
on leaves for the care of family members as the primary instrument. These leaves fall 
under the framework of Law 39/1999 (Ley de Conciliación 39/1999) ‘to promote the 
reconciliation of work and family life of employed persons’. Although this law gives 
both women and men the right to take paid leaves, it is primarily women who make 
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use of them. For example, in 2002 and 2003 only 1.4% and 3.8% of men respectively 
took leaves to care for their children or other family members (Caixeta et al., 2004: 
28). Without mechanisms that promote a change in mentality among men and 
fundamentally among employers, this law only reinforces traditional gender roles.
With an ageing population and a declining birth rate, the development of long term 
care services for the elderly has had a clear impact on women’s labour market 
participation rates (Da Roit et al., 2008). However, there have barely been any 
changes in the provision of services and development of infrastructure related to the 
provision of care in Southern European countries. The inadequacies of social policies 
in the reproductive sphere are particularly noticeable in the area of services for 
dependent persons and the provision of long term care, where the public system is 
by its very nature residual or secondary, with limited budgets oriented toward 
economic subsidies rather than the actual provision of services (Rodríguez Cabrero, 
2004: 261). Thus, the network of local state-run residential facilities and assisted care 
facilities for the elderly is notably limited, while the majority of resources are 
taken up by long term care facilities (nursing homes, psychiatric facilities, etc.) 
(Costa-Fonty García González, 2007). In addition, despite the high number of highly 
dependent persons living at home, home assistance is barely developed, both in 
terms of quantity of assistance (number of hours offered per week) and in terms of 
coverage (around 3.4% of the population) (Da Roit and Castegnano, 2004). 
Graph 5.1 compares the differences in resources assigned to this type of 
assistance in a number of European countries, as well as changes in the proportion 
of resources allocated to cash transfers and the provision of services in these 
countries.
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graph 5.1
Monetary transfers and spending in the provision of long-term care services 
by purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita (adjusted to 1995 prices) 
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A key measure in this sphere has been the passage of the so-called “Dependency 
Law” (Ley de Promoción de la Autonomía Personal y de Protección de las 
Personas en Situación de Dependencia), which was approved after eight years of 
debate in 2006 (Costa-Font and García González, 2007). This new law defines 
the subjective right to receive care when a person is in a situation of dependency 
and establishes a common regulatory base for the benefits and services that 
the autonomous communities must provide. The very decentralized nature of the 
application of this law, as well as its implementation in a context of budgetary 
cutbacks, have led to a very slow delivery of programmes and a tendency to 
adopt mechanisms that lower the cost of care. 
In this institutional context, the increased demand for care has not led to the 
creation of jobs in publically financed care giving services. At the same time, 
the private market is not a viable alternative for the majority of Spanish 
households, due to the high cost of private caregiving services. 
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table 5.3
feminine employment rates in the caregiving sector (healthcare, 
assistance for the elderly, social services) by women under and over  
50 years of age
1992 1995 2000 2005 2007
25-49 50-64 25-49 50-64 25-49 50-64 25-49 50-64 25-49 50-64
germany 12.0 8.1 14.9 10.1 17.7 8.9 19.4 11.7 19.7 12.9
denmark 23.5 17.1 30.1 20.5 31.9 29.8 29.9 30.9 31.4 30.9
Spain 5.4 – 7.0 2.3 8.6 3.3 10.2 7.3 10.9 8.4
france 12.7 5.4 15.5 6.4 16.6 10.1 19.5 16.2 20.1 16.7
greece 5.1 1.4 6.6 1.7 7.4 2.1 8.2 3.1 8.9 4.0
Ireland 8.8 4.8 12.4 7.4 14.0 13.3 17.0 20.3 17.5 21.3
Italy 7.3 2.2 7.5 2.2 8.7 2.9 11.1 5.3 11.3 6.3
netherlands 19.3 7.4 21.0 – 23.9 16.5 25.8 23.1 27.6 25.2
portugal 6.9 – 10.5 6.1 10.8 5.2 12.7 7.2 13.0 8.8
united Kingdom 15.5 10.6 18.1 13.8 19.4 17.2 20.5 19.9 20.4 19.4
Sweden – – 36.6 – 33.3 – 27.4 31.8 27.2 31.3
Source: based on eurostat data.
Table 5.3 shows that the percentage of women employed in the caregiving sector 
(understood in a broad sense and including healthcare, aid to the elderly and 
social services) has increased slightly in Spain over the last couple of decades, 
but remains low in comparison with more developed European countries (though 
in line with those of the Mediterranean regime). It is noteworthy that the 
percentage of women over 50 years of age that are formally employed in 
caregiving is particularly low in Spain, which suggests that the accumulation of 
informal responsibilities for care within families is an obstacle for the development 
of professional activities outside of the home.
This situation shifts the coverage of the potential demand for care and the 
consequent creation of jobs to the unregulated informal economy which offers 
lower labour costs. This niche in the Spanish labour market is being filled to a 
great extent by women immigrants primarily from Latin America but also from 
Eastern Europe and to a lesser extent, the Philippines and Morocco.
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 5.3. immigrant women and the caregiving sector
After a gradual decline at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, the 
level of employment in the domestic sector began a period of substantial growth 
in 1998, coinciding with the increase in immigration. In this context, foreign 
workers have come to represent between one half and two thirds of regular 
employment in the sector, and the great majority of these jobs are held by women. 
In 2004, 91.7% of new affiliates to social security under the regime for domestic 
employees were women (Villares et al., 2005).
table 5.4
evolution of employment in the household sphere, by social security 
affiliates and ePa
affIlIateS In the domeStIc regIme epa
domeStIc 
WorKerS
percent 
foreIgnerS
WorKerS In houSeholdS 
that emploY domeStIc 
SerVIce
percent  
affIlIated  
WIth InSS
2004 184,193 41.3 591,400 30.6
2005 364,754 68.5 682,800 41.6
2006 300,134 61.0 760,600 44.0
2007 269,150 56.8 770,000 35.8
2008 286,027 59.6  –  –
Source: based on data from the epa and the InSS.
Affiliates to social security through the regime for domestic employees have 
grown in concert with the processes of regularization of undocumented 
immigrants. Thus, the extraordinary regularization carried out between February 
and May 2005 can be considered to be largely responsible for the increase in the 
number of immigrant workers affiliated to social security through this regime. In 
comparison with previous regularization processes, the one in 2005 was 
particularly beneficial for workers in the domestic sector, as they could present 
their application for regularization if they could show that they had worked at 
least 30 hours per week for a period of six months (Da Roit et al., 2008). 
These affiliations are only the tip of the iceberg of a much broader 
phenomenon which escapes fiscal monitoring as it develops outside of legal 
employment channels, in part through employing undocumented women 
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immigrants (Da Roit et al., 2008). The data from the Economically Active 
Population Survey (Encuesta de Población Activa (EPA)) gathered in table 5.4 
shows that the rate of legal employment in domestic jobs ranges from 30 to 
45%, in function of migratory policy, with the majority of this work 
remaining a part of the underground economy (for both immigrant and 
Spanish-born workers).
table 5.5
evolution of social security affiliates through the domestic regime by 
nationality
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009*
Total affiliates 184,193 364,754 300,134 269,150 286,027 287,265
Spain 108,045 114,732 116,958 116,347 115,683 113,760
Total foreigners affiliated 76,148 250,022 183,176 152,803 170,344 173,505
rest of europe 12,425 57,217 44,585 34,809 31,225 32,471
latin america 49,659 161,110 113,831 94,501 110,062 111,877
africa 7,706 21,992 15,249 13,424 16,206 16,247
asia and oceania 6,280 9,553 9,148 9,766 12,579 12,638
* data from december 31 for all years except for 2009, in which the data reflects the annual average.
Source: based on data from the InSS.
Data on workers affiliated through the regime for domestic employees from 
31 December 2008 indicates that 65.3% of immigrants employed in this sector 
are from Latin America. The three largest national groups are Ecuadorians, 
Bolivians and Colombians, making up 17.3%, 12.4% and 11.8% respectively 
of the total percentage of foreigners employed in the domestic regime. Along 
with these nationalities, a significant number are Romanian (8.5%) and 
Moroccan (7.24%). Other immigrant women that often find employment in 
this sector are from Peru, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Brazil, Argentina, 
the Ukraine, the Philippines and China, although women from these countries 
make up a small percentage of the total. 
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table 5.6
Principal nationalities among foreigners affiliated to social security 
through the domestic regime as of December 31 2008
natIonalItY number percentage
Latin America – 65.39
ecuador 26,628 17.38
bolivia 19,064 12.44
colombia 18,115 11.82
peru 9,257 6.04
dominican rep. 6,541 4.27
paraguay 5,996 3.91
brazil 3,333 2.17
argentina 2,619 1.71
Asia – 6.74
philippines 6,764 4.41
china 2,274 1.48
Africa – 8.55
morocco 11,099 7.24
EU – 12.77
romania 13,151 8.58
Rest of Europe – 6.49
ukraine 6,767 4.42
Total 100
Source: based on data from the InSS.
Qualitative research indicates that these national groups occupy different 
positions in the domestic sector as this labour market is highly segmented by 
nationality: while some nationalities specialize in cleaning (non-live-in 
workers) and are paid by the hour, others fundamentally work in providing 
care to the elderly or children (live-in workers). This segmentation of foreign 
workers reflects a social hierarchy of jobs in the domestic sector. Non-live-in 
jobs are more socially valuable and in the majority are occupied by 
autochthonous workers, while live-in jobs involve much more difficult and 
often abusive working conditions. These are the jobs which no one wants, with 
long workdays, low wages, lack of a private life, etc. A study by Imserso 
(Instituto de Mayores y Servicios Sociales [Institute for Older Persons and 
Social Services]) estimated that 40% of the caregivers of the elderly were 
foreign women and that this figure reached 81.3% in the case of live-in 
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caregivers (Imserso, 2004). Although official statistics on the domestic sector 
do not differentiate between ‘caregiver’ and ‘cleaner’, these jobs greatly differ, 
both in terms of the training required as well as the intensity of the work 
carried out.(33)
Among immigrant women, the recent arrivals and the undocumented occupy 
the worst jobs. In the most difficult live-in domestic jobs some studies have 
documented a certain ethnic succession (Martínez Buján, 2008): as they 
become more settled and integrated, different national groups abandon live-in 
jobs, which are then taken by less integrated nationalities. In this regard, 
Martínez Buján (2008) shows that in 2004, 37.5% of foreign caregivers were 
Ecuadorian women, but after the regularization of 2005, 90% of these women 
received legal residence and their live-in jobs were taken largely by Bolivian 
women. This would also indicate that immigrants follow a typical pattern of a 
succession of jobs in their process of integrating into the Spanish labour 
market. Reflecting the widespread tendency of immigrants to enter the 
receiving country through the least regulated jobs in which employers have 
greater power to establish working conditions, recent arrivals initially take 
live-in jobs. In a second phase, they look for non-live-in jobs, save money, 
become documented workers and make plans for their families to join them. 
As the majority of jobs for caregivers are for live-in workers, this work 
becomes an employment niche for recent arrivals and for immigrant groups 
that are less settled or integrated, groups that have still not been able to 
regularize their situation and are therefore obliged to accept this type of 
employment (Martínez Buján, 2008).(34) 
The previously cited Imserso study reveals that although 83.5% of families 
care for their elderly members without assistance (public or private), when 
they do decide to look for outside help they are most likely to hire a domestic 
worker, usually an immigrant woman. In general a domestic worker is preferred 
over a professional caregiver because the former do not limit their work to 
personal care, but also take on domestic tasks, such as cooking, shopping or 
cleaning. These are high-intensity jobs, particularly in the case of caring for 
(33) For this reason, Martínez Buján proposes that we talk of the “domestic care sector” within the broader domestic 
sector; the former would cover only the work of “caregiving”, differentiating this work from the work of “cleaning”.
(34) It should be remembered that Raquel Martínez Buján’s research has been carried out in Galicia and Navarra, 
and that in other regions we may see other tendencies.
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the elderly, which combine the tasks of maintaining the psychological well-
being of the dependent person (providing company and conversation, etc.) 
with the physical tasks of cleaning the home or caring for an elderly person 
(hygiene, mobility). 
Spanish families’ demands for care structure the working conditions of their 
caregiving employees. Families prefer live-in employees that can respond to 
the needs of the elderly 24 hours a day. Therefore, in addition to working 
hours, there is what the law refers to as “on-call time”, time agreed to between 
the employer and employee in which the latter has to be present and possibly 
respond to low effort tasks, such as answering the telephone. The research of 
Martínez Buján on Galicia and Navarra reveals that these live-in jobs as 
caregiver involve a high workload and a low salary – between 400 and 1000 Euros 
a month - (Martínez Buján, 2008: 107). 
In addition, the choice of employees reveals clear preferences on the part of 
employers. Qualitative research on these preferences indicates that 90% of the 
demands for personal assistance in the caregiving sector are aimed at immigrant 
women (Martínez Buján, 2010). Qualitative studies also show that families 
prefer women, and they prefer Latin American women to provide care because 
of the shared language (Villares et al., 2005). 
Labour market segmentation among immigrants is influenced by the ethnic 
stereotypes of autochthonous employers, who choose a domestic employee 
based on their ideas about the home and the qualities necessary to carry out 
domestic tasks. The different immigrant groups are associated in the collective 
imaginary with specific characteristics, which makes them more or less 
appropriate as caregivers. A study by Caixeta et al. (2004) identifies certain 
dominant cultural stereotypes. Based on its results, Latin American women 
are considered ‘sweet’ but also ‘liars’ and ‘not very hard workers’, particularly 
Ecuadorians. Women from Eastern Europe, in contrast, are seen as ‘disciplined’ 
and capable of learning the language quickly but likely to have some 
relationship to organized crime networks. The stereotype of Moroccan women 
is that they are ‘very dependent on their spouses’ and they are seen as radically 
‘other’ in the domestic space. Gavanas et al. also confirm these stereotypes in 
their study, observing considerable anti-Muslim sentiments which lead to 
perceptions of Moroccan women as ‘untrustworthy’ (Gavanas et al., 2007). 
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Faced with social transformations which make the ‘familist’ welfare regime 
difficult to sustain, the weak public services and the inability to afford the cost 
of purchasing care on the formal market, the alternative for households is to 
resort to the unregulated market for caregiving services. As a result, female 
immigration has been used as a cheap and flexible solution to the growing 
demand for labour power in the caregiving sector. To access the labour market, 
Spanish women need to ‘outsource’ domestic tasks and the care of children, 
the elderly and other dependent persons. Work in the home and caregiving has 
been reorganized with immigrant labour playing a central role in structuring 
this new model (Imserso, 2004). 
Functioning as ‘servants of globalisation’ (Parreñas, 2001), immigrants from 
developing countries fill the gaps left by the integration of Spanish women 
into the labour market. In this way a ‘global care chain’ is created (Hochschild, 
2000; Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2002) in which women from disadvantaged 
regions emigrate to care for the families of women employed in the regular 
labour market in Western countries, while with the money they send home, 
they support their own children, left in the care of family members back 
home. One might call it a ‘care drain’ copying the expression ‘brain drain’ 
from the traditional language on migration (Bettio, et al., 2006: 272).
This new international division of reproductive labour or ‘global care chain’ 
is a global phenomenon with a particular effect on Southern European 
countries: Spain, Greece, Italy and to a lesser extent, Portugal (Martínez 
Buján, 2010). In these countries a new migratory model in which women play 
a leading role developed beginning in the 1980s. In contrast with the post-war 
migratory model in which the man, as the head of the household, emigrated 
alone to look for work and was followed by his wife and children later, in this 
new model it is women who are taking the initiative in migratory projects 
(King and Zontini, 2000).
The development of this source of employment is also connected to certain 
public policies which facilitate the employment of women immigrants as 
caregivers; research shows that there is a relationship between the establishment 
of direct cash payments to dependent persons and the employment of women 
immigrants in the caregiving sector (Williams, 2004). For example, France, 
Spain, the United Kingdom and Finland all introduced assistance to cover the 
cost of childcare in the form of direct payments or tax deductions (Lister et al., 
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2007). In Austria, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the elderly 
and dependent persons receive direct payments to finance their home assistance 
(Ungerson and Yeandle, 2007; Bettio et al., 2006). These monetary benefits in 
the form of both tax deductions and direct payments encourage the development 
of a private market for home care, characterized by high rates of informality 
and low wages. It is in this informal market where “global caregivers” find 
opportunities for insertion in the labour market, as they are willing to work 
under the precarious working conditions offered.
As a result, there is a direct relationship between the degree of formalization in 
the caregiving sector and the immigration of women. Regarding the former, the 
countries with a social democratic welfare regime and a higher degree of 
formalization in the caregiving sector offer a much smaller niche for immigrant 
employment. The countries with a corporatist model that use monetary payments 
in place of public services for providing care have generated a growing niche for 
the immigration of women. Finally, countries with a Mediterranean welfare 
regime have created an unfulfilled demand for care at home by leaving families 
to face this problem alone. However, they have now begun to create programmes 
providing monetary transfers to help families provide care at the lowest possible 
cost, which is generating a large source of jobs for ‘global caregivers’ (Kofman 
et al., 2005; Williams, 2004; Lister et al., 2007).
 5.4. conclusions
From what we have seen throughout this chapter the clear conclusion is that it 
has become increasingly difficult for the family to take on the tasks and 
responsibilities that ensure the viability of a welfare regime based on 
‘familism’. If a new equilibrium between government intervention, the market 
and civil society is not established, an enormous deficit in the provision of care 
may be produced, one which will call into question existing relations of 
intergenerational solidarity.
Various authors have argued that the real crisis of the welfare state will in fact 
be a crisis over the provision of care (Myles, 1991). In European countries 
characterized by more advanced public systems for the provision of care, it 
is possible to distinguish a pattern of adaptation. Essentially, we see a trend 
toward budget cutbacks, the introduction of selection criteria for beneficiaries 
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based on the principle of ‘need’ and strict eligibility requirements, the 
subcontracting of services to the private sector, and an emphasis on informal 
care accompanied by cash transfers (Arriba and Moreno Fuentes, 2009). At 
the centre of this crisis, however, are those countries which up until now 
have found their equilibrium in the establishment of ‘familist’ regimes but 
that are currently seeing the social and axiological foundations of these 
regimes gradually vanish.
In this context, a new division of labour is consolidating. What was previously 
unpaid care provided by Spanish women, is now being outsourced to a private 
unregulated market in which immigrant women under precarious working 
conditions and with little professionalization provide care. The family model 
of care has been replaced by the model of “an immigrant in the family” (Bettio 
et al., 2006: 272). 
This informal solution appears to be helping to resolve the crisis of care in 
the short term, but it may be jeopardizing the development of a standardized 
and professionalized system of care. Thus, the emergence of an informal 
market for providing care, basically covered by immigrant women, raises 
challenges for the sustainability of the welfare regime, but also for shared 
responsibility, immigrant integration and social justice. In the face of such 
challenges, the state must assume greater responsibility for personal care 
services and regulate the market for them so that immigrant workers can 
obtain labour rights and legal residency instead of remaining in situations of 
illegality and insecurity.
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 Vi.  the impact of immigration on the 
financial and social sustainability  
of the welfare state
The analysis of the impact of immigration on social protection systems in the 
receiving country requires a focus on both economic and social dimensions. In 
this chapter we will first analyze the economic impact of immigration on 
Spain. Given the enormous complexity of this issue, our intention is only to 
provide a synthetic analysis of the principal implications of immigration on 
the financial sustainability of the Spanish welfare regime.We will then look at 
the evolving attitudes of Spanish citizens toward immigration, and in particular, 
toward the extension of social rights to immigrant groups. This is a key aspect, 
both in analyzing the legitimacy of policies extending rights to these 
groups (the correlation between opinions expressed by the citizenry and the 
nature of public policies) and in terms of the sustainability of social protection 
systems. In this regard, citizen alienation and loss of public support for these 
policies, resulting from a perception that welfare state programmes are abused 
by immigrants, translate into less willingness to pay taxes and support 
redistributive policies.
 6.1. immigration and the financial sustainability of the welfare regime
Because of their position as a link between the productive and reproductive 
spheres, social protection policies cannot be analyzed apart from the 
economic sphere which frames them. Any study on the impact of immigration 
on social protection programmes in a specific country must be based on a 
multidimensional analysis which takes into account the role of migration in 
the country’s socioeconomic system.
the Impact of ImmIgratIon on the fInancIal and SocIal SuStaInabIlItY of the Welfare State  133
  6.1.1. immigration, economic growth and the production system
Immigration has been an important stimulus to the Spanish economy over recent 
decades and has contributed to consolidating the country’s social protection 
system. Between 2001 and the beginning of 2008, Spain’s GDP grew at an average 
annual rate of 3.5%, creating more than 4.5 million net jobs (40% of the total 
generated in the EU-15 during this period), approximately half of them being 
taken by foreigners. Different studies have tried to quantify the effect of immigration 
on this period of economic growth. Given the complexity and multiplicity of 
factors to take into consideration, the conclusions reached vary regarding the 
impact immigration has had, although all of the studies point to the net positive 
effect of the arrival of millions of working age persons on the production system 
and public finances. 
A report prepared by the Economic Office of the President in 2006, stated that 
30% of Spain’s GDP growth between the mid-1990s and the beginning of the new 
century was a result of the arrival and settlement of immigrant groups. This 
positive effect increased to 50% of GDP growth during the period between 2000 
and 2005. The positive impact of immigrants is the sum of certain direct effects 
(increase in private consumption and the demand for housing, the increase in 
the overall labour force participation rate, changes in the demographic structure 
of the Spanish population, etc.), as well as a complex combination of indirect 
effects on the GDP (increase in the labour force participation rate among the 
autochthonous population, flexibilisation of the labour market, etc.). A study by 
the Caixa Catalunya savings bank also found that from 1996-2006 Spain’s 
economy grew an average of 2.6% annually thanks to the contribution of 
immigrants (Caixa Catalunya, 2006). According to the model developed by the 
authors of that study, Spain’s GDP would have fallen 0.6% annually over this 
period without the contribution of immigrants.(35) With somewhat different results, 
but also equally positive regarding the impact of immigration, Conde-Ruiz et al. 
estimated that more than 38% of the average annual growth in GDP at the national 
level during the period 2000-2006 could be attributed to the direct consequences 
of immigration (without including other indirect effects which also increased the 
(35) The positive effect of immigration was produced in the majority of European countries, which, without the 
contribution of immigrants would have undergone annual declines in GDP per capita. The most significant declines 
would have been in Germany (–1.5%) and Italy (–1.2%), followed by Sweden (–0.8%), Portugal and Greece (–0.6%).
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impact in an equally positive manner); in addition, the positive effect was even 
greater in certain autonomous communities (Conde-Ruiz et al., 2007).(36) 
As we saw in chapter 2, immigration has radically transformed the structure 
and functioning of the labour market and, thus, the Spanish production 
system. In broad terms, economic immigrants from developing countries 
are employed in economic sectors where there are jobs not covered by 
autochthonous workers. Immigrants have thus helped to introduce 
flexibility into the labour market and to reduce inflationary pressures in a 
period of strong economic and jobs growth. Thanks to immigration, 
employers have had cheap and flexible labour available and have increased 
their profits (Otero et al., 2010). In line with the findings by the Bank of 
Spain in its 2006 annual report, Dolado and Vázquez (2008) point out that 
immigration has also helped to control inflation, thanks to immigrants’ 
capacity to save and their influence reducing tensions over wages. At the 
same time, many Spanish families have enjoyed an increase in their 
standard of living thanks to lower prices for a large number of services, 
from access to personal care at a lower cost (domestic service, aid to 
dependent persons), as well as from increased household income resulting 
from the growing incorporation of Spanish women into the labour market. 
Freed from a part of their work and responsibilities in the reproductive 
sphere, which have been transferred to immigrant women employed for 
these tasks, Spanish women have joined the labour market en masse. Based 
on the calculations of these authors, inflation in Spain during the last 
decade would have increased 0.5% annually if not for the arrival of the 
immigrant population (Dolado and Vázquez, 2008). The Spanish economy, 
therefore, has benefited from an increase in general economic activity 
(increasing internal demand), from the containment of prices and from the 
maintenance of certain economic sectors that without immigration would 
have suffered serious difficulties in surviving in an environment of 
growing international competition (particularly agriculture, tourism and 
certain industries dependent on intensive labour). 
This latter factor can be interpreted as a short-term advantage, as it permits 
a less traumatic transition to be initiated toward a different economic model 
(36) By communities, the greatest effects were produced in the Balearic Islands (82.08%), La Rioja (69.61%), 
Valencia (60.41%), the Canary Islands (55.21%), Murcia (54.18%), Catalonia (45.24%) and Madrid (44.80%).
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by cushioning the costs of the transition, but it also creates certain medium 
and long-term disadvantages. It is a disincentive for the introduction of new 
technologies and the investment of capital, as it perpetuates economic 
sectors of relatively low added value and therefore calls into question the 
future sustainability of the Spanish economy. The stagnation of productivity,(37) 
the general limited orientation of the economy toward international markets 
and the serious deterioration in balance of payments all raise the urgent need 
for a change in the economic model in which immigration will play an 
important role. 
An additional element regarding the effect of immigration on macroeconomic 
parameters and in particular on the balance of payments is the role of monetary 
remittances. Just as the savings of the Spanish who emigrated contributed to 
providing foreign currency to the Spanish economy during the years of 
development, the remittances of emigrants to their families in their countries 
of origin constitute a transfer of economic resources which has an important 
impact on Spain’s balance of payments.
The Bank of Spain estimates that beginning in 2004, Spain became a net 
emitter of monetary flows because of the growth in remittances from 
immigrants, in comparison to funds received from the Spanish residing 
outside of the country (Roquero, 2008). The amount of money that 
immigrants sent to their countries of origin grew 5.6 times between 2002 
and 2007, increasing from slightly more than 1.5 billion Euros to over 8.4 
billion Euros. This money is a result of the efforts and sacrifices of immigrants 
who delay their own gratification in order to send money to their families to 
cover basic needs and to invest in their society of origin. What constitutes on 
the one hand a reduction of potential internal demand, as well as an element 
of growing importance in calculations of Spain’s balance of payments, is 
also a new element to consider in Spanish foreign policy (in particular 
regarding cooperation and development) as new types of connections are 
established with source countries of origin of migration flows towards Spain.
(37) The evolution of aggregate productivity in the Spanish economy for the period 1995-2007 shows a flat profile, 
with substantial gains in the agricultural sector, a slight, although up and down increase in the industrial sector and 
a significant decline in the service sector and in construction.
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  6.1.2. immigration and fiscal balance
The fiscal impact of immigration on public finances has also received some 
attention from applied social research. Beyond social security contributions 
and direct and indirect taxes collected from the immigrant population, as well 
as estimates of expenses attributable to the benefits and services provided 
to immigrants, analysis must also include the totality of wealth generated by 
the presence (and employment) of immigrants in the host society. Despite the 
absence of comprehensive research including all these parameters, the data we 
have available based on partial analyses clearly show the positive impact of 
immigration on public finances in Spain. 
The previously cited 2006 report from the Economic Office of the President 
estimated that 50% of the budget surplus in public finances during the years 
of greatest economic growth (some 5 billion Euros annually) was a result of 
immigration. This report calculated that individuals of immigrant origin 
absorbed 5.4% of public spending (18.6 billion) and contributed 6.6% of total 
state revenue (23.4 billion), for a net contribution of 4.78 billion Euros, in 
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other words, half of the total surplus in the public sector in 2005. According to 
Dolado and Vázquez (2008), in 2008, state income resulting from immigration 
(income taxes, contributions to social security, sales tax and other special 
taxes, etc.) exceeded costs (in the form of unemployment benefits, pensions, 
education and healthcare related costs, etc.) by about 2 billion Euros, with the 
expectation that this positive balance would increase to 3 billion by the end of 
2010. These authors also calculated that to the extent that demographic growth 
projections of the autochthonous population and migratory flows are accurate, 
this positive surplus will decrease to some 1.5 billion Euros annually toward 
the end of the next decade. 
A report on the economic impact of immigrants in the Basque Country, published 
by the autonomous government of that region, draws similar conclusions as 
these studies. According to this report, the balance between the fiscal contribution 
of the immigrant population and the cost of social services and transfers 
immigrants receive results in a positive net per capita annual contribution of 
1000 Euros more than the autochthonous population, without counting social 
security contributions, which are under the competency of the central government 
(Gobierno Vasco, 2008: 120).
Common to all groups of immigrant origin is their relatively unstable insertion 
into the labour market, as they often straddle both the underground economy 
and the formal economy but in situations of precarious employment and 
particularly difficult working conditions. In today’s economic context, marked 
by an employment crisis, the surplus that the state enjoys as a consequence 
of the expansion of immigration will clearly decline. The concentration of 
immigrant workers in the economic sectors most sensitive to economic cycles, 
as well as the weakness of their family and community networks, leaves this 
population more exposed to the negative repercussions of the crisis.
Immigrants suffer higher rates of unemployment, are more likely to be 
overqualified for the jobs they hold and to be temporarily employed. However, 
five years after arrival, their rates of labour market participation begin to 
converge with those of the native born population. Their unemployment rate 
declines to levels even below that found for Spanish workers, while their rates 
of over-education and temporary employment remain approximately constant. 
In comparative terms between different immigrant groups, employment 
indicators for Eastern European immigrants converge more rapidly toward the 
138 ImmIgratIon and the Welfare State In SpaIn
autochthonous population, while working conditions for African immigrants 
continue to be worse than those for nationals long after their arrival in the 
country (Dolado and Vázquez, 2008).
In 2008, immigrants from developing countries residing in Spain had a labour 
force participation rate significantly higher than that of the autochthonous 
population (81.2% compared to 72.6%) (Otero, et al., 2010). This difference 
was clearly visible in the case of men (89.1% versus 82.1%), and particularly 
marked among women (73.3% versus 62.7%). According to Otero et al., this 
meant that in 2008 immigrant contributions to social security alone (8.08 
billion Euros), not including direct and indirect taxes they paid, were greater 
than all the social spending associated with immigration (6.5 billion Euros). 
The present and future sustainability of the social security system is one of the 
areas most often mentioned when discussing the relationship of immigration 
to social protection policies. The general argument is relatively simple: if European 
societies, and among them, particularly Spain, are headed toward a significant 
increase in their rates of dependency (the ratio between the inactive population 
and the active population) as a consequence of the ageing of their populations, 
the arrival of economically active young people from other countries is one 
of the fastest and easiest ways to temporarily halt this process.
European countries are essentially becoming victims of a slow demographic 
time bomb. The increase in life expectancy and low birth rates, beginning in 
the 1970s (in Europe) and the 1980s (in Spain), have had a direct impact on 
social security systems, as the proportion of retirees is increasing, while the 
proportion of workers is declining. Given that there are increasing numbers of 
people receiving money from the system and fewer contributing to it, Spain’s 
ageing society will not be able to meet its commitment to provide the retirement 
pensions promised to the workers who are currently contributing to the system 
without increasing their current contributions (which would depress internal 
demand and slow down economic growth, while also making Spain’s exports 
less competitive) or reforming the social security system (there is a certain 
margin to delay the coming problems, but without resolving them structurally). 
The cost of pensions currently represents around 8.7% of GDP in Spain, and 
it is estimated that this could increase to 20% of GDP by 2050 (even if 
employment rates were to converge with those of the EU).
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Graph 6.2 shows the projections for the Spanish population calculated by 
Spain’s National Statistics Institute, and it is easy to see how the gradual 
ageing of the population calls into question the sustainability of Spain’s 
economy and therefore, the system of social protection as it currently functions. 
Based on these projections, if current demographic trends continue, the 
Spanish population will lose 3.4 million workers between the ages of 19 and 
40 years of age over the period from 2010 to 2020, and the population over 65 
years of age will double by the year 2050. For each person of working age 
there will be almost one potentially inactive person.
Several international institutions (UN, EU, and OECD) argue that international 
migration is one of the best and most feasible mechanisms to balance the 
social security budget in the near future. According to the European 
Commission, births in Spain during the next two decades will barely offset 
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deaths, and only the arrival of foreigners will increase the economically active 
population and the number of contributors to social security; thus, it will be 
necessary for Spain to receive at least seven million immigrants in the next 20 
years if the dependency rate is to remain at 34%.
There are three main reasons why immigration could contribute to attenuating 
the negative effects of an ageing population. First, a net inflow of immigrants 
increases the total population of the receiving country. Thus, in 2001, over 
74% of population growth in the EU came from immigration. In Spain, the 
proportion was even higher, slightly over 80%. Secondly, immigration has 
an immediate effect on the working age population, given that on average, 
immigrants are considerably younger than the autochthonous population. 
Finally, the first generation of immigrants tends to have more children than the 
native-born population, in this way contributing to increasing the total birth 
rate of the receiving country.
The bulk of population growth in Spain between 1992 and 2010 was in fact 
due to immigration. Between 1992 and 2005 the Spanish population grew by 
4.3 million persons, 3.4 million of whom were immigrants (Pajares, 2007). 
Immigration has moderated the effects of the ageing of the population in 
Spain. The immediate consequence of this population growth, if we look at the 
age structure of the immigrant population, is the increase in the potentially 
active population. The year 1976 marked the end of a baby boom in Spain, and 
this meant that beginning in 1993, the number of young people age 16 is much 
lower than found in that preceding period. As a consequence, the fall of the 
birth rate each year affected a larger age group, and therefore each year fewer 
young people entered the labour market. The immigrant population, in their 
majority between the ages of 20 and 39, compensated for this decline in the 
potentially active native population. 
Immigration has also had a clear demographic impact on the labour market. 
Persons of foreign nationality now make up more than 11% of the employed 
population in Spain, contributing to the increase in the labour force participation 
rate and in employment. According to data from the EPA, half of the 2.6 
million new jobs created between 2001 and 2005 were taken by foreigners 
(Economic Office of the President, 2006). This growth in employment would 
have been impossible without immigration (Pajares, 2007: 22).
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Despite the autochthonous active population barely growing, the labour force 
participation rate among the Spanish has grown, fundamentally thanks to the 
growing participation of women in the labour market. Traditionally, Spain has 
had female labour force participation rates well below the European average, 
to a great extent explained by the difficulty in reconciling work and family life. 
The employment of a large number of women immigrants in the caregiving 
sector has permitted many working age Spanish women to join the workforce. 
At least a third of the increase in the female economic activity rate is attributable 
to the increased presence of domestic employees of immigrant origin, who 
take on a part of autochthonous women’s responsibilities in the reproductive 
sphere (Economic Office of the President, 2006). This can also be observed in 
the regions in which there has been the most immigration, as there has been a 
parallel increase in labour force participation among Spanish women (Conde-
Ruiz et al., 2007).
To the extent that immigrants contribute to the payment of pensions for the 
current generation of retirees through their contributions to the social security 
system, there is no doubt that immigration contributes to the financial 
equilibrium of the system. The arrival of more than four million immigrants 
has not only contributed to rejuvenating the economically active population, 
but has also increased the number of contributors to social security, the number 
of pensioners remaining constant, and is the reason why the public system has 
had a budget surplus of more than 1% in recent years. According to the 2006 
report by the Economic Office of the President, immigrants in that year 
contributed 8 billion Euros to the INSS (National Social Security Institute), 
and received pensions worth 400 million. Based on the most recent figures 
from the INSS, at the end of 2010 there were 18.7 million contributors to the 
system, of which almost 1.9 million were immigrants (81% non-EU immigrants 
and 19% from other EU countries). The contributions of these immigrants 
have temporarily raised the ratio of contributors to pensioners to nearly 2.5 to 
1. As a result, immigration will delay by almost five years — from the year 
2023 until 2028 —the Spanish pension system’s entry into a state of deficit, 
introducing a margin for action that will permit the necessary reforms to be 
made to guarantee the sustainability of the system (González et al., 2009).
The conversion of immigrants into pensioners will begin in approximately 
2030, but until at least 2045 they will continue to be net contributors to the 
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system, to a large extent because their pensions will be low, as their contribution 
base will have also been low. From that moment on, however, immigrant 
retirees will coincide with Spanish retirees of the baby boom generation, so 
they will be contributing to the increasing demand on the social security 
pension system. Different studies on this issue have come to the same 
conclusion: immigration has temporarily guaranteed the financial sustainability 
of the pension system, although at best, it leaves the solution to this problem 
to the following generation. In this regard, the contribution of immigrants is 
clearly positive, as it has postponed the social security deficit by several 
decades. Many of these immigrants, in addition, will not have spent enough 
time as contributors in Spain to benefit from a contributory pension, so they 
will only be able to opt for non-contributory benefits which are financed 
through the general state budget. This has multiple implications, as these 
pensions are considerably lower than contributory ones, and in addition, they 
shift the financial responsibility from the social security system to the state 
budget. These types of pensions also raise the issue of legitimacy, as the shift 
from a contributory logic to a logic of “national solidarity” leaves greater 
space for the politicization of the issue of immigrant access to the social 
protection system, initially designed for the autochthonous population. 
There have been few foresight exercises regarding the evolution of the 
economy, the welfare state and the impact of immigration on both, but they 
confirm the analyses carried out in other countries that argue that the arrival of 
immigrants has an overall positive impact on public finances during the initial 
phases of the settlement cycle. This positive effect is gradually neutralized as 
the demographic profile of immigrant populations slowly converges with that 
of the autochthonous population. In this regard, the work of Otero et al. (2010) 
is pioneering in its presentation of a series of possible alternative scenarios for 
the year 2025. In these scenarios, based on different combinations of economic 
growth rates and rates of migratory flows, the authors propose a series of 
relatively clear conclusions. The first of these is that depending on the economic 
model adopted by Spain in the coming years and the rate of economic growth 
achieved during this period, the total volume of migratory flows to Spain will 
range between two and five million persons. The arrival of immigrant labour 
may vary considerably, but given the negative natural growth of the 
autochthonous population there will be demand for it in any case. This situation 
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will coexist with high unemployment rates especially among the immigrant 
population, resulting from the relatively low-skills of a large part of the 
immigrant workforce that has come to Spain in recent decades. In a context of 
increasing social spending, a result of the demographic transformations in 
Spanish society, the proportion of spending allocated to the immigrant 
population will continue to grow, but the net positive impact of immigrants on 
Spain’s fiscal balance will remain (primarily as a consequence of their lower 
use of retirement benefits of a contributory character). In this regard, these 
authors calculate a 60% differential in social spending on the immigrant 
population in comparison to the autochthonous population.
  6.1.3. immigration, public administrations and social classes
Although immigration leads to aggregate gains for the country, the multilevel 
structure of the government and the systems of finance between these levels 
can produce budgetary imbalances between public administrations with 
important implications for social protection systems.
As we have seen, the positive fiscal balance from immigration is largely 
generated in the social security system, which is under the control of the central 
state government. Similarly, income and sales taxes, which immigration can 
have a positive impact on, are also administered by the central government (with 
the exception of the Basque Country and Navarra, who collect their own taxes 
based on a system known as the Concierto Económico (Economic Agreement)), 
which subsequently distributes the agreed on percentages of revenue to the 
autonomous communities based on regularly negotiated regional financing 
agreements. In this context, the massive wave of immigration in recent years, 
along with the concentration of immigrant groups in certain communities, has 
led to a significant gap between the tax revenues generated by immigration and 
the expenses resulting from the increase in demand for certain services 
(healthcare, education, social services). Communities such as Catalonia, Madrid 
and Valencia, where the arrival of immigrants has led to rapid increases in the 
population, have had difficulties in responding to the additional demands for 
benefits and services because the finances received from the central government 
have not kept pace with their population growth. The benefits from immigration 
are clear at the macroeconomic level (budget surpluses in the general state 
administration between 2005 and 2007 are not unrelated to this process), while 
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tensions arise on the mesoeconomic (autonomous community budgets) and 
microeconomic (budgets for schools, healthcare clinics, hospitals, etc.) levels. 
The concrete risk from these processes is the deterioration of public services and 
their loss of legitimacy among the autochthonous population as a result.
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We can see in graph 6.3 that the main components of social spending among the 
immigrant population are related to healthcare and education. Although economic 
conditions introduce fluctuations in the composition of spending, these two 
spheres absorb a minimum of 75% of public spending aimed at this population. 
The other components (unemployment, retirement, survivors’ pensions, disability 
allowances and aid for families) do not come to more than 25% of the total. The 
principal component of social spending for immigrants corresponds, therefore, to 
social protection programmes under the direction of autonomous community 
governments, whose budgets finance the costs of these programmes.
Graph 6.4 shows that the percentage of total social spending dedicated to the 
immigrant population has grown significantly over the period reflected. From 
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representing approximately 1% of spending for healthcare and education in 
2000, this proportion has grown to 5% of spending on healthcare and 6% of 
spending on education in 2007. These percentages are below the proportion 
of the population represented by immigrants, but they clearly show how social 
spending linked to immigration, under the responsibility of the autonomous 
communities, has grown considerably in a short period of time without a 
proportional adjustment in financing from the central government.
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Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show how the autonomous communities have had to allocate 
different proportions of their resources to fund social programmes for 
immigrant populations. 
While in regard to education spending there has been a general trend toward 
an increase of resources dedicated to students of immigrant origin (with some 
communities obviously dedicating greater resources due to the larger number 
of immigrants settled in their territory), in the area of healthcare there has 
been a much more noticeable increase in the cases of Catalonia, Madrid, and 
to a lesser extent, Valencia. 
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table 6.1
Percentage of healthcare expenditures dedicated to the immigrant 
population by autonomous communities
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
andalusia 0.54 0.78 1.11 1.60 1.89 2.50 2.85 3.01
aragon 0.09 0.20 0.37 0.53 0.65 0.89 0.93 1.13
asturias 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.24
balearic Islands 0.14 0.24 0.42 0.62 0.72 0.96 0.87 0.98
basque country 0.13 0.19 0.29 0.39 0.46 0.58 0.64 0.80
canary Islands 0.39 0.56 0.82 1.04 1.26 1.41 1.32 1.41
cantabria 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.19 0.20 0.23
castilla-la mancha 0.10 0.21 0.39 0.56 0.69 0.96 1.04 1.36
castilla y leon 0.09 0.15 0.28 0.41 0.50 0.69 0.75 0.86
catalonia 1.32 1.96 2.87 4.17 5.17 6.48 6.79 7.43
extremadura 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.21 0.21 0.23
galicia 0.12 0.18 0.26 0.33 0.36 0.48 0.47 0.52
la rioja 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.17 0.21 0.27 0.30 0.34
madrid 1.35 2.63 3.67 4.85 5.52 6.77 6.43 7.13
murcia 0.22 0.48 0.74 1.05 1.19 1.46 1.50 1.70
navarra 0.07 0.17 0.27 0.35 0.39 0.43 0.43 0.45
Valencia 0.44 0.78 1.44 2.14 2.63 3.38 3.56 4.06
ceuta and melilla 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.07
Total 0.91 1.52 2.30 3.16 3.72 4.50 4.83 5.18
Source: based on data from otero et al., 2010.
Resources made available to autonomous communities and municipalities by 
the central government to aid the integration of immigrants through the 
Support Fund for the Reception and Integration of Immigrants and their 
Educational Support have clearly not been sufficient to halt the potential 
deterioration of social services resulting from the rapid increase in demand 
due to population growth. Faced with this situation, the communities that have 
experienced significant migration flows have tried to use population growth as 
a central argument for redefining their financial relationship with the central 
government, with the aim of having their particular circumstances recognized 
and therefore, increasing their financial resources. 
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In this context, it has been more at the municipal level rather than the level of 
autonomous community where policy initiatives aimed at limiting the social rights 
of immigrants have emerged. Plans to restrict undocumented immigrants from 
registering as residents in local municipalities proposed by local councils in Vic and 
Torrejón triggered heated debate on the relationship between immigration and the 
saturation of public services and their financing. In fact, these initiatives were not a 
direct response to the difficulty in financing social services, which do not depend on 
municipalities but on the autonomous community governments, but rather were a 
response to the efforts of certain ‘political entrepreneurs’ hoping to use citizens’ 
perceptions of competition over scarce resources for their own political gain. 
table 6.2
Percentage of educational expenditures dedicated to the immigrant 
population by autonomous communities
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
andalusia 0.51 0.71 1.00 1.40 1.95 2.30 2.67  3.98
aragon 0.62 1.12 2.13 3.56 4.59 5.39 6.46  6.97
asturias 0.28 0.44 0.78 1.26 1.66 1.97 2.27  2.56
balearic Islands 1.26 1.88 3.19 4.96 6.59 7.16 7.67 11.23
basque country 0.44 0.67 1.04 1.54 2.06 2.60 3.05  3.12
canary Islands 1.19 1.58 2.31 3.16 3.74 4.30 4.33  7.34
cantabria 0.39 0.57 0.97 1.70 2.43 2.87 3.39  3.48
castilla-la mancha 1.05 1.05 1.81 2.97 3.96 4.79 5.70  6.06
castilla y leon 0.40 0.70 0.98 1.64 2.17 2.81 3.24  4.26
catalonia 1.42 1.91 2.78 4.02 5.68 6.59 7.72  8.39
extremadura 0.41 0.56 0.81 1.06 1.28 1.46 1.73  2.09
galicia 0.21 0.32 0.54 0.87 1.15 1.32 1.62  2.29
la rioja 0.80 1.56 2.81 4.80 6.37 7.35 8.54  8.87
madrid 2.28 3.02 4.43 6.22 7.69 7.90 8.50  8.75
murcia 1.44 1.54 2.82 4.59 5.96 6.64 7.62  8.58
navarra 1.14 1.72 3.33 5.04 6.19 7.00 7.36  7.35
Valencia 0.55 1.20 2.12 3.38 4.72 5.45 6.16  8.01
Total 0.94 1.33 2.06 3.07 4.07 4.63 5.24  6.19
Source: based on data from otero et al., 2010.
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It is clear that immigration changes the patterns of distribution of national wealth; 
its impact is different depending on one’s place in the socioeconomic structure. 
Thus, the decrease in costs of certain goods and services and the increase in real 
estate income or business profits that may result from the arrival of immigrants 
(especially through their integration in different markets: labour, housing, etc.) are 
particularly beneficial for the more affluent classes, while groups at the bottom of 
the social structure may face growing competition for employment and greater 
difficulty in access to scarce resources (services, public facilities, housing, etc.).
The precarious economic situation of many immigrants, along with 
discrimination in the housing market — principally rental (difficulties in 
finding housing in habitable conditions for an affordable price) — on occasion 
leads to the appearance of areas of substandard housing, crowding, exploitation 
and in general, the continued use of housing stock that is often close to the end 
of its useful life, permitting property owners to continue obtaining income 
from this substandard stock (Martínez Veiga, 1999). The phenomena resulting 
from the concentration of immigrants in disadvantaged neighbourhoods are 
multiple and their effects persistent over time; thus, we increasingly see those 
sectors of the native population who can, fleeing these neighbourhoods to 
escape the immigrant “ghetto”, aggravating the process of segregation. 
The strong trend toward residential segregation, as well as the appearance of 
an increasing number of neighbourhoods in which the immigrant population 
has come to represent a significant proportion of the population in a short 
time, magnify the perception of competition over social resources, one of the 
clearest indicators of the differentiated impact that immigration has on 
different social classes.
 6.2. immigration and the social sustainability of the welfare regime
There has been much debate in international studies on the extent to which 
immigration is a threat to the social legitimacy of the welfare state. Some 
authors argue that immigration is an intrinsic problem for the social viability 
of the welfare state (Freeman, 1986). Nationalistic and protectionist, the 
welfare state can only be sustained by a strong sense of belonging to a closed 
community whose membership is based on relationships of solidarity and 
support for redistribution (Myrdal, 1960). In fact, welfare states in different 
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countries have developed in close relationship with the institutionalization of 
specific citizenship regimes. Immigration, which in contrast, follows the open 
logic of the market and international demand for labour, alters the social basis 
of solidarity, thus, calling into question the welfare state itself.
This argument can be broken down into two areas of tension: tension between 
heterogeneity and redistribution and tension between recognition and 
redistribution (Banting, 2000). The former refers to the danger that an increase 
in ethnic diversity poses for gaining public support for welfare policies (Miller, 
1995; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). According to this argument, ethnic 
diversity weakens the welfare state because it is difficult to generate trust and 
solidarity among individuals of different ethnic or cultural groups. If there is 
less of a sense of belonging to a national community in ethnically diverse 
societies, it is difficult for the population to believe in solidarity between 
citizens. As a result, there will be less support for the welfare state and 
redistributive policies. This hypothesis is supported by the historical evidence 
that shows that welfare states offering broad social rights have developed in 
ethnically homogenous countries characterized by the existence of strong 
trade unions, whereas more limited welfare states have emerged in contexts 
characterized by ethnic fragmentation.
The second source of tension appears between multicultural policies and welfare 
policies. Public support for redistribution is weakened by the establishment of 
multicultural policies based on the recognition of cultural or ethnic identities 
and the granting of rights to disadvantaged minorities. Defenders of this thesis 
argue that the establishment of multicultural policies has three negative effects on 
welfare policy: 1) it diverts time, energy and money from redistribution toward 
multicultural policies; 2) it erodes solidarity between citizens and therefore, 
support for redistributive policies, and 3) it produces a mistaken diagnosis of the 
problems minorities face (Barry, 2001; Wolfe and Klausen, 1997). 
The tension between principles of individual freedom and group rights is 
common throughout the history of liberal political theory: there are two types 
of liberalism, one based on individual rights (Rawls, 1971) and the other which 
recognizes collective rights (Young, 1990). Proponents of the latter understand 
that disadvantaged ethnic or cultural minorities cannot achieve equality merely 
through the exercise of their individual rights, either because they have specific 
cultural needs or because they suffer systematic discrimination. As a result, 
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there is a specific type of inequality which cannot be dealt with using the 
generic tool of universal individual rights. Proponents of the former argue that 
giving special attention to certain groups can undermine universalism (Wolfe 
and Klausen, 1997). By using measures of positive discrimination for groups 
suffering from certain inequalities, others may feel they are being discriminated 
against. This permits extreme right parties to co-opt the anti-immigrant 
feelings of broad sectors of the autochthonous population (Freeman, 1986).
The hypothesis of the decline of solidarity has been challenged both in its 
initial version – as an effect of cultural diversity (Boeri et al., 2002; Van 
Oorschot and Uunk, 2007) – and in its second version – as an effect of 
multicultural policies (Banting and Kymlicka, 2004). The results of empirical 
studies reveal, however, conflicting conclusions. In their comparison of OECD 
countries with or without multicultural policies, Banting and Kymlicka (2004) 
did not find evidence that multicultural policies tended to erode the welfare 
state. In fact, countries with the most solid multicultural policies had the most 
solid welfare schemes. In contrast, a study by the same authors on Canada 
regarding levels of trust among residents of different neighbourhoods found, 
in line with the findings of Putnam (2004) for the United States, that levels of 
citizen trust declined in proportion to the increase in ethnic diversity in the 
neighbourhoods they studied (Banting and Kymlicka, 2004).
Regardless, the outcome of the debate between proponents and opponents of 
the negative effects of immigration on the welfare state is not conclusive. 
Nevertheless, analysis of the attitudes of the autochthonous population should 
be framed within this debate. Confirmation of the first tension means that 
countries with greater immigration flows would have less favourable attitudes 
toward immigrants and would be less supportive of the welfare state. The 
second tension implies that the welfare state would face a greater risk of 
cutbacks in countries with multicultural policies. Given that Spain has had 
an extraordinary increase in its immigrant population since 2000, one would 
expect, according to the first hypothesis, a proportional increase in negative 
attitudes toward immigration. In addition, although Spain is not characterized 
by multicultural policies, it does have social assistance schemes based on the 
principle of need, the results of which are that certain immigrant groups are 
more likely to receive assistance due to their more precarious situation. The 
perception of overrepresentation of immigrants among beneficiaries of 
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assistance and subsidies can be understood as a form of positive discrimination 
and can lead to distrust among the autochthonous population. 
In the following section, we will analyze the opinions and attitudes of 
Spaniards toward the presence of immigrants in Spain using data from the 
2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008 waves of the European Social Survey (ESS). This 
data, based on a standard questionnaire developed for all of Europe, allows us 
to observe not only the evolution of attitudes over these years, but also to 
analyze them in relation to other European countries. However, the data 
produced from these surveys must be treated with caution because of the 
simplification and rigidity of possible responses restricting the opinions 
expressed by the participants and because of normative principles sanctioning 
xenophobic attitudes, which lead participants to provide socially acceptable 
responses (Colectivo Ioé, 2005; Cea D’Ancona, 2004). As a result, we will 
compare the data from the European Social Survey with the results from other 
surveys and qualitative studies carried out recently in Spain in order to provide 
greater nuance and even question the results of the ESS. 
  6.2.1. tolerance towards immigrants in spain
The data from the ESS between 2002 and 2008 show that in general, attitudes 
toward immigration in the Mediterranean countries (Spain, Portugal and Greece) 
are less positive than in the countries of central and northern Europe. This is 
especially reflected in three questions asking respondents about their attitudes 
toward allowing immigrants to come and live in their country: ‘To what extent 
do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as 
most [country] people to come and live here? How about people of a different 
race or ethnic group from most [country] people? How about people from the 
poorer countries outside Europe?’ The majority of the Spanish population said 
that they would prefer to allow the entrance of only a few immigrants of a race 
or ethnic group different from their own; while in northern and central European 
countries the preference for allowing the entrance of some immigrants 
predominates. Graph 6.5 clearly reflects this differentiated pattern; the peaks 
on the left represent the countries of central and northern Europe and the peaks on 
the right represent the Mediterranean countries. Greece and Sweden appear 
as the prototypical countries for each profile. The higher relative levels and rapid 
pace of immigration in Southern European countries in recent years could be 
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associated with the majority attitude in these countries of greater reticence 
toward immigration; however, the case of Italy, which with similar migratory 
flows presents an attitude more in consonance with Northern European countries, 
contradicts this explanation. In addition, if we consider the proportion of extreme 
responses to the same question, we find that Spain stands out in comparison to 
the whole of Europe by the lower proportion of opinions most strongly against 
immigration. In this survey we can see that in 2002, Spain presented a significant 
level of responses in favour of ‘allowing many immigrants of a different race or 
ethnic group to enter the country’, behind only Sweden and Italy. There were 
also fewer Spanish who chose the response “do not allow any immigrants to 
enter”; in this case Spain was behind only Sweden and Germany. In this regard, 
although the majority of the Spanish population is more reticent toward 
immigration than that of the north of Europe, Spain has a smaller group holding 
xenophobic opinions and a larger group with more favourable opinions toward 
immigration than other European countries. 
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The trends shown in the data from the ESS reflect, however, a general increase 
in anti-immigrant attitudes in all the countries surveyed. In Spain we can also 
see a gradual decline in the levels of tolerance (graph 6.6). The trend is toward 
an increase in those who do not want to allow the entry of any immigrants 
of an ethnic group different from their own: this response increased from 9% 
in 2002 to 15.5% in 2008. This gives Spain a high level of xenophobic 
responses, similar to the UK (14.5%), although still below the 25.2% found in 
Portugal and the 29% in Greece for the same year. At the same time, there has 
been a decrease in the number of those who would allow the entry of many 
immigrants: from 17% in 2002 to 10.8% in 2008.
These trends are even more apparent if we combine response categories. 
In 2002, the majority of Spanish surveyed had a positive opinion about the 
presence of immigrants in Spain. In addition, a majority were in favour of 
the entry of (‘many’ or ‘some’) immigrants, whether they were of similar 
racial or ethnic characteristics (55.5%) or not (52.7%). In 2008, the attitudes 
of the Spanish, as reflected in the ESS, were much more negative toward 
immigration: the majority favouring restricting the entry of immigrants 
whether of the same racial or ethnic group (57.8%) or not (56.6%). The 
question, ‘do immigrants make the country a better or worse place to live’ also 
gathered a relatively negative response (graph 6.7), 38.1% responding that 
immigration makes Spain worse, in comparison to 33.3% who said that the 
country improves with the arrival of immigrants. We can also see that between 
2002 and 2008 the percentages in the intermediate positions declined, which 
indicates a certain polarization of attitudes toward immigration, the curve 
tending to flatten while the extremes increase. 
Despite this increase in intolerance, other questions indicate that the Spanish 
maintain a relatively positive assessment of immigration. This is the case for 
questions regarding the consequences of immigration for Spain, in which we see 
more positive opinions which remain steady over time. Thus, in 2008, 43.1% of 
the surveyed were of the opinion that immigration had positive effects on the 
Spanish economy, which did not vary significantly from 2002 (44.1%), and 
53.2% thought that immigration enriched the cultural life of the country.
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graph 6.6
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Apparently, this positive assessment of the effects of immigration contradicts the 
increase in negative attitudes toward the entry of immigrants. In particular, 
the increase of respondents that say that ‘immigrants make the country a worse 
place to live’ – therefore thinking that immigration has negative effects on the 
receiving country — conflicts with the stable majority that thinks that immigrants 
make a positive contribution to the economy and cultural life of the receiving 
country. However, if we understand the question ‘do immigrants make 
the country a better or worse place to live?’ as an interpretation of those surveyed 
on the prevailing environment in the society and not so much as a general 
indicator of the individual attitude of the surveyed, the apparent paradox is 
resolved. Perceptions about the prevailing environment and the contribution of 
immigrants do not have to coincide; the same respondent can recognize the 
objective advantages that immigration brings to the country while also holding 
a negative assessment of the result, informed either by subjective elements or by 
the belief that immigration will result in disadvantages for him or herself in 
particular. This would explain the apparent contradiction between responses that 
reveal, on the one hand, a vision of Spain as worse off, and on the other, recognize 
the positive contribution that immigration makes to the economy and the culture. 
The image produced by the European Social Survey broadly coincides with that 
which emerges from other studies carried out in Spain. These studies have 
concluded that the Spanish population has a more positive image of immigration 
than the average for European countries (Anduiza, 2005; Martínez-Herrera and 
Moualhi, 2005).
These studies also reveal a gradual increase in xenophobic attitudes in Spain 
(Cea D’Ancona, 2004, 2005, 2007; Cea D’Ancona and Vallés, 2008.2 2009) 
and an attachment to cultural uniformity (Ayerdi and Diaz de Rada, 2008). 
The evolution in attitudes captured by public opinion barometers by the CIS 
reveals a growing concern about immigration in Spain; in 2006 immigration 
became the issue which most concerned the Spanish, mentioned by some 59% 
of respondents. In addition, in November 2005, the CIS barometer indicated 
that 60% of the Spanish thought that there were too many foreigners living in 
Spain, while one third (33%) thought that there were a lot of foreigners but not 
too many. However, as Méndez also points out, we should not exaggerate the 
importance of the presence of immigration on the list of problems most cited 
by the Spanish. The increase in concern about immigration coincides with the 
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presence of this issue in the media and in public debate (Méndez, 2008). Thus, 
moments of greater concern about immigration are produced after periods of 
intense television and press coverage, but concern then falls back to earlier 
levels. The consolidation of immigration as one of the issues of greatest 
concern to the Spanish began in 2004. 
Concern over immigration does not in itself indicate xenophobia, as it can 
refer to both anti-immigrant attitudes as well as concern about the difficult 
living conditions of the immigrant population. As a result, although there are 
some differences depending on the respondents’ ideological position — with 
a certain predominance of the centre-right and the right — we cannot say that 
these differences are very great.(38) In contrast, concern over the issue of 
immigration is correlated with the percentage of immigrants in autonomous 
communities (the correlation index for 2005 was 0.4) and the age and education 
level of respondents (Méndez, 2008: 10-12).
The increase in intolerance appears to be more clearly measured by other 
questions on the CIS barometer. Cea D’Ancona argues that the barometer 
has lost its effectiveness as an indicator of xenophobia, given that since 2002 
there has hardly been any variation in the majority response regarding the 
acceptance of ‘permitting the entry of only those that have work contracts’ 
(eight of every ten surveyed in agreement in 2007). The author proposes, in 
contrast, the usefulness of the question “Are the laws too lenient?” to discern 
different attitudes regarding immigration. In fact, this question became an 
indirect indicator of xenophobia between 1996 and 2008. 
This question from the CIS barometers reflects above all an increase in 
public support for more restrictive policies. A broad and growing sector 
supports the idea that Spain’s immigration policies are too lenient. In 2008, 
42% of those surveyed for the barometer held this opinion, an increase of 
18 points from the 2004 barometer (24%). These surveys also record an 
increase in support for the expulsion of unemployed immigrants (14% 
were strongly in support of this in 2008, in comparison with 7% in 2005) 
and for sending immigrants back to their countries of origin if they are 
undocumented (16% in 2008, four points more than in 2007 – CIS 
(38) On the other hand, there is a clear relationship between ideological position and the perception of the number of 
foreigners residing in Spain: the more to the right, the greater is the percentage of survey respondents that are of the 
opinion there are too many immigrants (Méndez, 2008).
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barometer, November 2005; CIS-OBERAXE survey, 2008). In addition, a 
qualitative study based on focus groups revealed unanimous agreement on 
the need to increase immigration control (González-Enríquez and Álvarez 
Miranda, 2005).
Despite these general trends, the opinions and attitudes toward immigration 
reveal significant differences. The studies include three primary factors 
that structure individual opinion: cultural capital, ideological position and 
social class (Ayerdi and Díaz de Rada, 2008; Méndez, 2008; Cea D’Ancona 
and Vallés, 2009). Ayerdi and Díaz de Rada detected the closest association 
between education level and attitudes toward immigration. Individuals 
with lower levels of education reveal the highest level of “rejection” of 
immigration, probably because they are more concerned about its possible 
material repercussions. 
   6.2.2. opinions regarding immigrants’ ‘monopolization’ of public 
services
The data presented in chapter 3 show that immigrants use welfare state 
subsidies and services to a lesser extent than do Spanish nationals. However, 
the majority of the Spanish believe the opposite. Given that opinions regarding 
the ‘monopolization’ of public assistance were not recorded in the ESS, in this 
section we will refer to other studies, including both surveys and qualitative 
research (Cea D’Ancona, 2004, 2005 and 2007). Regarding surveys recently 
published in Spain, three studies have included questions on immigrants’ use 
of public services: IESA (2006), CIS-OBERAXE (2007) and CIS-OBERAXE 
(2008). Regarding quantitative studies we will refer in particular to the 
MEXEE project (Cea D’Ancona and Vallés, 2008a and b) and the Informe 
sobre el racismo y la xenofobia en España del año 2009 [2009 Report on 
Racism and Xenophobia in Spain] (Cea D’Ancona and Vallés, 2009), which is 
a synthesis of and comparison of all the above.
According to the three surveys cited, a majority of the autochthonous population 
has an image of the immigrant as a ‘usurper’ of public resources. The data shows 
that a majority of the population perceives immigrants as receiving ‘more’ or ‘a lot 
more’ than they contribute. The sum of both these responses was 54% in 2007 and 
52% in 2008 (graph 6.8). This is similar to what is found in other European 
countries, with welfare benefits being associated with ethnic minorities and the 
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welfare state being seen as ‘something for “them” paid for by “us”’(Freeman, 
1986: 62). In addition, the CIS-OBERAXE survey (2008) showed that immigrants 
are perceived as the group that is most protected by the state, with 40% of the 
surveyed agreeing that they receive ‘enough’ assistance, far ahead of the groups 
that are the traditional beneficiaries of public aid (graph 6.9).  
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In this same survey, 50% of participants were of the opinion that immigrants 
receive more education-related assistance (financial aid for books and meals) 
than the Spanish, even when income levels are similar, and 46% were of the 
same opinion regarding healthcare (CIS, 2008). Consistent with these opinions, 
earlier surveys reveal that (CIS 2007, IESA 2005, IESA 2006) the discourse in 
favour of giving Spanish nationals preference regarding social benefits is much 
more widespread in regards to education than healthcare. Seventy-eight per cent 
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of those surveyed in the IESA 2006 survey think that Spanish parents should be 
given preference for school choice. The fact that there are fewer respondents 
who think that immigrants use more resources in healthcare than in education 
may mean that the respondents’ direct experiences with the healthcare system 
have contributed to breaking down these false perceptions. As a result, the 
opinion that immigrants monopolize educational benefits will be more dominant 
because only a part of those surveyed have school-age children and therefore, 
direct contact with the educational sphere.
graph 6.9
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Source: d’ancona and Vallés, 2009 and 2008 cIS-oberaXe survey.
In contrast to the above surveys, focus groups in the MEXEE study reveal that 
the national preference discourse is used more often in relation to healthcare 
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services than education, which is an argument for the idea that ‘the autochthonous 
population perceives itself as being discriminated against’ (Cea D’Ancona and 
Vallés, 2009: 146). These results contradict the thesis that contact between the 
autochthonous and immigrant population is important in reducing prejudice, 
and in contrast, they reinforce the opposite hypothesis of conflict, which will be 
explained next.
A majority of those surveyed also agree that immigrants reduce the quality 
of social protection systems. Along with the idea that immigrants 
monopolize services and benefits, there is also the suspicion that they 
abuse or overuse the public services offered, contributing to their collapse. 
In the CIS-OBERAXE survey for September-October 2008, 52% strongly 
agreed or agreed with the statement that ‘the presence of immigrants 
decreases the quality of healthcare services’. Some 50% believe that ‘the 
quality of education is worse in schools where there are many children of 
immigrants’.
Paradoxically, despite immigration being associated with a decline in the 
quality of social benefits, those surveyed in the CIS (2007) and CIS-
OBERAXE (2008) studies were less and less likely to agree with the 
statement that ‘the government should invest more in places where there are 
a lot of immigrants so that healthcare does not worsen’. Thus, the sum of the 
answers ‘strongly agree’ and ‘tend to agree’ declined from 79% in 2007 to 
75% in 2008. This slight decline of four percentage points (and three points 
in the case of public education) is remarkable, as Cea D’Ancona and Vallés 
point out, given that in these questions ‘the easy and predictable answer 
would be to agree’ (Cea D’Ancona and Vallés, 2009: 282).
Studies on the issue explain these xenophobic attitudes as related to 
perceptions among some sectors of the autochthonous population of being 
in competition with or threatened by the immigrant population. Such a threat 
could be understood as competition over access to jobs and social services 
(education, healthcare and housing) or as cultural, religious or identitarian 
in nature. This fits with the classic theory most frequently invoked to explain 
attitudes toward immigrants, group conflict theory (Campbell, 1965), which 
argues that the perception of ‘zero sum’ competition between groups 
translates into the perception of a threat which feeds prejudices and negative 
stereotypes among the members of one group regarding the other. The 
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perception of threat is supported by qualitative studies in Spain, which 
indicate that a wide majority of those surveyed perceive the immigrant as a 
rival or competitor regarding access to benefits and public services (Cea 
D’Ancona 2009; Cea D’Ancona and Vallés, 2008b). 
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As a consequence, the desire to grant rights to immigrants declines and 
opposition to any favourable treatment of immigrants increases (González-
Enríquez y Álvarez Miranda, 2005). Measures of positiv  discrimination 
which favour immigrants are considered by a part of the autochthonous 
population to be discriminatory (Ce  D’Ancona a d Vallés, 2009). These 
studies v rify the existence of a discourse in defence of giving priority to the 
autochth nous population over foreigners: 
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‘…[public services] that the autochthonous feel to be their own, 
not recognizing the legitimacy of the immigrant to enjoy them. 
“They just arrived”, “they didn’t contribute to paying for them, as 
our parents and grandparents did…” are the common arguments 
used to justify giving priority to the autochthonous over the 
foreigner’ (Cea D’Ancona and Vallés, 2009: 256). 
Given that different classes live under different conditions, the perception of 
conflict varies based on social class. There is broad consensus that the perception 
of competition and that immigrants monopolize public resources is more 
widespread among individuals with lower levels of education and income 
(Ayerdi and Díaz de Rada, 2008). These authors suggest that since immigration is 
concentrated within sectors of the working class, both skilled and unskilled, it 
is in this sector where one would expect to find greater perceptions of competition 
between natives and immigrants. Spanish professionals and those in management, 
therefore, are less likely to have xenophobic attitudes. Cea D’Ancona and Vallés 
(2009) also conclude that education level has a significant impact on discourses 
regarding nationals having preference in access to benefits and services. Thus, 
there is a 35 percentage point difference between the majority favourable to this 
position among individuals with low education levels (75%) and those persons 
with intermediate or higher levels of education (40%). 
The idea that immigration is a threat is based less on objective situations than 
on beliefs and perceptions (Méndez, 2008; Cea D’Ancona and Vallés, 2008b, 
2009). This is reflected in the influence of variables that structure perceptions 
such as the social class, age, religiosity and ideology of those surveyed; 
intolerance is greater among those with a lower education and income, who 
are older, more religious and hold ideological positions on the right. Regarding 
this, Boeri et al. (2002) in a study on Italy concluded that anti-immigrant 
attitudes are more the result of racial intolerance than economic concerns.
 6.3. conclusions
In this chapter we have discussed the complexity of analyzing the economic 
impact of immigration on the host country given all of the factors that must be 
taken into consideration, as well as their interrelationships. Immigration has 
been one of the principal elements promoting economic growth in Spain in 
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recent years, although it is certainly possible to raise criticisms regarding the 
sustainability of the model of economic development followed in Spain in 
recent decades. However, in no way is it possible to hold immigrants responsible 
for the negative implications of this model, as they have only responded to the 
demand for unskilled labour from a broad range of economic sectors in 
Spanish society. Any transformation of the production model proposed for the 
future must take into account the supply of immigrant workers settled in Spain 
in recent years, the majority of whom have come to stay.
Overall, a clear consensus can be found among scholars regarding the positive 
impact of immigrants on the financing of social protection systems during the 
initial stages of immigrant settlement, due to their youth and therefore, their 
availability to enter the labour market. As the migratory process matures and 
the sociodemographic structures of immigrant groups converge with those 
of the autochthonous population, these positive effects will be moderated until 
they practically disappear. However, there is no empirical evidence that shows 
that immigrant populations will end up becoming a burden for the welfare 
states of receiving societies.
The data presented in chapter 3 contradict the arguments that immigrants abuse 
and overuse benefits and social services. Social perceptions, however, function 
to a great extent in an autonomous manner. Data show that a considerable 
percentage of the Spanish population is of the opinion that immigrants receive 
more from the welfare state than they contribute, and they are reluctant to 
concede social rights to these citizens. Some 50% of those interviewed for the 
2008 CIS survey thought that immigrants receive more education-related 
assistance than the Spanish do, even when income levels are similar, and 46% 
shared the same opinion regarding healthcare (CIS, 2008). 
A majority of the surveyed also supported establishing access mechanisms 
that would favour the autochthonous population: 78% of those consulted in 
2006 agreed that Spanish parents should have preference when choosing a school 
(IESA, 2006). This indicates that politicians must be conscious that a part of 
the citizenry does not support (or even directly rejects) measures to integrate 
immigrants, particularly if these include measures of positive discrimination 
favourable to the immigrant population.
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In the context of today’s budgetary constraints and spending cuts, health 
authorities will have to pay special attention to the concentration of demand in 
certain points of the healthcare system (hospital emergency services, healthcare 
centres in areas with a high concentration of immigrants) in order to avoid the 
political manipulation of sectors of the autochthonous population who feel 
they are in competition with immigrants for scarce resources. In the area of 
personal social services, such arguments may be even stronger as the lack 
of definition within this sector and particularly, its traditional lack of resources 
fuel this perception of competition between Spanish nationals and immigrants. 
However, it is in the educational sphere where the discourse of national 
preference appears more entrenched; thus, it can be a considerable obstacle for 
public policies aimed at promoting equal educational opportunities at the 
expense of reducing freedom of school choice. Many Spanish parents oppose 
measures in favour of a more even distribution of immigrant students among 
schools because they believe that their presence lowers the quality of the 
education their children receive.
In all of these policy areas, it is not enough to present the facts in order to 
overcome the perception that immigrants are a threat and in competition with 
the native-born population. Although the intensity of anti-immigrant sentiment 
appears to be associated with education level and how well-informed those 
surveyed are, it also stems from ideological and religious beliefs, which are 
much more resistant to change. 
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 Vii.  conclusions: the challenges and 
opportunities immigration poses  
for the welfare state
 
 7.1. General conclusions
The opening of social protection programmes to immigrants by the Spanish 
welfare state has been relatively effective given its characteristics and 
limitations. However, the incorporation of immigrants into the welfare state, 
whether through contributory or direct assistance channels, has been limited 
in intensity and breadth. We can thus speak of a ‘subordinate construction of 
immigrants’ social rights’ (Carrasco y Rodríguez Cabrero, 2005). In the 
institutional framework of the Spanish welfare system, characterized by a dual 
form of income support (contributory/universal) which creates a polarization 
of its clientele (Ferrera, 1996), the opportunity for immigrants to benefit from 
the system are limited by the fact that so many of them are employed in 
unprotected sectors of the labour market. Generally immigrants who work and 
are affiliated with the social security system have temporary contracts entitling 
them to short periods of unemployment; while the immigrant population that 
works in the informal economy only has access to social assistance through 
municipalities and third sector organizations. Moreover, immigrant clientele 
face discrimination and ethnic exclusion in the use of benefits and services. A 
clear example of this is found in the dynamics of school segregation, which 
tend to concentrate immigrant children in public schools.
There is no doubt that the non-EU foreign population works and lives in more 
precarious conditions than the autochthonous population (with a higher 
incidence of participation in the informal economy, temporary contracts, etc) 
and are, therefore, more prone to suffer the risks of socioeconomic exclusion. 
Illustrating this is the way in which these groups have been hit much harder by 
the present economic crisis, their unemployment rate increasing to close to 
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30% in comparison to an unemployment rate of 18% among the autochthonous 
population. This would lead to the conclusion that their level of dependence on 
social protection systems must be quite high and therefore, the cost of such 
coverage considerably high as well. However, we have found that the immigrant 
population not only does not rely heavily on the different existing social 
protection programmes but in fact they are generally underrepresented among 
the beneficiaries of most social protection schemes in proportion to their 
relative weight in the population. In addition, available data show that the 
fiscal balance of immigration based on their contribution to public finances 
and the cost of benefits and social services they receive is clearly positive. This 
is largely explained by the younger age of the immigrant population, which 
therefore has less need for healthcare services, pensions, etc. In a certain 
sense, immigration has been ‘a stroke of luck’ for the social security system, 
as immigrants’ contributions have permitted the adoption of certain necessary 
reforms with greater margin for reflection and greater consensus; but this of 
course does not provide a definitive solution to the problem of the systems’ 
future financial sustainability.
The immigrant population has become a structural component of Spanish society. 
Since the beginning of the economic crisis that has affected the Spanish economy, 
with particular intensity since 2008, migratory flows have slowed down, but this 
does not mean they are going to disappear. Family reunification will continue, 
and the flow of economic immigrants will likely increase again when the 
economy begins to show signs of recovery. While some of the foreigners settled 
in Spain will decide to return to their country of origin or emigrate to other 
developed countries looking for better job opportunities, the majority of those 
now settled form an integral and structural part of the Spanish population.
The so-called “call effect” exists, but it is not a result of the existence of 
generous social programmes in the host country, but rather is associated above 
all with employment opportunities. The model of economic growth in place in 
Spain during recent decades, based on the development of labour intensive 
sectors with low productivity, required a large labour supply, and the arrival of 
immigrants from developing countries responded to this demand. Moreover, a 
deficit in the provision of care produced by the growing incorporation of 
women into the labour force, aggravated by a weak institutional response in 
the face of this change, generated a need for female workers in the domestic 
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sector that was largely complementary to the demand for male workers 
generated by sectors such as construction and agriculture.
The immigration of recent decades has permitted the reproduction of this 
model of growth, but at the same time it has created a “new social division and 
a new division of labour” (Carrasco and Rodriguez Cabrero, 2005) in which 
immigrants form a new Spanish proletariat. Immigrant labour has aided the 
transition of autochthonous workers toward jobs with better conditions and 
has facilitated the participation of women in the labour force. 
Immigrant workers were incorporated into a pre-existing economic system and 
responded to a demand for labour generated by Spanish companies and families. 
We cannot attribute the low productivity of the Spanish economic system to 
immigration or accuse immigrants of having made it difficult to adopt the 
measures necessary to transform this model. It was not the existence of abundant 
labour supply that determined business strategies, but rather the demand for 
unskilled labour launched by economic actors (employers and families) that 
largely contributed to the generation of immigration. With their labour, 
immigrants have contributed to the survival (at least temporarily) of economic 
sectors that would otherwise have succumbed to international competition, in 
this way generating wealth and helping to maintain higher skilled and better paid 
jobs for autochthonous workers. At the same time, they have carried out their 
migration projects although under precarious conditions and on occasion open 
exploitation, and frequently have started their own businesses. The phenomenon 
of “ethnic entrepreneurship” should lead us to consider the consequences of 
immigration in terms of the importation of human capital, given that a 
considerable number of economic immigrants have qualifications and /or skills 
that are potentially useful for the Spanish economy.
From an academic perspective it is possible to raise a theoretical debate about 
the extent to which it would have been possible to develop a different model 
of economic growth, one based on autochthonous labour (increasing the 
economic activity rate, particularly that of women) and directed toward sectors 
that are capital-intensive, technology-intensive and/or knowledge-intensive, 
as well as toward the creation of a professionalized system of personal social 
services. What is certain, in any case, is that today those millions of foreign 
residents now living in Spain form part of the Spanish employment problem 
and will also have to be part of its solution.
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In changing from an economic model of labour-intensive sectors of low added 
value to a knowledge economy of high-added value and greater competitiveness, 
the challenge will be to increase and improve the education and specialization 
of Spanish workers (autochthonous and immigrant) and to create jobs 
appropriate for their qualifications. The key to developing a more competitive 
growth pattern will be to reduce unemployment while also increasing the 
activity rate and productivity.
Cost-benefit analyses of immigration are extremely complex given the difficulty 
in considering all the variables involved. Despite this, all analysis on this issue 
suggests that the net economic effects of immigration on the receiving society 
are positive. Immigration contributes in diverse ways to economic development: 
favouring an increase in employment (through an increase in the active 
population and women’s activity rate, decreasing rigidities in the labour market); 
improving per capita income (through the influence on activity and employment 
rates); contributing to state finances (through direct and indirect taxes, as well as 
contributions to social security); favouring increased consumption and 
encouraging the creation of new businesses.
Contrary to what has been argued on occasion (Reher and Sanchez, 2009), 
immigrants do not make their decisions about migrating based on the 
“generosity” of social services. There is no empirical evidence whatsoever 
suggesting a relationship between the volume of migration flows and the level 
of guaranteed social protection in a country. On the contrary, various studies 
have shown that immigrants look for monetary income, so they search for 
areas where they have the greatest possibility of finding work and not where 
there is a more generous social protection system (Amuedo-Dorantes and De 
la Rica, 2005; Garci Gomez and Lopez-Casanova, 2006).
 7.2. challenges for the future
In the near future, Spanish society will face a series of challenges stemming 
from the important migratory flows it has experienced in recent years. 
Transforming new residents into citizens with full rights so that they become 
an integral part of the society while maintaining their own culture is the 
complex goal to achieve. Spain is, in fact, in a similar juncture to that of other 
European countries that are currently trying to define or redefine their models 
concluSIonS: the challengeS and opportunItIeS ImmIgratIon poSeS for the Welfare State 169
of incorporation to address a complex and changing social reality. The 
settlement of nearly six million new residents has not only meant an increase 
in the population but also an increase in cultural and ethnic heterogeneity. It 
implies an increase in demand for benefits and services but also the appearance 
of problems of adjustment between supply and demand in the area of welfare.
The intercultural approach of the Spanish central government in recent years 
aims to recognize the right to a distinct cultural identity, but also seeks to avoid 
practices which will separate communities. In this context, the different social 
protection programs must address a number of challenges which raise questions 
regarding the way they function as well as their future sustainability.
•  Growing ethnic and cultural heterogeneity means that social protection 
systems must pay greater attention to inequalities. Improving data 
generation systems, as well as implementing mechanisms to respond to 
these inequalities should permit different welfare programmes to adapt to a 
population with diverse needs. Such adaptation should include the training 
of professionals to manage diversity, as well as the establishment of systems 
for linguistic and cultural mediation; in general these measures would need 
to be developed within a broader framework of initiatives to overcome 
inequality targeting the entire population. 
•  In the healthcare sphere, the first objective should be to eliminate barriers in 
access to the healthcare system (making it easier to obtain a health card, 
expanding hours during which appointments can be made, etc.), which 
currently prevent its de facto universalization. As we have seen in this study, 
immigrants are at present in better health than the autochthonous population, 
between 30% and 50% less likely to state that they have fair to poor health, 
suffer from a chronic illness or disability or face limitations in their daily 
activities due to health. In this regard, Latin Americans and East Europeans 
are in relatively better health than immigrants from Africa. The primary 
reason for this difference in subjective health lies in the younger age of these 
groups with respect to the autochthonous population. Once this ceases to be 
the case, their health will tend to be worse than that of the autochthonous 
population because of their poorer living conditions in Spain. 
 The healthcare system may contribute to the reduction of this difference 
through preventative care and public health measures that reduce the inequalities 
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in healthcare that affect these groups. Strengthening primary care would help 
to manage the peaks in demand for emergency healthcare services (which 
immigrants tend to use slightly more often than the autochthonous population); 
this would also help in managing demand in those primary care centres where 
there is a greater concentration of immigrants, resulting from residential 
segregation. In recent years the population has increased significantly in certain 
areas without healthcare resources keeping pace. This can lead to a deterioration 
of the healthcare provided, which has negative repercussions on the health of 
residents in these areas, as well as on social perceptions of the public healthcare 
system. Primary care is the most appropriate level for responding to inequalities 
in the use of the healthcare system by the immigrant population through 
initiatives promoting health and health education.
•  Institutional and financial deficits in the personal social services system are 
a serious handicap when it comes to developing mechanisms to respond to 
the challenges posed by immigration. While this area of social services tends 
to respond more closely to the problems arising from the precarious 
conditions in which some immigrant groups live, the scarcity of budgetary 
resources for most of these programs leads to restrictive practices in granting 
these benefits and services.
  As we saw in chapter 2, Spain spends less than 50% of the European average 
on these types of programmes and approximately 30% of what is spent by 
France or Sweden. In addition to real demand not being covered, the lack of 
funding for this area of social policy leads to the proliferation of stereotypical 
discourses claiming that the autochthonous population is ‘excluded’ from 
certain programmes (low-cost or free school lunches, public day-care centres, 
etc.), or that immigrants receive ‘preferential treatment’ from public authorities. 
Differences in these types of programmes among municipalities and 
autonomous communities also produce significant disparities depending on 
place of residence, which affect the disadvantaged, both immigrant and 
autochthonous. 
•  It is urgent to rethink education policy in relation to the perpetuation of 
social inequalities. In Spain, students of immigrant origin obtain poorer 
academic results than do autochthonous students (a 60 point difference on 
reading comprehension on the PISA 2009 tests); they are 2.1 times more 
likely to leave school early than their autochthonous classmates and are less 
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likely to continue in post-compulsory education (only 10% of immigrant 
students undertake post-compulsory studies). A low level of education 
reduces opportunities for insertion in the labour market, even more so for 
young people of different cultural and ethnic background. Although the 
poorer academic performance of immigrant students is a complex problem 
involving multiple factors, research in this regard is in agreement that school 
segregation is a key element. School segregation is worrying because it is an 
important determinant of educational opportunities for immigrant students. 
PISA results for Spain show that although average student results in private 
schools are 38 points higher than in public schools, the difference lies in the 
social composition of the student body, as the quality of education in both 
private and public schools is comparable. Students’ access to schools is 
mediated by selection dynamics involving both parents and schools. Curbing 
segregation, therefore, requires regulating both autochthonous parents’ 
freedom to choose schools as well as school admission policies. This is a 
controversial task which faces the explicit opposition of those who advocate 
educational freedom over the goals of equality and equity. 
•  Recognizing the role of immigrant women in the caregiving field is the first 
step toward improving the working and living conditions of this large 
group. As we have seen, women immigrants make up 81.3% of domestic 
caregivers for the elderly (Imserso, 2004), as autochthonous women avoid 
these jobs because of their low pay and difficult working conditions. As the 
majority of these jobs are live-in jobs, they have become an occupational 
niche for the most recent arrivals and for women immigrants from 
nationalities that are less integrated, not yet having been able to regularize 
their status. The consolidation of a system for the provision of care based 
on insecurity and informality has so far prevented the emergence of a 
labour market for professionalized care under decent working conditions. 
This sphere is potentially an important source of employment for a large 
number of workers in Spain, both immigrants and native-born. Increasing 
female labour force participation to European parameters will happen 
largely by overcoming this state of affairs. Both the reform of the domestic 
social security regime (by making the working conditions of those in this 
regime comparable to the working conditions of other workers) and the 
expansion of the programmes linked to development and implementation 
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of the ‘Dependency Law’ (Ley de Promoción de la Autonomía Personal y 
de Protección de las Personas en Situación de Dependencia) present a 
golden opportunity to move in that direction. Unfortunately, the budgetary 
constraints that threaten to seriously affect the implementation of such 
reforms complicate this scenario.
•  Although the possibilities for government intervention in this area are 
relatively limited, the consequences of the concentration of immigrants 
in certain neighbourhoods should be considered. As is well-known, 
the immigrant population is not distributed homogeneously throughout the 
country but is rather concentrated in certain regions, which contributes 
to the increase in demand for welfare benefits and services in these areas. 
The development or reinforcement of territorial stigmatization (associating 
negative behaviours and attitudes with residing in certain neighbourhoods) 
is a phenomenon that particularly affects immigrants, clearly limiting the 
opportunities (particularly employment opportunities) of the residents in 
these areas. This process, which is still in its infancy in Spain, has been 
studied extensively in societies with a longer history of migration; once 
crystallized it has required vigorous government action to address it.
•  As has been noted, the settlement of immigrant populations has drawn 
attention to problems in the balance of powers and responsibilities between 
different levels of government. One of the clearest examples of this is the 
imbalance in financial flows produced by the unequal division between 
the costs (who pays for benefits and services provided to new residents) 
and benefits of immigration (the mechanisms to collect and manage the 
f inancial resources generated by the presence of new contributors). 
The low level of funding from the Support Fund for the Reception and 
Integration of Immigrants and their Educational Support (Fondo de Apoyo 
para la Acogida, Integración y Refuerzo Educativo de los Inmigrantes) — 
200 million Euros annually since its consolidation to be distributed among 
autonomous communities and municipalities — as well as the relatively rigid 
processes of negotiation over autonomous and municipal financing cannot 
adequately resolve a problem that could have far-reaching negative 
consequences both in terms of a deterioration in public services (in areas 
where demand has risen without a corresponding increase in funding) and 
a resulting politicization of this deterioration.
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•  The danger of the ‘displacement’ of the most disadvantaged among the 
autochthonous population as a consequence of the arrival of new residents in 
even more precarious situations, as well as the flight of the middle class from 
public social protection systems (which come to be labelled as services for 
the poor) are two sides of the same coin related to shortages in human, 
material and ultimately financial resources for social protection programmes. 
If the authorities responsible for social protection systems do not respond 
flexibly to the increase in demand for services and benefits linked to the 
settlement of immigrants, this could result in growing alienation among 
the middle class (accelerating the previously existing process of opting 
for the market as the main service provider) as well as increasing anti-
immigrant sentiment among those who must continue to rely on public social 
protection schemes. The consequences of both are the politicization of 
immigration and the loss of legitimacy of the welfare state, threatening its 
sustainability in the medium and long-term.
•  The speed with which Spanish society has become a net receiver of migration 
flows, along with the absence of an organized and electorally successful 
extreme rightwing, has thus far resulted in the issue of immigration having a 
relatively low profile in the Spanish political agenda. This does not mean that 
the risk of the politicization of immigration through the mobilization and/or 
generation of anti-immigrant sentiment cannot occur in Spain. In most of the 
countries with a long history as recipients of migration flows, this issue has 
emerged (with greater or lesser virulence) on the political scene as part of a 
political strategy or for electoral gain. In terms of European politics, in recent 
years we have seen a rise in extremist rightwing parties with anti-immigrant 
discourses and mainstream conservative parties mobilizing xenophobia to 
strengthen their electoral base. At the same time, social democratic and 
liberal parties have responded cautiously to problems related to immigration 
for fear of being judged too lenient or generous toward immigrants, and 
leftwing parties have had to contend with a loss of a portion of their traditional 
electorate due to hostility toward immigration. These processes have 
contributed to influencing immigration policies adopted in much of Europe. 
In Spain the politicization of immigration has emerged primarily on the 
municipal level, with enrolment in municipal population registers (the main 
gateway to universalized social rights) as the main battleground.
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•  As we have also seen, the increase in cultural diversity brought about by 
immigration is causing a decline in favourable attitudes toward social 
solidarity and redistribution. A majority of the population believes that 
immigrants receive ‘more’ or ‘a lot more’ from the state than they contribute 
(the combined responses added up to 52% in 2008). In particular, 50% of 
those surveyed believed that immigrants receive more education-related aid 
than Spanish citizens, even if they have a similar income level, and 46% 
shared the same opinion regarding healthcare benefits.
 The autochthonous population might be reluctant to contribute with their 
taxes to redistributive schemes they think largely favour the immigrant 
population (regardless of the fact that this is far from the reality). In some 
European countries, such as the UK or the Netherlands, immigration has 
indirectly contributed to a reassessment of the effectiveness and axiological 
foundation of social policies. As we have been stating, the loss of social 
support for the welfare state calls into question the foundations on which its 
future prospects must be sustained. 
•  The existence of non-discriminatory mechanisms for social mobility that 
guarantee real equal opportunity for all (regardless of their social, cultural, 
ethnic or religious origin) is one element for the successful incorporation of 
immigrants in democratic societies. The widespread existence of prejudices 
and racist and xenophobic behaviour (albeit not always explicit) forms part 
of the explanation for the problems of alienation experienced by young 
‘second generation’ immigrants in diverse European countries in recent 
decades. Designing viable models for integration into the receiving society 
for these young people requires guaranteeing the possibility of upward social 
mobility for immigrants’ descendants as well as designing and implementing 
effective policies to fight discrimination (indirect as well as direct). In this 
regard, European societies face an extremely complex challenge for the 
future, and Spanish society is no exception, as the attitude of the Spanish 
population toward immigrants has become more negative in recent years. 
The area of social protection policies, with a central role in this process, must 
adjust its guidelines for action, taking into account the diversity stemming 
from the settlement of immigrants around two basic axes: equality (equal 
access to benefits and services) and equity (attainment of equality in 
outcomes, although this may mean differential treatment). 
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Throughout this study our aim has been to describe how immigration positions 
us to address structural problems in the Spanish welfare regime, revealing its 
weaknesses in the form of pressures being placed on the system, imbalances 
in resources and the inability to meet certain demands. But it has also revealed 
the strength of the system in its capacity to include newcomers while 
maintaining service coverage. The arrival of populations of immigrant origin 
is thus not only a challenge but also an opportunity to identify weaknesses in 
our social protection system and develop policies to address them, respond to 
new challenges and guarantee a sustainable future for the welfare state. 
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